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7INTRODUCTION
The Centre for Empirical Social Research within the Institute of Sociology and Social 
Policy, Corvinus University of Budapest, has recently fi nished conducting research 
under the title of “Survey on the Civic Integration of Immigrants” with support from 
the European Integration Fund. The aim was to explore the integration and political 
and civic participation of “third country nationals residing in Hungary” (hereafter, 
“immigrants” or “migrants”). How immigrants and Hungarian society interpret political 
and civic activity was examined, along with how this is correlated to their material, 
cultural and social resources (using such concepts as “identity” and “potential for action”, 
as well as the existence of a sense of fairness and dignity). Having recognized the role 
of civic society in the process of integration of immigrants, the European Union – in its 
Zaragoza Declaration1 – highlighted some indicators (such as civic participation) to be 
used in the evaluation of integration policies and asserted that the active participation 
of immigrants in the democratic process contributed to their integration. From among 
the indicators deemed important in the Zaragoza Declaration, researchers examined 
the eff ect of factors which aff ect the essence of “active citizenship” – such as trust in 
public institutions, electoral behaviour and a sense of attachment and identity.
People decide upon or are forced by their situations to opt for migration for a variety of 
reasons. Traditional theories claim that both push and pull factors infl uence the decision 
to migrate (Tóth 2001, Hárs 2001). Push factors cause migrants to leave a country; the 
direction of migration being determined by the attractive alternatives. These days, 
however, this paradigm of alienation from the country of origin and integration into the 
receiving country only partially contributes to international migration. Today, migration 
is more easily described using dynamic models, which use the concept of “migration 
chains” as a foundation (e.g. Boyd 1989, Kritz, Lim, and Zlotnik 1992, Melegh et al. 2009). 
Migration can occur periodically, be temporally limited and incomplete in a sociological 
sense, and attachment to the community of origin may survive in widely diverse forms.
Understanding the integration of immigrants and the road to naturalization can be 
approached from diff erent viewpoints (Bijl et al. 2008). Integration, on the one hand, is 
a legal, political process in the course of which the immigrant becomes endowed with 
rights and obligations similar to the majority of society in the host country, and becomes 
incorporated into the host country’s political community. On the other hand, it is a socio-
economic process, the key element of which is employment and taxation of the immigrant 
and participation in the host country’s economy. Thirdly, integration has a socio-cultural 
aspect which implies the building of a network of relations between the immigrant and 
the majority elements of society, as well as the immigrant’s accumulation of knowledge 
and potential acceptance of the language, customs and norms of the recipient country.
1 Statement of the ministers’ conference held in Zaragoza on the theme of the integration of immigrants, 
15/16 April 2010.
8The success or failure of the integrative process depends to an extent on the host 
society’s openness or level of prejudice. A recent opinion poll found that the evaluation 
of immigrants is the least positive in Hungary of all EU twenty-seven member countries.2 
This is all the more startling as, compared to the old EU members, the rate of immigration 
to Hungary is low. While immigrants from non-EU countries amount to nearly 4% of the 
total EU population, the corresponding fi gure is less than 1% for Hungary. Hungary has 
a special place in the international migration process: it is not exposed to signifi cant 
migration, but in the 1990’s it became the target country for certain groups that are 
signifi cant in terms of the phenomenon of globalization. There are a considerable 
number of unqualifi ed job-takers with temporary contracts; there are also quite a lot of 
well-qualifi ed “transitional” migrants and there are a growing number of women involved 
in international migration. The territorial distribution and concentration of migrants in 
and around Budapest corresponds to the geographic pattern of capital investment in the 
center of the country, in and close to the capital (Melegh et al. 2004).
Unlike other aspects of migration, little is known about the consequences of migration 
upon civic and political activity in contemporary democracies. In the context of the EU it 
is of signal importance to know how immigrants (often from politically non-democratic 
countries) infl uence the democratic political life and norms of the host country. Traditionally, 
civic activity is gauged by citizens’ electoral behavior, while the civic activity of immigrants 
awaiting naturalization has attracted little attention from researchers. In any case, it is not 
enough to examine civic activity in terms of electoral behavior, as non-electoral types of 
activity are gaining more prominence and power in modern societies. While the electoral 
behaviors of immigrants can only be examined for certain groups and in local aff airs, 
non-electoral forms of activity must be interpreted in a broader context (Paskeviciute and 
Anderson 2007). This type of political activity is particularly important because our research, 
besides Hungarian society, addressed immigrants who have come from a third country 
and who have not yet become citizens and have limited voting rights: they cannot vote in 
general elections, although some of them can participate in local elections. In addition to 
many pieces of international research on the topic of the political integration of immigrants, 
two investigations have also been conducted into this theme in Hungary recently.3
With the present research we tried to examine the correlation of the issue of migration 
with topics such as action potential, fairness, a sense of dignity and subjective well-
being. We laid stress on not treating immigrants and the host society separately; we did 
not want to speculate about the immigrants themselves, or to approach members of 
Hungarian society through their attitudes to immigration, but rather to examine these 
2 In spring of 2008 the “Eurobarometer 69” survey found that 10% of the Hungarian population agreed with 
the statement that “Immigrants contribute much to Hungary”, compared to an average of 44% for the EU.
3 The “LOCALMULTIDEM” research eff ort was based on special policy analyses, media analyses and individual 
and institutional surveys (2006–2009, Institute for Minority Research, HAS). The EIF-fi nanced research project 
“Immigrants in Hungary” examined the integration and strategies of six migrant groups in Hungary through 
questionnaire surveys (Örkény and Székelyi 2010). The individual survey part of both pieces of research was 
based on snowball sampling and same-size samples of migrant groups. 
9issues together, along the same lines, by mutually comparing them.  This approach 
allowed us to see how migrants’ political and civic activity is being shaped, and also, in 
what context this takes place (i.e. with what system, what values and what attitudes are 
immigrants becoming integrated).
ON THE RESEARCH
The research in this book therefore serves to highlight and compare the political and 
civic activity of immigrants versus Hungarian society. Though we also shed light on some 
causal connections, our research is primarily exploratory, with the following questions 
about migrants and – whenever relevant – Hungarian society – being investigated:
–  How do the original social, cultural and material resources of immigrants infl uence 
how they are equipped with similar resources in Hungary?
–  How do social, cultural and material resources infl uence the objective and 
subjective well-being of immigrants and of Hungarian society?
–  What is the individual’s sense of distributive and procedural justice; i.e. the 
perception of being fairly treated and receiving a fair redistribution of available 
resources - and how does this infl uence objective and subjective well-being?
–  How do resources infl uence the inclination to exit (in Hirschman’s sense of the term) 
and the sense of dignity of immigrants and of members of Hungarian society?
–  How is political and civic participation correlated to objective and subjective well-
being, to distributive and procedural justice (Klandermans et al. 2008) for migrants 
and the host community, and how does possession of resources infl uence this?
Figure 1 Research model on the immigrant-related issues and their inclination to political and 
civic participation
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The research was conducted in 2011 in several subsequent phases which combined 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. The backbone of the research was a 
representative survey of 1500 individuals with a ca. 30 minute questionnaire comprised 
two sub-samples: one of immigrants (n = 500) and one of host country individuals (n 
= 1000).
The pool from which the immigrant sample was taken was comprised of people 
over the age of eighteen coming from a “third country” who possessed a residence 
permit, an immigration permit, or a (national/ EC) permanent residence permit in 
Hungary. 
To make sure that the 500-member sub-sample of immigrants was representative, 
we fi rst received from the Central Offi  ce for Administrative and Electronic Public 
Services a random list of immigrants with permanent residence which represented 
the population of immigrants adequately by age, gender, country of origin and place 
of residence. From this list, 156 persons were selected using a multistage sampling 
process by settlement type. The other part of the immigrant sample (344 people) was 
identifi ed using the snowball method in the course of which composition by age, 
gender and country of origin was determined through the use of quotas. As a result, 
the fi nal sample adequately represented the above-specifi ed immigrant population of 
Hungary according to age, gender and country of origin).
The sampling of the Hungarian adult population was done by using stratifi ed 
multistage sampling. After defi ning the number of people from a stratum, the sample 
was created using the random walk method. First households, then individuals were 
selected. One thousand is the standard number of people for a research sample using 
the whole Hungarian population.
Interviewers visited an address at least three times for both sub-samples. To 
supplement unusable addresses, a supplementary and identically stratifi ed sub-
sample was created in the same way as the sample for the Hungarian population. After 
sampling, any distortions in data were corrected by weighting. Detailed information 
on the design and data collection method of the survey is available in the Appendix, 
together with a copy of the questionnaire itself.
A general question concerning surveys (with particular relevance when using 
a culturally diverse target group) is how the questions will be interpreted and how 
comparable the answers will be. Therefore, before the research commenced, we 
piloted the questions on the survey in cognitive interviews with fi ve immigrants and 
fi ve Hungarians to explore possibly culture-dependent infl uences. This was done using 
the so-called “think aloud” method, which reveals the cognitive path that leads to the 
fi nal answer. Using the fi ndings from the in-depth interviews we created the fi nal 
questionnaire. In addition, we also tested details on the survey through four interviews 
with experts.
To come closer to understanding the themes of “sense of fairness and justice” 
we utilized a qualitative approach to allow for a deeper understanding than would 
be possible from answers given to a questionnaire. We held focus group discussions 
11
with immigrants and Hungarian citizens. This research phase was complementary and 
aimed to support the interpretation of the survey. 
The chapters of this book include descriptive analyses and causal or regression 
models suitable for digging into the more complex connections, as well as explorative 
factor analyses, which uncover the underlying structure of opinions. This raises two 
technical questions: fi rst, how to compare two sub-samples of diff erent sizes created 
with diff erent sampling methods; and second, how to handle the diff erences caused 
by the diff erent socio-demographic structures. To what extent does the diff erence 
between the two samples mean real divergence, and to what extent can this be 
attributed to structural diff erences?
As for the fi rst question, choosing the statistical test to be used for the descriptive 
analyses was problematic. Chi square-based indicators (suitable for the examination 
of the association of categorical variables) are chiefl y used to compare groups taken 
from a single population with the same probability sampling method. T-test indicator 
(used for measuring diff erences of at least interval-level variables) was utilized because, 
once each category is made dichotomous, it is then suited for comparison using two 
independent sub-samples. The problem with this test is that it presupposes a normal 
distribution of variables (Hunyadi and Vita 2002) and is less reliable for samples of more 
than 30 members (Sajtos and Mitev 2006). Neither statistical test is thus perfect for 
comparing the results in the two sub-samples. However, it turned out in practice that 
the two tests produced similar results. When the two samples are directly compared 
(as described in the following chapters), these two statistical tests were primarily used; 
readers should take note of the above-described caveats4.
Additionally, regression and factor models were run separately for the two groups. 
To control the structural deviations between the two sub-samples, a shared model 
would have been suitable, but it was used only with limitations in our research. Another 
method for solving this problem is that used by Endre Sik in the ENRI-East5 research 
project; it is based on an “adjustment” of the majority sample to the composition of 
the immigrant sample (Sik 2012). As a result of this process, two samples of similar 
composition can be compared along the factors. This adjustment – namely, the re-
weighting of the majority sample – was done according to the composition of the 
immigrant sample by age, gender and residence (Budapest/not Budapest). However, 
the comparison between the re-weighted majority sample and the immigrant sample 
did not provide signifi cantly diff erent results from the results of the original majority vs. 
immigrant samples. Therefore the results of the original samples are later presented.
In the authors’ view, the samples presented in the following research do represent 
Hungarian society and those people staying in Hungary with immigration or residence 
4 Signifi cance level (p-values) of the statistical tests in the studies are indicated as follows: ****<0.001, 
***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1.
5 FP7-SSH collaborative research project (2008–2011); “Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities. 
Nations between States along the New Eastern Borders of the European Union”.
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permits/permanent residence (collectively labeled “immigrants”). It should be stressed 
that the immigrants we studied are not refugee camp dwellers or foreigners employed 
illegally in Hungary. Though themselves faced with a lot of problems, the immigrants 
we interviewed are in a far more favorable position than immigrants in typical refugee 
camps or migrants employed in the grey economy. This is an important fact to be 
remembered when reading about the research.
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The book is divided into three main parts. First it introduces the context of immigration 
and the factors determining the details of this phenomenon through the socio-
demographic and welfare characteristics of immigrants. Next, immigration and 
civic integration, civic activity are discussed using a qualitative approach. Finally the 
concepts of justice, dignity and action potential are examined on the basis of the survey 
results, along with an analysis of political and civic participation using the formerly-
analyzed concepts. Thus, the research described in the book is complementary; most 
quantitative analyses being a comparison of the status of Hungarian society compared 
to the immigrants.
In Part One, Dorottya Kisfalusi fi rst describes the sample of immigrants in terms 
of their socio-demographic features, social and cultural resources and motivation for 
migration. The most important statement about motivation for migration is that fi ve 
primary causes for leaving one’s native land can be identifi ed: the most frequently 
mentioned driver is family issues, followed by job-seeking, hopes for a higher standard 
of living, resumption of studies, and fi nally political, religious reason or war. Eleonóra 
Szanyi-F. meanwhile looks at material resources and their perception; i.e. the theme 
of objective and subjective well-being, when comparing Hungarian society and 
immigrants.
In Part Two, the partial results of two pieces of research done using qualitative 
methodology are presented. First, the fi ndings of earlier research – the results of “civic 
discussions” – are presented This research (from 2009) touched on several questions 
concerning the integration of immigrants so we thought that it had a place in this 
volume on account of the methodology it used, which involves the direct participation 
of both immigrants and members of Hungarian society. The fi ndings of the expert 
evaluations of the civic discussions from two years later are also briefl y analyzed.
Next, Éva Vépy-Schlemmer presents the results of an analysis of two confi rmative 
focus group surveys on the themes of fairness, justice, political and civic participation 
and action potential. An important conclusion of the analysis is that both Hungarian 
society and the immigrants have very similar opinions about distributive justice. Both 
groups report to suff ering grave and lasting procedural injustice. This fi nding may 
contribute signifi cantly to the shaping of the political thinking of migrants.
In Part Three, György Lengyel’s study explores how exit inclination and a sense of 
dignity correlate to economic, cultural and social resources across the whole of society 
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and for immigrants, and examines how these factors infl uence civic participation and 
subjective well-being. His fi ndings suggest that, owing to composition eff ects, for 
immigrants there is a higher rate of exit inclination and sense of dignity than for the 
host society, and there is less voice potential for them. Across the whole of society, it 
is not those whose dignity has suff ered but those who have a deeper sense of dignity 
that represent a greater voice potential.
Lilla Tóth examines the preconditions necessary for collective action and political 
participation, also building on the social psychological approach to the issue. She takes 
a close look at concepts such as grievances, the perception of procedural injustice, the 
chosen principles of distributive justice, perceptions about effi  ciency, the subjective 
aspect of double identity, fear and social embeddedness. She has found that, in terms 
of grievances, perceived injustice and unfairness, the majority of Hungarian society 
have a more negative view of the situation, and hence their political participation is 
more highly motivated and more probable. As regards perceived effi  ciency, immigrants 
are overrepresented in the variable of “control over one’s own individual life”, while 
host county members perceive they have greater effi  ciency in protesting against 
government decisions. In social terms, both groups are little embedded, but taking the 
subjective aspect of embeddedness gauged by general trust and trust in institutions, 
immigrants seems to be better embedded.
In Pál Juhász’ research, he scrutinizes the diff erences in political opinions and 
judgments (more broadly speaking, the value systems) of the Hungarian population 
and the immigrants. He explores questions such as how the degree of responsibility 
taken for one’s own life and the determinant factors of “fatalism” correlate with 
perceptions about justice and fairness. One of the conclusions of this piece of analysis 
is that immigrants are less characterized by fatalist attitudes than the host society. 
In the last piece of research described, Borbála Göncz examines the civic or political 
integration of immigrants and the factors that determine it. The indicators discussed in 
various chapters of the book are analyzed again. There is discussion of electoral vs. non-
electoral kinds of political activity, the degree to which economic, social and cultural 
factors, subjective well-being, perceived justice or injustice and several other variants 
which measure individual integration and earlier socialization infl uence civic or political 
activity.
Who is this book written for? Particularly for policy-makers in charge of the 
integration of immigrants and for politicians in general who are interested in 
understanding the political participation (or lack of participation) activities of Hungarian 
society, including foreigners residing in the country. Additionally, Hungarian and non-
Hungarian researchers and students might also fi nd this book interesting, in addition to 
civil society organizations and non-profi t institutions interested in political participation 
in general. Since interpretation of the fi ndings and understanding the majority of the 
research requires no deep preliminary scientifi c expertise, the book may serve as useful 
reading for all those interested in the theme.
Finally, let us express our gratitude to specialists and colleagues who participated 
in the workshop at which the fi rst version of this volume of studies was presented. 
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We thank them for reading the work and expressing their opinions that contributed 
valuable material to the fi nal version of the book.
The editors
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SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES, 
THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL 
RESOURCES OF IMMIGRANTS AND 
DRIVERS OF MIGRATION
Dorottya Kisfalusi
INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on a comparison of the two populations studied in the research – 
third-country nationals, or immigrants, and Hungarian society – as regards their socio-
demographic characteristics and cultural and social resources. Also explored are what 
the migrants’ aims and motivations are, what made them leave their native countries 
and why they chose Hungary as a target country.
It is in the central interest of the research objective – to better understand civic and 
political integration – to explore the composition of the immigrant group in Hungary 
through examining socio-demographic factors and cultural and social resources. 
Earlier research fi ndings (Örkény and Székelyi 2009a) have suggested that immigrants 
are younger, more highly educated and more economically active than members 
of Hungarian society, on average. The question of how this infl uences their political 
and civic activity then arises. The research also investigated if there were diff erences 
in the political and civic participation of migrant groups in Hungary and their home 
countries according to diff erences in the length of their stay and their legal status. The 
main objective of this paper is to present results from the research which are related 
to socio-demographic background variables and resource indicators – which are used 
in subsequent chapters as explanatory variables. Additionally, the authors introduce 
how these variables correlate with the drivers of migration and with the length of the 
immigrants’ stay in Hungary and their legal status.
In the fi rst part of this section, offi  cial statistical data on the number of immigrants 
and their socio-demographic composition and the relevant fi ndings of earlier research 
on the theme are presented. In terms of the goals and motives behind the decision 
to migrate, a brief review of theories about migration, highlighting “push and pull” 
eff ects is also off ered. In the second part, the descriptors of length and immigrant’ legal 
status and country of origin, together with the goals and motivations behind migration 
are used to describe migrants. In part three, a comparison of socio-demographic 
diff erences between Hungarian society and the immigrants is in focus, with a view to 
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identifying diff erences between groups of immigrants. In the last part, the cultural and 
social resources possessed by the host society and the immigrants are explored.
MIGRANTS IN HUNGARY: STATISTICAL DATA, EMPIRICAL RESULTS, 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The target group of our research comprises third country nationals who are staying in 
Hungary with legal rights granted through any of the following legal documents1:
a) a residence permit;
b) an immigration permit;
c) a permanent residence permit;
d) an interim permanent residence permit;
e) a national permanent residence permit;
f ) an EC permanent residence permit.
It is hard to know (even using diverse statistical sources) how many third country 
nationals live in Hungary, and by what right they are resident. Firstly, the legal context 
of immigration has constantly changed over the past decade, and secondly, with the 
changing of the borders of the European Union the geographical pool from which 
third country nationals could come has also changed. For example, while immigrants 
from Romania were “third country nationals” prior to 1 January 2007, after the accession 
of Romania to the EU the (signifi cant) number of immigrants from Romania are now 
registered as being immigrants “from EU countries”. However, these changes are not 
automatically refl ected in databases; for example, according to the statistical summary 
on 31 December 2011 of the Offi  ce of Immigration and Nationality (OIN)2 a great 
number of migrants residing in Hungary were Romanian citizens who would no longer 
qualify as “third country nationals” today and thus would fall outside the scope of our 
research3.
Ágnes Hárs (2009) has made an attempt to estimate the number of third country 
nationals in Hungary on the basis of accessible statistical databases. She puts the fi gure 
at being between 51 000 and 72000; the Central Statistical Offi  ce (CSO) fi gure on 1 
January 2008 estimate was 71,337 and that of OIN on 31 December 2008 was 51,422. 
1 The following legal statutes provide for the regulation of residence permits valid for a defi nite length (5 
years) of time and of permanent residence and immigration permits valid for indefi nite lengths of time: 
Act LXXXVI of 1993 on the Admission, Right of Residence and Immigration of Foreigners (immigration 
permit), Act XXXIX of 2001 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Foreigners (permanent residence 
permit), and Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third Country Nationals, section 64 
(interim permanent residence permit), section 35 (national permanent residence permit) and section 38 (EC 
permanent residence permit). A simple residence permit is valid for a defi nite duration of time.
2 Source: http://www.bmbah.hu/statisztikak.php 
3 On questions of defi nition and more on the diffi  culties of statistical data collection on this topic, see Hárs 
2009.
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These two databases reveal that the majority of this population – 55-60% – come from 
European countries and the high proportion – one-third – of Asian immigrants are also 
signifi cant in number. Immigrants from neighboring countries – Ukraine, Serbia and 
Croatia – make up a large proportion of third country nationals at 41% (OIN fi gure) or 
50% (CSO). 
Socio-demographic features
As the fi gures for 1 January 2008 reveal, men are slightly overrepresented from the 
pool of migrants who originate from a third country (53%). The gender composition of 
migrants from European countries is balanced, while males make up 55% of all Asian 
immigrants (Hárs 2009). Examination of six migrant groups by Antal Örkény and Mária 
Székelyi (2009a)4 reveals that the gender balance is diff erent from migrant group to 
migrant group, with a predominance of males primarily characterizing Turkish and Arab 
immigrants (at over 75%). For Hungarian immigrants from outside the country, as well 
as Ukrainians, Chinese and Vietnamese, the male/female ratio was more or less equal. 
Compared to the host country, the number of elderly immigrants is lower. CSO fi gures 
show circa 10% of immigrants below 14 years of age and another circa 10% above 60 
years of age. 15-39 year-olds amount to 38% of all immigrants while the age group of 
40-49 years amounts to 31% (Hárs 2009).
CSO statistics show that there is a great regional concentration of immigrants. 
57% live in the Central Hungarian region, nearly half of them in Budapest. A little more 
than 10% of all migrants live both North and South of the Great Plain. The degree of 
concentration is considerably higher for those with a fi xed term residence permit 
and for non-European migrants, and is considerably lower for those with permanent 
residence or immigration permits and for those immigrants who come from European 
countries (Hárs 2009).
The economic activity of third country nationals is high compared to the local 
population. Over 70% are active, as against 40% of the Hungarian population (National 
Health Insurance fi gures)5. Work activity rates slightly diff er among migrant groups 
according to age (Hárs 2009). Similarly to offi  cial statistics, Örkény and Székelyi (2009a) 
also found that over two thirds of all the six studied groups of migrants were active 
workers.
As regards employment status, there are greater divergences among immigrant 
groups. Most of the migrants with work permits from developed countries6 undertake 
4 The research was conducted with the “Immigrants in Hungary” research project conducted by the Institute 
for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the ICCR Budapest 
Foundation. For the survey, the researchers interviewed six samples of 200 each of six immigrant groups 
(Hungarians from outside Hungary, Ukrainians, Chinese, Vietnamese, Turks, Arabs) using the snowball method 
of recruitment.
5 The number of minors from all migrants from outside the EU is 12.1%, as compared to 19.2% for Hungarian 
society.
6 At the end of 2008 15,435 immigrants from third countries were active, with work permits (Hárs 2009).
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qualifi ed work, and this applies to a part of the African immigrant group as well. A 
considerable number of Asian immigrants render services while the overwhelming 
majority of Europeans are employed as unskilled laborers (Hárs 2009). The “Immigrants 
in Hungary” research eff ort found that a great number of Vietnamese, Chinese and 
Turkish migrants are entrepreneurs, while for Ukrainians and Hungarians from beyond 
the Hungarian borders the proportion of manual workers is high and self-employment 
is low (Örkény and Székelyi 2009a; for Chinese and Vietnamese entrepreneurs, see also 
Nyíri’s (2010) and Várhalmi’s (2010) studies within the IDEA research7).
Örkény and Székelyi’s fi ndings (2009a) disprove the hypothesis for each studied 
group that migration entails a loss of status. They found that over half of all migrants 
preserved their former occupational positions, for two-fi fths occupational mobility 
was maintained horizontally, another two-fi fths occupied a better job position than 
earlier, and a mere 7% suff ered a loss of status due to migration (below 10% for each 
migrant group). Hárs (2010) draws similar conclusions when she fi nds similar features 
of migration in the new EU member countries to those in the new target countries of 
migration (South European Mediterranean countries, Ireland) where the labor market 
position of migrants is favorable and the likelihood of their being employed is equal to 
or higher than the employment rate of the host country. By contrast, in the “old” target 
countries for migration in Western Europe the labor market position of immigrants is 
less favorable than that of the host society; their unemployment rate is higher and the 
employment rate is lower.
Cultural and social resources
Cultural and social resources play an important role for migrants in their new country. 
Since material resources can only partially be mobilized during migration, and 
qualifi cations, schooling and vocational training may only with diffi  culty be accepted 
by the host country, the migrant’s earlier-acquired embodied cultural capital (Bourdieu 
1986) – such as skills and language knowledge – and a mobilizable network of relations 
become particularly signifi cant.
There is information about the cultural resources of immigrants in Hungary in 
Örkény and Székelyi (2009a). The members of the six migrant groups they examined 
are typically highly educated, over half of them having tertiary education diplomas. 
Two-fi fths have completed secondary school education, but half of this group was 
staying in Hungary for the purpose of further education, so they were due to obtain 
diplomas, too. The level of schooling of the Ukrainians and Arabs is the highest; the 
proportion of this group with tertiary education diplomas being at over 80% and nearly 
70%, respectively. The less well educated are the Turkish and the Chinese, but diploma 
holders amount to nearly one third, even for these groups. Research has found that 
7 The IDEA project – Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries as New Immigration Destinations in the 
European Union – was coordinated by the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences.
23
over half of the Ukrainians, nearly one third of the Vietnamese, Turks and Arabs and a 
quarter of the Chinese speak Hungarian quite well.
Success in migrating can be signifi cantly infl uenced by interpersonal relations. 
Contacts in the target country may help with administrative procedures, job hunting 
and generally getting along in the new environment. However, ethnically closed 
networks may also have negative eff ects on an individual. There are several examples in 
the literature which show how resources provided by ethnic groups may promote the 
economic success and social mobility of immigrants (see e.g. Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993, and the examples provided by Portes 1998), while there is a recognition that 
being embedded too deeply in one’s ethnic community may also hinder individual 
mobility and successful integration (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).
Örkény and Székelyi (2009a) have found that immigrant groups typically have an 
extended network of relations and can count on the help of many people, especially 
for solving personal problems. In seeking work and fi nancial support they named 
fewer people on whom they could rely, a statement which is particularly applicable to 
Turkish and Chinese groups. These networks comprise family members and relatives in 
proportions of approximately 40-60%, and the overwhelming majority of the friends of 
these groups are of the same ethnicity; immigrant rarely make friends with Hungarians 
(with the exception of Hungarians from outside Hungary).
The social network of migrants infl uences not only the success of migration but also 
the target country. It was found by Örkény and Székelyi (2009s) that nearly two thirds 
of the sample they investigated had come to Hungary because relatives or friends 
were already living there. When looking at migrants from neighboring countries, Gödri 
(2010) arrived at similar conclusions: immigrants had considerable relational capital in 
Hungary before they migrated and these relations were converted into real resources 
during their relocation. For both Chinese and Vietnamese businessmen, Várhalmi 
(2010) found that after these entrepreneurs become established, they invite friends 
and relatives from their countries of origin, off ering them employment, and, after a 
time, support for them to set up on their own.
Besides a network of relations, another important component of social resource 
is trust. Trust is a form of social capital that helps the individual mobilize the resources 
possessed by his/her contacts on the one hand, and at a macro level it contributes 
to the functioning of the whole system (Esser 2008). Örkény and Székelyi (2009a) fi nd 
that migrant groups in Hungary are characterized by high levels of trust; most trusting 
are the Arabs and Turks while the least trustful are the Chinese and the Hungarians 
from outside Hungary. Compared to migrant groups in other large European cities, 
immigrants in Budapest have higher levels of trust than Hungarian individuals do in 
general, and they trust more the institutions of their new country than the natives do (a 
24
fi nding that also holds true of migrants in other big cities) (Örkény and Székelyi 2009b)8. 
However, they make a point of stressing that the trust of the studied migrants is not a 
sort of resource that promotes successful integration, but conversely that a subjective 
feeling of the success of integration infl uences the degree of trust (Örkény and Székelyi 
2009b).
Push and pull eff ects
Migrants are encouraged by diff erent causes, goals and motivations to leave their native 
countries. Both push and pull factors may underlie decisions to migrate: the former 
comprise the factors that drive the individual to leave his/her homeland, the latter 
determine the direction of migration. “Push and pull” factors have had a particularly 
signifi cant role in explaining migration according to the classic theories of migration.
Classic migration theory, based on the model of push and pull factors, stresses 
the role of economic factors as justifi cations for migration. It claims that underlying 
migration is the intention to improve one’s economic situation. In this process the 
unfavorable economic and political conditions of the country of origin exert a push 
eff ect while the receiving country’s better economic and social conditions exert a 
pulling eff ect on the individual (Gödri and Tóth 2005). “Push-pull” models identify 
diff erent economic, environmental and demographic factors which are presumed to 
cause people to leave their homeland in order to migrate to other areas (de Haas 2010).
The push and pull model belongs to the family of equilibrium theories, the essence 
of which is the postulation that the rate of migration will be in inverse ratio to income 
(and other) inequalities. This view can be traced back to the work of Ravenstein who 
described his theories of migration in the 1880s. “Push-pull” models are rooted in 
Ravenstein’s statement that migration is a function of spatial inequalities (de Haas 2010).
In Lee’s view (1996), the migration processes and decisions about migration are 
determined by the following factors: positive and negative (as well as neutral) factors 
of both the country of origin and the target countries, the obstacles the migrant is 
faced with – such as distance, physical hindrances, immigration regulations, etc. – and 
personal factors. Although Lee never used the push-pull terminology, the diff erentiation 
of pull and push factors is usually attributed to him (de Haas 2010).
In the opinion of de Haas (2010) the analytical value of the push-pull models is 
limited for various reasons. Firstly, it is a static model that does not defi ne more 
accurately what interactions exist between migration and the initial conditions which 
lead to migration. Secondly, these models give a descriptive, post hoc explanation of the 
causes of migration by taking into account – fairly arbitrarily – a variety of infl uencing 
factors aggregated at diff erent levels, without defi ning the relative weight of each 
factor. Thirdly, these models often fall into the trap of “ecological fallacy” by mixing up 
8 The paper was part of the “LOCALMULTIDEM” research which compared immigrant groups in eight large 
cities in Europe (Barcelona, Madrid, Lyon, Geneva, Zurich, Milan, Budapest and London). The Budapest sample 
included Hungarians from outside Hungary, Chinese and Turkish people.
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the macro-level determinants of migration (e.g. population growth, deterioration of 
environment, climate change or diversity) with micro-level, individual motives. The 
risk is that it may be implied that certain concrete basic causes may directly “cause” 
migration, ignoring the fact that these causes interact with other factors which 
infl uence the migrant’s decisions, and life.
De Haas suggests that the equilibrium theories of migration are handicapped in 
explaining the migration patterns that actually occur in reality because the concepts of 
structure and agency are not adequately specifi ed. These theories regard the decision 
to migrate as being an aggregate of individual decisions taken in an environment 
when all information can be accessed and when market conditions are perfect. If they 
ascribe some role to structure, they regard it as an aggregate of individual behaviors. In 
equilibrium theories, structure is at most the sum total of the parts instead of being a 
pattern of social relations which acts with a driving force upon the behavior of individuals. 
These theories also lack a meaningful concept of agency which recognizes the capacity 
of social actors to take independent decisions that can force the surrounding structural 
conditions to change, too. In this way, the theory reduces the individual into a mere 
puppet; a subject propelled by macro-level push and pull forces; an individual who is 
able to (indeed, must) take perfectly rational and predictable decisions in accordance 
with the rules of individual maximization of utility. This is why equilibrium theories are 
incapable of explaining transformations in migration patterns.
Irén Gödri (2005) emphasizes that migration research requires an approach that 
combines diverse analytical methods. Micro-level personal decisions, life situations 
and motivations are embedded in local social and economic relations, thus factors 
acting at the level of the individual and those acting at societal level must equally be 
considered if the migration process is to be understood. In addition to macro-level 
analyses of structural causes and micro-level approaches to individual decisions, there 
are intermediate-level theories that place the networks of relations into the focus of 
attention.
These days, migration can often be described using dynamic models. Migrations 
are often unfi nished or periodic in a sociological sense, and attachment to the country 
of origin can live on in a variety of forms. Also, a migrant may foster close connections 
with more than one country at the same time.
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IMMIGRANT RESPONDENTS
Let us begin with a review of the main characteristics of the immigrants in the sample9. 
A greater part of the sample, a little more than half of the respondents, are staying in 
Hungary with fi xed term residence permits. Another 48% have some sort of a permanent 
9 The immigrant sample was created to represent by age, gender and country of origin the entire population 
of immigrants staying in Hungary (according to any of the aforementioned status descriptors). For a detailed 
description of sampling see the Introduction and the Appendix on data collection. 
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residence permit: nearly a quarter have a permanent residency permit (issued prior to 
1 July 2007), one in eight have a national permanent residence permit and 6.4% of 
the respondents have an immigration permit. The proportion of immigrants from our 
respondent sample with a permanent EC or temporary residence permit is low. For 
simplicity’s sake, the six legal categories are grouped into two broad categories: one 
group is defi ned as having a residence permit for a fi xed period while members of the 
other group have permanent residence or immigration permits.
As for the date of entry into Hungary, half of all respondents have arrived in the 
past eight years, the other half have been living in Hungary longer than this. Members 
of the latter group may apply for Hungarian citizenship by right of the length of their 
residence in Hungary (assuming the rest of the preconditions are met). The number of 
those who arrived before the political changes of 1989 is 8%.
Table 1 Distribution of immigrants by status, length of stay and country of origin (%)
IMMIGRANT STATUS
Has
Residence permit 52.0
Immigration permit 6.4
Permanent residence permit 22.8
Temporary permanent residence permit 2.0
National permanent residence permit 12.6
EC permanent residence permit 4.3
HOW MANY YEARS AGO DID YOU ARRIVE IN HUNGARY?
  0–4 28.1
  5–8 22.4
  9–15 24.2
16– 25.3
FROM WHICH COUNTRY DID YOU COME TO HUNGARY?
Countries of former Soviet Union 30.8
Balkans 19.2
China 17.5
USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand 5.4
Other Asian 14.9
Other (Africa/Near East/South America) 12.3
N=500
As regards the country of origin, a large portion – exactly two fi fths – of immigrants 
come from countries neighboring Hungary, which is also refl ected in the sample: 
22.9% came from Ukraine, 14.5% from Serbia and 3.5% from Croatia. Grouping 
the countries of origin into larger geographic units, we fi nd that most immigrants 
came from the successor states of the former Soviet Union10 (nearly one-third 
10 Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Belarus.
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of respondents were born there). Every fi fth respondent named a country in the 
Balkans11 as their place of birth, and a similar number originated from China. 14.5% 
named other East and South East Asian countries as their native lands.12 A mere 5.4% 
of the respondents came from Anglo-Saxon areas,13 and a little over a quarter of 
the sample originated from the rest of the world (Africa, South America, Near East). 
Broken down by continent of immigrant origin, the largest proportion of immigrants 
arrived from two main areas, Europe and Asia, the former being represented by half 
the respondents, the latter with two-fi fths.
Two-thirds of the immigrants from the countries of the former USSR are living in 
Hungary with permanent residency or immigration permits. This group has the longest 
average stay of 14 years. Nearly two thirds of those who come from the Balkans and 
over two-thirds of respondents from Anglo-Saxon areas and from the “other” category 
have residence permits of limited duration. For the Chinese and other Asian immigrants, 
the two permit types are equally distributed. People from the Balkans have been in 
Hungary for 12 years, the Chinese for 11 and the other Asians for 9 years, on average. 
Anglo-Saxons and “other” respondents have lived here for the shortest time; the 
former being here for 6.5, the latter for 8.5 years, on average. There is, logically, a strong 
correlation between the length of stay and immigrant status, for legislation makes a 
permanent residence permit conditional upon a long stay in the country. This is also 
an explanation for why those with permanent residence permits have already lived in 
Hungary an average of four years longer than those with fi xed term residence permits.
Figure 1 Distribution of immigrants by status and country of origin (%)
11 Serbia, Croatia, the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo.
12 Other Asian: Vietnam, Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan.
13 USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.

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The current citizenship of respondents corresponds to the distribution by country of 
origin. Nearly a quarter are Ukrainian citizens, nearly a fi fth Chinese, and every seventh a 
Serbian citizen. Vietnamese, Russian and American citizens make up over 5% each, and 
citizens of neighboring Croatia amount to 4%.
Figure 2 Distribution of immigrants by citizenship (%)
Note: People with dual or multiple citizenship could give multiple answers.
The distribution of the immigrant sample by mother tongue clearly reveals that a 
considerable portion – 15.2% – of those migrating to Hungary are Hungarians born 
outside the borders of the country. Comparing the fi gures for “mother tongue” and 
“country of origin”, we fi nd that half of those who have Hungarian as their mother 
tongue come from Serbia and the other half come from Ukraine. Only Chinese is spoken 
by a greater proportion of respondents. Ukrainian is the mother tongue of every eighth 
respondent, followed in frequency by Russian, Serbian, Vietnamese and English.
Figure 3 Distribution of immigrants by mother tongue (%)


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In sum, it can be concluded that, from our sample, most third-country migrants 
staying in Hungary with some form of legal status come from neighboring or other 
European countries. A considerable number of respondents come from Asian 
countries, particularly China. As regards status of residence, approximately half are here 
with fi xed term residence permits and the other half have with permanent residence 
or immigration permits. There is a signifi cant correlation between the country of origin 
and the legal status of the immigrant, as well as the length of residence.
Goals and motivations for migration
Although newer migration theories have long superseded the models based exclusively 
on push-pull eff ects, examination of the causes and aims of migration is indispensable 
in any research on the integration of migrants. Motivation may largely be infl uenced by 
the former social, cultural and material resources of the migrant and the political and 
economic state of the country of origin. Moreover, groups who emigrate for diverse 
reasons may display diff erent patterns of integration into the host country. Individual 
aims and motivations of the immigrants for migration are highlighted below.
An open question was asked about the reason for leaving the country of origin. 
Responses can be distributed into in six main categories. Multiple answers could be 
given to the question. The largest group of respondents – nearly one third – named 
some family reason (marriage/companionship, family reunion, following other family 
member) as being the motive for leaving the native country. A little over one quarter 
left to fi nd work and nearly another quarter hoped for a higher standard of living/“a 
better life”. Presumably the motives of fi nding work and fi nding a better life are closely 
interrelated; someone looking for a better job probably longs for a higher standard of 
living. Conversely, higher living standards are often the desired end for those who “seek 
better work opportunities”. Every sixth respondent named education as the reason for 
relocation, while 6.3% left their motherland for political or religious reasons or due to 
warfare.
Figure 4 Reasons for leaving the country of origin (%)
Note: The question was: ”Why did you decide to leave your native country?” 

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There are statistically signifi cant diff erences in motivation by country of origin. A 
signifi cant number of those who come from Soviet successor states, Anglo-Saxon 
countries and China left for family reasons. Work was named in the largest proportion 
by those from other Asian countries (half of them left in the hope of fi nding work, the 
other half had already had found a job). Nearly a third of immigrants from Anglo-Saxon 
areas also came to work. Studying was mentioned most frequently by the other Asians 
and by migrants from “other” areas (Africa, South America, the Near East) as well as the 
Balkans. The largest number of immigrants who were motivated to leave their countries 
for political, religious or confl ict-related reasons came from the Balkans. There is no 
signifi cant diff erence among respondents as to their desire for higher living standards, 
with the exception that those from Anglo-Saxon countries hardly ever mentioned this 
factor as being a motive. 
Figure 5 Reasons for leaving the motherland by country of origin (%)
When the immigrants from neighboring countries (Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia) are examined, 
several important diff erences can be found. Nearly half of those from the Ukraine left for 
family reasons, while the corresponding fi gure for Serbia and Croatia is lower; around 
one fi fth. A third of the respondents from Croatia named fi nding employment as being 
their goal for migration (this proportion was less than one fi fth for migrants from the 
other two countries). By contrast, Serbians mentioned education as being their main 
goal far more often. The hope of a better way of living motivated most Ukrainians and 
the least Croatians. Political, religious causes or war were mentioned most frequently 
by former inhabitants of Southern Slavic areas: over one third of those from Croatia and 
15.1% of those from Serbia specifi ed these reasons as being a motivation.

31
Figure 6 Reasons for leaving the motherland (for immigrants from neighboring countries (%)
Between the two large groups divided by their legal residence status, the only signifi cant 
diff erences are found with the variable of those who had left for family reasons: a far 
larger portion – two fi fths – of those with a permanent residence permit had left their 
countries for family reasons compared to one quarter of those who had fi xed term 
residence permits. From the perspective of length of stay, those who had arrived earlier 
were overrepresented in the group of family-motivated migrants. Migrants living in 
Hungary for at least 16 years all named political, religious or war-related reasons in 
above-average proportions. A quarter of those who arrived 0–4 years ago, 16-17% of 
those who came 5–8 or 16– years ago, and a mere 7.5% of those who arrived 9–15 years 
ago mentioned study as being the motivation for their migration. For the rest of the 
named reasons there were no signifi cant diff erences between the groups diff erentiated 
by the length of stay in Hungary.
Figure 7 Reason for leaving the country of origin by date of entry to Hungary (%)


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Diff erences can be found when the socio-demographic features of the migrants are 
collated with the motives for leaving the country. Nearly twice as many women as men 
specifi ed family reasons for leaving their homeland, while over twice as many men 
named studying as a driver. As regards age, those above 60 were overrepresented from 
the migrants who reported leaving for family reasons and this group did not identify 
employment prospects as a motive at all. Most prospective students were below 30 
years of age, while the age group between 40 and 49 mentioned hope for a better 
standard of living most frequently.
School qualifi cations were a signifi cant diff erentiation factor for the two large 
groups: 23.3% of those with a secondary education and 18.2% of those with a college 
diploma said they had left their native countries to study, while this reason was rarely 
mentioned by those who did not fi nish secondary education with a certifi cate. By 
contrast, the hope of higher living standards was mentioned by one third of the latter 
group (this proportion being merely 17-20% of the higher educated). So the less 
educated were more motivated by their hopes of attaining a better standard of living, 
which may have two explanations. On the one hand, those with higher qualifi cations 
and better living standards in their countries of origin would probably fi nd their 
way more easily in their own country and are less motivated to leave their homes 
to make a living. On the other hand, it is possible that migration for the purpose 
of studying might be latently motivated by hopes of better living standards and 
working opportunities abroad.
A close ended question asked why (for what main purposes) the respondents 
chose Hungary as their destination. Nearly two fi fths specifi ed work, 17.8% chose study 
and nearly one third identifi ed family reasons (marriage, family reunion, migrating as 
a minor with parents). Every tenth person arrived for the purpose of settling in the 
country permanently for reasons other than family.
We surveyed the pull factors using the open ended question “Why did you choose 
Hungary as your destination?” The majority referred to relations: a third came because 
they had relatives or friends, or came with them. Every tenth mentioned marriage or 
companionship. One tenth of the respondents came for pre-existing jobs they had 
identifi ed, 7.7% for better living conditions and  7.1% to study. In connection with 
the former closed-format question, it should be noted that about a third or quarter 
of those who came for work or study or permanent settlement chose Hungary 
because of family relations or acquaintances. Several of them also mentioned the 
desire for better living conditions and a higher standard of living, and a few referred 
to geographic proximity, Hungarian lineage, knowledge of the Hungarian language 
and former good experiences with the country.
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Figure 8 Reasons for choosing Hungary (%)
Note: The question was: ”Why did you choose Hungary as your destination?”
When comparing diff erent groups’ choice of Hungary by geographic area, signifi cant 
diff erences can be discerned. Nearly a third of the respondents from Anglo-Saxon 
countries came to marry or live with someone while nearly one fi fth came for other 
family related reasons. Over half of the Chinese stressed the alluring eff ect of their 
family relations (which confi rms research indicating that the Chinese tend to employ 
labor from their native country). Obviously, knowledge of Hungarian, Hungarian 
extraction and geographic proximity were stressed by those coming from neighboring 
countries. Respondents from other Asian as well as African/South American/Near 
Eastern countries were overrepresented among those who identifi ed concrete work 
opportunities as their motivation. Nearly a quarter of all respondents from other Asian 
countries identifi ed a desire for higher living standards; this group having the highest 
proportion of all who answered this way.

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There are few cases in which the connection between the date of entry into Hungary, 
the immigrant’s legal status, and the motivation for migration is statistically signifi cant. 
Those with a permanent residence permit are overrepresented in the group of 
immigrants who came for marriage or for reasons of Hungarian lineage. Residents 
who have lived here for 0–4 years mentioned studying as a reason for their staying 
more often than others, while those who came 5–8 years ago hoped for better living 
conditions in greater proportions than others.
Correlations between socio-demographic factors and schooling are signifi cant 
only in a few cases but the pattern they outline coincides with what the answers 
given to the question “Why did you leave your native country?” suggested. Women 
were overrepresented among those who mentioned family reasons (marriage/
companionship, family relations, Hungarian origin), while a higher proportion of 
men emphasized higher living standards and better living conditions. “Study” was 
more frequently mentioned by younger respondents and “earlier good experiences” 
by the older generations. Work opportunities were more often referred to by the age 
group of 30–59 years than by younger or older respondents, while the youngest were 
underrepresented among those who mentioned marriage or partnership as being the 
reason for coming to Hungary. The highest educated were well overrepresented from 
those who mentioned concrete job opportunities or “study” as reasons for bringing 
them here. The latter reason was more often mentioned by those with, than those 
without secondary school certifi cates. The role of family relations was most frequently 
mentioned by those who only had a maximum of eight years of education, and least 
frequently by those with tertiary diplomas.
To conclude, it can be stated that the motivation for migration considerably (and 
statistically signifi cantly) diff ers by country of origin and by various socio-demographic 
variables. The highest proportion of respondents left their countries and chose Hungary 
for some family reasons. At the same time, many of those who mentioned other causes 
of emigration chose Hungary because of family or friendship relations as well. For areas 
close to Hungary, people chose Hungary it for its proximity and for their knowledge of 
Hungarian, while those from more remote areas opted for Hungary on account of their 
connections or prospective employment opportunities. Women were overrepresented 
among those who named family reasons for migration, while men stressed study and 
a change in living standards more frequently. Younger respondents came to study 
in greater proportions, while the motivation of elderly people to migrate was more 
frequently motivated by family reasons. The middle-aged hoped for higher living 
standards and chose Hungary as a workplace to a greater extent than the rest of the 
groups. Those who had at least a secondary school education were overrepresented 
from study-motivated migrants when compared to the lower educated, who hoped to 
better their lives.
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SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF MIGRANTS AND HUNGARIAN 
SOCIETY
Gender, age groups
There is a diff erence between the age composition of the sample of Hungarian society 
and that of the immigrants; the latter being considerably younger on average. 76.9% 
of migrants (compared to 56% of Hungarians) were below 50. The most marked 
diff erence between the two samples was found with the youngest and oldest age 
groups: while slightly over 30% of migrants were younger than 30, 13.7 percentage 
points fewer Hungarians were, and as for the groups of 60-year-olds and older, their 
proportion was over a quarter in the Hungarian sample but 15.5 percentage points 
lower for immigrants.
Table 3 Distribution of respondents by gender and age group (%)
Hungarian society Immigrants
GENDER
Male 46.6 53.6
Female 53.4 46.4
AGE
–29 21.8 35.5
30–39 17.8 22.4
40–49 16.4 19.0
50–59 17.5 12.2
60– 26.5 11.0
N=1500
The host society and the immigrants also diff er in terms of gender distribution. From 
the immigrant sample, 53.6% were male and 46.4% were female while 46.6% and 
53.4% were the corresponding Hungarian fi gures. The connection between gender 
and age group reveals that the above diff erence derives partly from the diff erent age 
structure of the Hungarian and the migrant groups: among the latter, people of 60 and 
above are considerably underrepresented whereas women in this age group have a far 
greater share than men. The other source of the diff erent gender distribution in the two 
samples derives from the actual on-the-ground gender situation: in Hungary, there is a 
balance between genders across age groups below 50, and an “excess” of older women, 
while men are considerably overrepresented in all migrant age groups below 60 years 
of age.
Compared to the rest of the geographic areas, there is a high proportion of elderly 
people and women among those who came from the countries of the former USSR. 
Among the Chinese and the migrants from the “other” (African, South American, Near 
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Eastern) countries there was no one above 60. The highest proportion of migrants 
under 29 years came from other Asian countries (51.4%). Men from the “other” (African, 
South American, Near Eastern) countries are noticeably overrepresented.
Figure 9 Gender distribution of migrants by country of origin (%)
Figure 10 Age distribution of migrants by country of origin (%)
Settlement type, region
In Hungary, opportunities for work and education, and generally speaking, the standard 
of living largely depends on where one lives, owing to massive regional inequalities. 
Just as the social well-being and cultural and material resources of Hungarians are 
infl uenced by their place of residence, where immigrants choose to live has a signifi cant 
infl uence on their prospects.
All the immigrants we interviewed lived in towns or cities, nearly two thirds in the 
Central Hungarian region (including Budapest). 22% lived in county centers, 5.8% in 
other towns. Compared to this, a mere 17.7% of the Hungarian sample lived in Budapest, 
about the same proportion in county centers, one third in other towns and about one 

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third in villages. Less than one third of all Hungarian respondents lived in the Central 
Hungarian region, while the majority is distributed more or less evenly across the rest 
of the six regions.
Table 4 Distribution of respondents by settlement type and region (%)
Hungarian society Immigrants
TYPE OF SETTLEMENT
Budapest 17.7 71.2
County centre 18.1 22.0
Town 33.2 6.8
Village 31.1 0.0
REGION
Central Hungary 29.9 73.6
Central Transdanubia 11.0 1.0
Western Transdanubia 9.5 1.0
Southern Transdanubia 10.3 3.6
Northern Hungary 12.9 2.8
Northern part of Great Plain 13.9 7.0
Southern part of Great Plain 12.6 11.0
N=1500
Figure 11 Distribution of migrants’ place of residence by country of origin (%)
Looking at the correlation between place of residence and immigrant legal status, we 
fi nd signifi cant diff erences between those staying for an indefi nite length of time and 
those staying for defi nite periods. As compared to less than two fi fths of respondents 
with permanent residence or immigration permits, over three fourths of those with 
fi xed term residence permits live in the Central Hungarian region, i.e. Budapest and Pest 
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County. One can fi nd even greater diff erences between the two groups concerning the 
types of settlement. Those who have already been in Hungary for at least 16 years are 
not as concentrated around the capital and the Central Hungarian region as those who 
arrived after them. Looking at the country of origin as an infl uential factor, we fi nd that 
the fewest migrants settled in the Budapest agglomeration from the Balkans, followed 
by those from the successor states of the Soviet Union, while about 90% of those 
from Anglo-Saxon countries and from other Asian, as well as “other” (African, South 
American, Near eastern) countries live in and around Budapest. A smaller proportion of 
the Chinese, about 77%, live in this area.
Figure 12 Distribution of migrants’ place of residence by date of arrival in Hungary (%)
The survey data thus reveals that the distribution of migrants according to area of 
settlement and type widely diff ers from the distribution of the Hungarian population. 
Third country nationals live to a far greater extent in the towns and regions that off er 
better labor market and income opportunities, better education and health care. This 
particularly applies to those with fi xed term residence permits. Immigrants who are 
closest to the pattern of the distribution of Hungarians by settlement type and region 
are those who come from neighboring countries (the Balkans and the former Soviet 
Union), who have lived here for at least 16 years and who have permanent residence 
permits.14
14 There is a strong correlation between these factors. A relatively high number of those who originate from 
the Balkans and the areas of the former USSR have lived in Hungary for at least 16 years and have permanent 
residence permits.

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Family status, size of household
In two categories does the family status of Hungarian and immigrant respondents 
signifi cantly diff er. First, a little over one third of migrants are single, the same fi gure 
being just over one quarter of Hungarian society. Second, there are a far larger number 
of widows – 14.5% – in the Hungarian sample; this proportion is merely 6.5% for 
migrants. For migrants who arrived in Hungary a longer time ago, the proportion of 
those who are married is higher and the number of singles is lower than that for more 
recent migrants. Singles are underrepresented from the successor states of the USSR 
and from China, and there are more married migrants who come from Asian countries 
than from other migrant groups. The proportion of widows from those who came from 
the countries of the former Soviet Union is noticeably high, which is at least partly 
explained by the age structure of that group.
As regards the size of households, the major diff erence between the two samples 
is that 7 percentage points more Hungarian respondents live in two-member families 
and 6 percentage points fewer live in three- or four-member families than the migrant 
sample. A somewhat higher proportion of migrants lived alone and a slightly smaller 
number lived in fi ve-member or larger households than Hungarians. Examining 
household size by country of origin, one fi nds that proportionately far fewer Asians 
live in one or two-member households and far more of them live in three-member or 
larger households. There are more singles from those who arrived a maximum of four 
years ago, and those who came to Hungary earlier are proportionally more likely to live 
in three-member or larger households.
The majority of respondents do not live together with a child less than 18 years of 
age. Compared to members of Hungarian society, the proportion of households with 
one child under 18 is higher for migrants, while households with two children have 
about the same proportions in the two samples. Regarding age groups, in the 18-39 
years-of-age category there are more households with at least one child under 18 years 
of age, while in the group aged 40 and above more migrants live in households with 
children. The correlation between the country of origin and number of children under 
18 years of age in the household is not signifi cant for migrants, but those who arrived 
in Hungary earlier are more likely to live with children than newcomers.
The most typical family structure for respondents is a conjugal family of a married 
or co-habitant couple and their children. Nearly half of the Hungarian respondents and 
half the immigrants live in families such as this. The next most frequent family type is 
that of the childless married or co-resident couple: the frequency is somewhat over one 
quarter for Hungarians and one fi fth for migrants. It is slightly more likely that a single 
parent Hungarian will be rearing a child/children by themselves, and that Hungarian 
grandparents will be tending to grandchildren than for migrants. For the latter, the 
three-generation family and other structures (not specifi ed in the questionnaire) are 
more frequently encountered family units.
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Table 5 Family status, family structure, household size of respondents (%)
Hungarian society Immigrants
FAMILY STATUS
Single 26.5 36.2
Married 48.9 49.0
Divorced 10.1 8.3
Widowed 14.5 6.5
N 1488 
SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD
lives alone 20.4 23.3
2 people 29.6 22.7
3–4 people 37.3 43.2
5 or more people 12.7 10.8
N 1490 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 IN THE HOUSEHOLD
0 60.6 52.8
1 19.3 26.7
2 or more 20.1 20.5
N 1171 
COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS’ FAMILIES
Married/unmarried couple 27.6 21.4
Married/unmarried couple + child(ren) 47.9 50.7
Single parent + child(ren) 11.1 7.6
Grandparent(s) + grandchild(ren) 1.3 0.5
Grandparent(s) + Parent(s) + child(ren) 4.0 8.9
Other composition 7,4 10.8
N 1162 
Religiosity and religious affi  liation
Hungarian respondents claimed to be somewhat more religious than the third-country 
migrants; 59.6% of Hungarians (as against 48.9% of migrants) said they had some 
religious beliefs. 45.1% of migrants claimed they were not, or defi nitely not, religious 
while this proportion for Hungarians was 10 percentage points lower.
Those who claimed to be religious and those who were hesitant about their answers 
were also asked which religion or denomination they felt they belonged to. A little 
more than two thirds of the Hungarians named the Roman Catholic Church and 17.2% 
said they were Calvinists. The proportions for the rest of the named denominations 
were below 8% (while 5.6% said they belonged to no denomination).
The religious beliefs of the migrants are far more heterogeneous than those of the 
Hungarians. The greatest proportion are Roman Catholics, but the share is far lower at 
19%. Over 10% are Greek Catholics, those without denomination, Buddhists and other 
religions and less than 10% are Calvinists and Muslims. Those who are Jewish as well as 
Baptists, Adventists and other smaller denominations amounted to nearly 5%.
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Table 6 Religiosity, religious affi  liation of respondents (%)
Hungarian society Immigrants
RELIGIOSITY
I am religious, I follow the teachings of the church 15.8 12.1
I am religious in my own way 43.8 36.8
I can’t say if I am religious or not 4.9 5.8
I am not religious 32.4 42.4
I have a diff erent conviction, I am defi nitely not religious 2.8 2.7
Other 0.3 0.2
N 1456 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
Roman Catholic 69.8 19.0
Calvinist 17.2 9.3
Lutheran 3.6 0.8
Greek Catholic 2.5 14.3
Jewish 0.0 4.6
Baptist, Adventist, other minor denominations 0.5 4.6
Muslim 0.2 8.0
Buddhist 0.0 13.1
Other religion 0.8 12.2
Belongs to no denomination 5.6 13.9
N = 849 
Figure 13 Distribution of migrants by religion (%)
Examining the migrants’ religious affi  liations by country of origin, signifi cant diff erences 
can be found in accord with the cultural diff erences. A higher proportion of Greek 
Catholics came from the former Soviet Union areas, but Roman Catholics and Calvinists 
are also quite numerous. Over two fi fths of those from the Balkans are Roman Catholics 
but Greek Catholics are overrepresented compared to the rest of the denominations. 

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The majority of Chinese and other Asians are Buddhists, while nearly half of those who 
come from African, South American and Near Eastern countries are Muslims and 17.6% 
are Jewish. The distribution of migrants from Anglo-Saxon areas is the following: nearly 
one third are Roman Catholics, nearly one third are Baptists, Adventists and other lesser 
denominations, and 15.5% are Lutherans.
Employment, labor market position
In line with the statistical data on the economic activity of immigrants, the research 
uncovered signifi cant diff erences between the Hungarian and migrant sub-samples 
as regards their employment and labor market positions. Compared to over two thirds 
of migrants, a mere 45.9% of Hungarians regularly work. This diff erence cannot be 
ascribed to the diff erent demographic composition of the two groups; the economic 
activity of the migrants is higher for all age and gender categories than for Hungarians. 
There are 18.2 percentage points fewer old-age pensioners and 7.3 percentage points 
fewer unemployed migrants than Hungarians, while the proportion of students is 8.1 
percentage points higher (or twice as many as in the Hungarian sample). When the 
variable of country of origin is also looked at, the result is that the situation of those 
who come from the successor states of the former USSR is considerably diff erent from 
the rest of the migrants: due to their age composition the proportion of those who are 
economically active is lower and the proportions of old-age pensioners and the jobless 
are higher. Compared to the rest of the migrant groups, there is a higher proportion 
of family members among those from Anglo-Saxon countries, while for Asians the 
proportion of students is higher than for the rest of the groups. As regards the date 
of entry into Hungary, there are more old-age pensioners in the groups who arrived 
earlier, while for the latter the proportion of students is higher.
Analyzing the occupation and place of work of respondents, one fi nds that across 
the entire sample more people work in the competitive sphere than in government, 
local government or budgetary organ/institutions. The overwhelming majority are 
employees (there is, however, a thin layer of entrepreneurs/owners). Comparing the 
two sub-samples, we fi nd that a far larger proportion of migrants are working in the 
competitive sphere and as entrepreneurs/owners. Over half the Chinese, nearly half 
the other Asians and nearly two fi fths of “other” (African, South American, Near Eastern) 
migrants are working as entrepreneurs, but for the rest of the groups by country of 
origin the proportion of entrepreneurs is more than double that in Hungary. Above 
average proportions of migrants from the former Soviet territories (a quarter) and 
from Anglo-Saxon countries (15%) are working for government, local government or 
budgetary organs, and a relatively high proportion – 11.1% – of migrants from Anglo-
Saxon areas are working for civil organizations.
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Table 7 Distribution of respondents by nature of employment and labor market status (%)
Hungarian society immigrants
DO YOU WORK? DO YOU UNDERTAKE REGULAR-INCOME EARNING ACTIVITY?
Yes 45.9 68.3
No 54.1 31.7
N = 1497 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Active earner 44.8 67.3
Receives (various) child-care allowance 3.2 2.6
Receives old-age pension (by own right), widow’s 
pension
26.0 7.8
Receives disability pension (before retirement age) 5.4 0.6
Unemployed 10.3 3.0
Student 8.2 16.3
Family member, other inactive earner 2.0 2.4
N = 1493 
(LAST) PLACE OF WORK
In the private sector 54.7 72.6
Government, local government, budgetary organ, 
institution
32.1 11.9
Civil organization 2.1 2.5
Never had a job 11.1 13.0
N = 1472 
WORKS (MAINLY) AS AN
Employee 92.3 69.9
Entrepreneur, owner 7.7 30.1
N = 1261 
Figure 14 Occupation, employment position of respondents (%)
Note: The question was: ”What is (was) your (last) job, position?”

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Examining the occupation and positions of respondents also reveals important 
correlations. One of the greatest gaps between Hungarians and migrants is with 
entrepreneurial status: 20 percentage points more migrants than Hungarians are 
entrepreneurs. Another major diff erence appears with the proportion of those engaged 
in semi-skilled and unskilled labor, auxiliary manual work or household help: nearly one 
third of Hungarian respondents (versus 8.3% of migrants) pursue such work. When the 
distribution of respondents is examined by sector; three categories in which there is 
considerable diff erence (10-15 percentage points) can be identifi ed between the two 
sub-samples: far more Hungarians are active in agriculture/forestry and industry, while 
migrants are more active in the sector of trade.
As mentioned above, the proportion of entrepreneurs is highest for Asian 
immigrants, but the proportion of Asian workers employed in the lowest occupational 
category (semi-skilled and unskilled labor, auxiliary manual work and household help) 
is also the highest. Manual workers are also overrepresented among migrants from the 
Balkans and the area of the former Soviet Union, while a relatively high proportion of 
those from Anglo-Saxon countries are working as leaders and white-collar workers. As 
regards date of arrival, entrepreneurs are overrepresented among those who came 9 or 
more years ago, most white-collar workers have lived here for at least 16 years and the 
majority of manual workers have arrived over the past 8 years. In other categories, no 
such clear tendencies can be discerned.
 
Figure 15 Occupation, employment position of migrants by country of origin (%)
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Figure 16 Occupation, employment position of migrants by date of arrival in Hungary (%)
In sum, it can be concluded that the socio-demographic features of migrants widely 
diff er from those of the host society, and between certain migrant groups signifi cant 
diff erences can be identifi ed by country of origin, date of arrival and title of stay. The 
age of migrants is younger on average and their place of residence – especially that of 
migrants with fi xed term residence permits – are primarily towns, fi rst of all in the Central 
Hungarian region (and within that region, in Budapest) far more, proportionately, 
than the Hungarian population. The survey also confi rmed that the employment and 
labor market situation of migrant interviewees was more favorable than that of the 
Hungarian respondents. The economic activity of migrants is considerably higher and 
a higher proportion are self-employed. By the same token, their income and ownership 
of assets are also more favorable than those of the Hungarians, and subjective well-
being indicators show that migrants are more highly satisfi ed. These data are explained 
in more detail by Eleonóra Szanyi-F. later in this volume.
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RESOURCES OF HUNGARIAN SOCIETY 
AND IMMIGRANTS
An individual’s possession of cultural and social resources largely infl uences his/
her chances of integration. Below, the cultural and social resources of immigrants as 
compared to members of Hungarian society are examined to see if there are diff erences, 
and if so, in what dimensions. Analysis of material resources was undertaken by Eleonóra 
Szanyi-F. and is described later in the volume.

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Possession of cultural resources
Three variables were selected for measuring the cultural resources of the respondents: 
the respondents’ level of education and number of spoken foreign languages, as well 
as their frequency of Internet use. Gauging the cultural resources of respondents using 
any of these three variables we fi nd that third-country nationals are, on the whole, 
better equipped in this regard than the host society. However, they may face diffi  culties 
when they try to have their educational achievements and vocational qualifi cations 
accepted in Hungary, and if they try to become integrated in a Hungarian community 
that has a low level of knowledge of foreign languages. Let us look at the data in detail.
Migrants who responded are more highly educated on average than the Hungarian 
respondents. Over a third of the Hungarian sample (as compared to 9.5% of migrants) 
have completed only eight primary years of education. 29.1% are the highest educated 
(with secondary school certifi cates) and 13.5% have tertiary diplomas in the Hungarian 
sample, as compared with 47.6% and 26.6%, respectively, for migrants.
Similarly to the level of education, there is a great diff erence between the two sub-
samples regarding the use of the Internet and the number of languages spoken. While 
almost half the Hungarian population never use the Internet and less than a third use 
it every or almost every day, half of the immigrants use it daily and a mere 13% do 
not. Compared with 72.5% of Hungarian respondents who don’t speak any foreign 
languages and a mere 8.3% who speak two or more, 85.6% of migrants speak at least 
one foreign language and 58.9% speak two or more languages. Thus Hungarians speak 
0.37 and migrants 1.85 foreign languages, on average.
Table 8 Cultural resources of respondents (%)
Hungarian society Immigrants
LEVEL OF EDUCATION
Maximum 8 primary grades 36.2 9.5
Vocational training 21.2 16.3
General or special secondary school 29.1 47.6
College, university 13.5 26.6
N = 1496 
FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE
Never 48.2 13.0
Once a week or rarer 8.1 12.8
Several times a week 12.4 24.0
Every day, almost every day 31.3 50.2
N = 1500 
NUMBER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES SPOKEN
Speaks no foreign language 72.5 14.4
1 19.2 26.7
2 6.8 36.1
3 or more 1.5 22,8
N = 1499 
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Let us now look at the correlations between the socio-demographic features and 
cultural resources. It applies to both sub-samples that the younger generation and the 
economically more active use the Internet more while the elderly and the inactive use 
it less. Also, fewer people above 60 speak foreign languages than people below 60. The 
younger generation and the economically active in Hungary have a higher education 
on average than the elderly and the inactive.
However, the correlations are far from unambiguous for migrants when schooling 
is taken as an indicator of cultural capital. Although it is true that the proportion of 
those with a maximum of 8 grades of primary education is somewhat higher and the 
proportion of tertiary education graduates is a bit lower for migrants over 60 than for 
those below 60, the proportion of migrants with secondary school certifi cates is higher 
for those above 60 than for those who are between 30 and 59. As for economic activity, 
there are proportionately more people with vocational training and higher education 
and fewer have only 8 primary years of education or general secondary certifi cates 
for the active workers than for the inactive sample. Looking at the variable of gender, 
it may be seen that the proportions of those with maximum primary education and 
secondary school certifi cates were higher and the proportion of those with vocational 
training was lower for women than for men in both sub-samples. As regards tertiary 
diplomas, no real diff erentiation between genders can be made for Hungarians, while 
women are slightly overrepresented in the migrant sample. Gender has a statistically 
insignifi cant impact on the other two indicators of cultural resources.
Focusing only on migrants now, we can fi nd that the length of stay in Hungary 
(in years) is not statistically correlated with any of the resource variables. When 
however, the variables are examined against the immigrant’s legal status, considerable 
diff erences can be discerned: those with a fi xed term residence permit are generally 
higher educated, speak more languages and use the Internet more often than those 
who have a permit to stay for an indefi nite length of time.
When cultural resources are examined by country of origin, we fi nd that migrants 
from Anglo-Saxon countries are noticeably better supplied with cultural resources than 
the rest of the sub-sample: nearly two thirds have a tertiary education, over two thirds 
use the Internet daily and speak two or more foreign languages. The least favorable 
situation in terms of education and foreign languages is that of the Chinese, while 
immigrants from the former Soviet areas are most likely never to use the Internet. The 
latter fi nding is at least partly attributable to the higher proportion of elderly in this 
group. 
An important cultural asset which can promote integration is knowledge of the 
Hungarian language. 15.2% of migrants interviewed reported that Hungarian was 
their mother tongue and 62.4% spoke Hungarian beside their mother tongue at least 
at intermediate level. At the end of the questionnaire the interviewers were asked to 
rank the Hungarian language competence of the respondents on a 5-grade scale. A “1” 
indicated poor knowledge and a “5” indicated perfect command of the language. The 
results tally with the self-reporting of the respondents. 6% spoke very poorly and 12% 
earned a “2” while the rest knew Hungarian at least at an intermediate level.
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Figure 17 Level of education of migrants by country of origin (%)
Those who had residence permits for an indefi nite time spoke Hungarian slightly 
better than those with fi xed term permits; the former gained a score of 3.97 and the 
latter 3.62 on the 5-degree scale. Those who have lived in Hungary for at least fi ve 
years received a score of nearly 4, but those who arrived here 4 years ago or later only 
averaged 3.36. As regards geographic origins, those from the Balkans spoke the best 
Hungarian (4.41), followed by migrants from the former Soviet Union (4.11). The poorest 
speakers of Hungarian were the Chinese with an average of hardly over 3. Diff erences 
are statistically signifi cant.
Figure 18 Migrants’ knowledge of Hungarian
(as evaluated by interviewers using a 5-item scale, mean)


50
Social resources
Research results have previously indicated that the amount of social resources 
considerably infl uences an individual’s well-being and the success of their integration. 
We therefore measured several dimensions of social capital: number of friends, the 
level of generalized and institutional trust, and the capacity for cognitive mobilization 
(Inglehart 1970). Let us start by describing interpersonal relations.
91.6% of migrants mentioned that they had foreigners (non-Hungarians) as friends, 
either in their native country, or among their ethnic group in Hungary, or from some 
other country. By contrast, only 16.2% of Hungarian respondents had foreigners as 
friends. Since over two thirds of Hungarian respondents have not been abroad in the 
past 5 years and 95.2% have never lived in another country for more than three months, 
the low number of foreign friends is not surprising. 95.3% of migrants have Hungarian 
friends, and although the number of Hungarian friends cannot be defi ned from the 
questionnaire, the process of integration is likely to be made easier by having at least 
one Hungarian friend.
When asked if the main criterion for choosing friends is that the individuals should 
be people from their own social stratum or their own nationality, a little over two thirds 
of Hungarians and half the migrants answered that they would choose friends on the 
basis of social stratum. A sense of national homophily characterized about one third 
of both sub-samples. 17% of migrants (compared to 6.3% of Hungarians) claimed 
they would choose a friend using quite diff erent criteria. The main stress was laid on 
personality traits and the importance of common interests as well as homophily by age.
Migrants have far more friends on the average than Hungarians. While the 
Hungarians had an average of 7.8 friends,15 the corresponding mean was 13 for migrants. 
This diff erence is partly attributable to the composition of the sub-samples: the migrant 
sample has proportionately more males and more of the higher educated, younger 
and urban residents. These socio-demographic variables are generally correlated with 
having more friends (i.e. compared to variables of being a woman, less well educated, 
older and living in small communities16).
Looking at the sub-groups of migrants we fi nd that there are no signifi cant diff erences 
between the immigrants’ legal status and their having or not having Hungarian friends. 
But those with a fi xed term residence permit usually have more friends than those 
who stay for indefi nite periods of time (average number of friends being 13 and 9, 
respectively). As for country of origin, somewhat fewer respondents from China and 
from “other” (African, South American, Near eastern) countries have Hungarian friends 
(89-92%) than those from other regions but the diff erence is statistically insignifi cant. 
15 To deal with the distorting eff ect of outlier values reported by respondents who said they had more than 
25 friends, researchers calculated using a maximum value of 25.
16 Two things must be noted here: fi rst, in both sub-samples those who report to having no secondary 
education certifi cate reported to having more friends than those with diplomas, and second, there is no 
linear connection between age and number of friends in the migrant sample, with the average number of 
friends in the group of 50-59 years being higher than for the previous two age groups.
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The number of friends is highest for those coming from Anglo-Saxon and other Asian 
countries with an average of 16 friends and lowest for those who come from the former 
Soviet areas (11 friends). Considering the length of stay, it was found that fewer of those 
who have been living in Hungary for 0–4 and 9–15 years have Hungarian friends than 
those who have lived here for 5–8, or at least 16 years. As regards the average number 
of friends, no statistically signifi cant diff erences were found.
Figure 19 Number of friends (mean)
Note: The question was: ”Altogether, how many friends do you have at home (in Hungary) or abroad?”
The level of cognitive mobilization (operationalized through discussions about political 
topics) (Inglehart 1970) is lower for migrants than Hungarians (except for those from 
the Balkans and from Anglo-Saxon areas; the proportion for the latter being even 
higher than for Hungarians17). Over half of all migrants almost never discuss political 
questions with their friends, two fi fths rarely do, and only 7.3% often discuss political 
issues. By contrast, double the number of Hungarians (14.5%) discuss political questions 
with their friends (and 10.2 percentage points fewer Hungarians never talk politics 
with friends). These fi ndings are particularly intriguing because when the correlation 
between schooling, gender, age and the answers to this question are examined, we 
fi nd that the higher qualifi ed, the men and the elderly discuss politics more than the 
lower educated, the women and the younger generations. Those in the 50-59 year 
age bracket appear to be the most active at discussing politics and this proportion 
slightly decreases above 60. Two of the three eff ects – education and gender – would 
in theory suggest that the migrants would be more active at discussing politics as they 
are higher educated on average and there is a higher proportion of male migrants than 
for the Hungarian sample. Nevertheless, fewer migrants reported that they discussed 
political issues with friends than Hungarians.
17 On the basis of length of stay in Hungary, no statistically signifi cant diff erences were found between 
groups of migrants.

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One reason for this may be that migrants are less interested in Hungarian politics and 
pay more attention to the events in their countries of origin. Indeed, migrants’ answers 
revealed that they are generally less interested in politics in general, but pay somewhat 
more attention to political, social and economic events in their native countries than in 
Hungary (see Borbála Göncz’s paper in this volume for more detail).
Beside interpersonal relations, another important type of social resource is trust. 
During our research we tested the level of generalized and institutional trust of the two 
sub-samples.
The level of generalized trust is considerably higher for migrants than Hungarians. 
Every sixth migrant opined that one can trust people “almost always”, while only every 
thirty-sixth Hungarian respondent shared this view. While over half the migrants 
said “one can usually trust people”, this proportion is hardly more than one third for 
Hungarians.
Checking the eff ects of control variables using cross tabulation we fi nd that 
women, the less well educated, the economically inactive and older people are on the 
average less trusting (for the Hungarian sample) than men, the more highly educated, 
the economically active and younger individuals, although there is no linear correlation 
with age. By contrast, the only statistically signifi cant correlation was between trust and 
age of migrants: younger migrants are generally more trusting than older ones.
Table 9 Distribution of respondents by various levels of generalized trust (%)
Hungarian society Immigrants
GENERALIZED TRUST
People can almost always be trusted. 2.8 15.8
People can usually be trusted. 36.5 51.2
You usually can’t be too careful in dealing with people. 44.2 26.1
You almost always can’t be too careful in dealing with people. 16.4 6.9
N 1480 
Note: The question was: ”Generally speaking, would you say that people 
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”
So as to be able to compare various groups of respondents, we ascribed marks from 
1 to 4 to diff erent answers, “1” corresponding to “You can hardly ever trust people” and 
“4” to “You can almost always trust people”. On this virtual scale Hungarians scored 2.26 
and immigrants 2.76, indicating that migrants have more generalized trust in people. 
Analyzed using the variable of country of origin, those coming from former Soviet areas 
displayed the lowest level of trust at 2.56, but even this is well above the Hungarian 
mean. The highest level of trust is found for those coming from other Asian countries 
(3.02), followed by those from Anglo-Saxon countries and then from the Balkans. The 
general trust of migrants from “other” (African, South American, Near Eastern) countries 
is around the average for the migrants. No signifi cant diff erences are found according 
to date of arrival, whereas the immigrant’s legal status proved to be signifi cant: the trust 
levels of those with a residence permit for an indefi nite length of time (2.36) comes 
close to the mean of the Hungarian sub-sample, while the level of those with a fi xed 
53
term residence permit (2.75) is close to the mean of the migrants. Those who left their 
countries to study are more trusting (3.10) than others, but those who left with the 
hope of a better standard of living had lower trust in people (2.59) than those who did 
not mention this cause for their emigration.
 
Figure 20 Generalized trust by groups (mean)
We also examined trust in fi ve institutions. Respondents utilized an 11-point scale to 
record their trust in the Hungarian parliament, the police, the Hungarian government, 
the Offi  ce of Immigration and Nationality and the local government. Migrants displayed 
greater trust in all fi ve institutions on the whole than Hungarians, with the greatest 
diff erence between the two sub-samples being with the Immigration offi  ce. While the 
migrants trusted this institution to the greatest extent,18 this offi  ce was placed third 
among trusted institutions in the Hungarian sub-sample. It must be noted, however, 
that compared to the other institutions, the Immigration offi  ce was the one which 
Hungarians knew least about (or did not wish to answer the question related to it): 
while 96% of Hungarian respondents replied to the questions about the other four 
institutions, only 72% expressed an opinion concerning the OIN). In both sub-samples 
highest trust was felt toward the local government and the police while parliament and 
the government were thought to be least trustworthy.
18 Concerning this question, quantitative and qualitative research results are somewhat contradictory: 
in focus group discussions, migrants unequivocally expressed negative opinions about the OIN (see Éva 
Vépy-Schlemmer’s research in this volume). It is hypothesised that, when fi lling the questionnaire, some 
latent motivation (wish to fulfi ll expectations, fear) resulted in the high rate of positive answers, or perhaps 
immigrants had no fi rst-hand experience of the rest of the institutions, unlike with OIN.

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Table 10 Trust of respondents in institutions (mean)
How much do you trust…? Hungarian society Immigrants N
 the Hungarian Parliament 4.51 6.68 1417
the Police 5.35 7.18 1443
the Hungarian Government 4.45 6.64 1418
the Offi  ce of Immigration and 
Nationality
4.66 7.83 1192
the local government 5.38 7.51 1420
Note: The question was: “Please tell me, on a scale of 0 to 10, how much you personally trust each of the 
following institutions to usually make the right decisions.  ‘0 ’ means that ‘you do not trust an institution at all’ 
and ‘10’ means ‘you have complete trust’.”
Looking at the distribution of answers, one fi nds that the migrants’ answers are left-
tailed, while the answers of the Hungarians are fairly evenly distributed along the scale. 
For the migrants, the proportion of those who do not trust (indicated by 0-4 on the 
scale) in the mentioned institution was highest (17%) for the Hungarian government; 
followed by the Hungarian parliament (15.5%); the rest of the three institutions being 
judged somewhat more trustworthy.
To measure institutional trust we used principal component analysis for the 
answers, revealing the respondents’ trust in the mentioned fi ve institutions. The 
principal components preserved 77% of the information in the answers of the 
Hungarians and 80% in the migrants’ answers. Positive principal component scores 
indicate a higher level of trust, negative scores indicate a lower level of trust. The 
analysis confi rmed that the highest level of trust in the institutions of the host 
country was reported by migrants from other Asian countries and the least trust 
was found for those from “other” (African, South American, Near Eastern) countries. 
The mean of the scores were also negative for those originating from former Soviet 
areas and the Balkans. Considering the date of arrival, the only positive score was 
found for the group that arrived 5-8 years ago, while those who have lived here for 
over 15 years had the least trust in Hungarian institutions. No statistically signifi cant 
diff erences could be found according to the legal status of immigrants. When trust 
was correlated with the causes of migration, one variable was signifi cant: those who 
left their native country in the hope of higher living standards displayed less trust in 
Hungarian institutions than those who did not mention this reason as a motivation. 
This result might also be attributed to the fact that those without a secondary 
education mentioned having a “better life” as being among their hopes to a greater 
extent than those with a secondary education, but the diff erence remains signifi cant 
even if the eff ect of schooling is controlled for.
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Figure 21 Trust in institutions by country of origin (mean of principal component scores)
Figure 22 Trust in institutions by date of arrival in Hungary
(mean of principal component scores)
To conclude, it can be declared that, on the basis of studied variables, migrants are 
better supplied with social resources both in terms of friendships and of generalized 
and institutional trust than the host society, Hungary. Of all the examined variables the 
level of cognitive mobilization was higher in the host society than for migrants, but it is 
also possible that this variable should be reckoned with as a manifestation of political 
interest, and not as a social resource. It should not be forgotten, however, that the 
conversion of the migrants’ cultural and social resources into their advantage requires 
the overcoming a lot of potential diffi  culties (i.e. qualifi cations, expertise, knowledge 
of foreign languages cannot usually directly be translated into economic value). There 
are also great diff erences between individual migrant groups in their possession of 
resources. Those who have lived in Hungary with unrestricted residence or immigration 

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permits are more similar (according to several indicators) to Hungarian society than 
those who have fi xed term residence permits, while the command of Hungarian in the 
former group is better than in latter. As regards country of origin, those coming from 
Anglo-Saxon areas are the best equipped of all with resources.
CONCLUSION
The research described herein focused on a comparison of the socio-demographic 
features and cultural and social resources of third country nationals and members of 
Hungarian society. It also explored diff erences between migrant groups as regards their 
legal status and length of stay in the host country, their countries of origin and their 
motivation for migration.
In sum, it can be said that the largest number of the studied migrants came from 
neighboring countries but the share of migrants from Asia is also high. About half of all 
migrants studied have permanent residence permits and half have fi xed term residence 
permits, meaning that Hungary is probably not their fi nal destination, or that they may 
have affi  liations with other countries. A very high proportion of migrants relocated 
for family reasons (or when other reasons were specifi ed, family, kinship or friendship 
relations were additional infl uential factors in their decision to move to Hungary). Many 
mentioned work, study or the hope of a higher standard of living as reasons to migrate.
In harmony with offi  cial statistics and other earlier empirical research fi ndings, our 
research confi rmed that the age structure of migrants is younger than that of Hungarian 
society. Immigrants are also more economically active and they are concentrated in the 
Central Hungarian region (and within it, Budapest) to a far greater degree than the 
Hungarian population. As for cultural resources, migrants are more highly educated, 
use the Internet more and speak more foreign languages (on average) than Hungarians. 
However, when having qualifi cations and knowledge which they have accumulated 
elsewhere accepted, they may face diffi  culties. This topic was not explored in the frame 
of this research. As regards social resources, we found that migrants have more friends 
and have higher levels of trust in people in general (even their trust in Hungarian 
institutions is higher). If the conclusions of Örkény and Székelyi (2009a) prove to be 
true, this higher level of trust might be a sign of a low level of integration and will not 
function as convertible capital.
For migrants, signifi cant diff erences can be found according to their legal status, 
length of stay in Hungary and country of origin. Immigrants from the successor 
countries of the former USSR – the greater part of whom are from Ukraine – are 
overrepresented in terms of their likelihood of having a permanent residence permits, 
having lived in Hungary for a long time and being older than average. Concerning 
socio-demographic and labor market variables they are thus closest in nature to the 
host society. Migrants who originate from Anglo-Saxon countries on average fare 
better than the rest of the migrant groups (and the Hungarian population) in terms 
of labor-market positions and cultural and social resources; only migrants from Asian 
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countries are supplied with social resources to a similar but somewhat lesser degree. 
As for correlating drivers of migration and resource variables, those who left their 
native lands in the hope of a better standard of living have below average trust both in 
people in general and in Hungarian institutions. Though the hope of a better life was 
mentioned more frequently as a driver for migration by the less well educated than by 
those with a secondary school education, the correlation remains signifi cant when the 
variable of education is controlled for.
The rest of the research in this book explores how the socio-demographic variables 
and cultural and social resources of immigrants (and the Hungarian sample) correlate 
with their material resources, their sense of justice and dignity and their objective and 
subjective well-being, and also how all this relates to the political and civic activities of 
migrants. 
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THE SOCIAL INDICATORS OF 
IMMIGRANTS AND HUNGARIANS
Eleonóra Szanyi-F. 
INTRODUCTION
Most of the research in this volume focus on the factors which infl uence political and 
civic participation; themes which the present chapter only touches tangentially. This 
chapter describes the social variables of the Hungarians and immigrants, and the 
factors that presumably infl uence subjective well-being. The cognitive dimension of 
well-being – satisfaction – is at the heart of this chapter, analyzed using a group of 
variables which cover various dimensions of life.
Besides the objective factors which make up quality of life, such as the economic 
resources of both society and the individual, increasing emphasis has paid to on 
examining subjective well-being in recent decades. In reviewing the set of subjective 
social indicators, Hegedűs (2002) diff erentiates between three groups. The fi rst group 
contains indicators based on personal opinions, which measure well-being indirectly 
but are not overtly centered on it (e.g. subjective social status). The second group 
includes indicators that relate directly to personal or social well-being (e.g. through the 
evaluation of a country’s economic situation), and the third group includes variables 
through which respondents do not merely assess their own or society’s status but 
also qualify it. Indicators for satisfaction and happiness belong to this third category. 
Researchers specify the former as being the cognitive component of subjective 
well-being and the latter as its aff ective dimension. As Lengyel (2002) points out, 
the interrelation of the two dimensions may change by culture; diff erent societies 
being predominated by diff erent norms which serve to regulate when it is “proper” 
to be happy or satisfi ed. By way of an example, Lengyel and Janky (2002) mention 
the traditions of countries in which there is a Confucian following where indicators of 
satisfaction “tend to the middle”; that is, social norms dictate that individuals should not 
be too satisfi ed or too dissatisfi ed. An interesting fi nding related to this example comes 
from the research of Örkény and Székelyi (2010a) who examined six immigrant ethnic 
groups in Hungary. They found that the level of satisfaction with their situation was 
lowest for Chinese immigrants. In western societies it is the ambition to be satisfi ed, 
rather than reaching some ideal level of satisfaction that is expected of the individual.
When categorizing subjective social indicators, Hegedűs (2002) mentions another 
two theories. After Eckersley (2000) she diff erentiates between information about the 
working of entire societies and information about an individual’s own life. In this regard, 
the present research concentrates on the latter. Hegedűs mentions another typology 
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which describes the quality of living; namely the categories drawn up by Berman-
Philips (2000), who diff erentiates between four dimensions: social-economic security, 
social involvement, social cohesion and social entitlement. All of these dimensions are 
dealt with in various elements of research throughout this book.
International research eff orts indicate that only a weak correlation can be found 
between the objective and subjective dimensions of well-being. However, research 
by Veenhoven (1996) and Cummins (2000) reveals that the strength of this correlation 
may diff er when examined using macro-economic indicators. Also, examining the 
relationship between the cognitive or aff ective dimensions of subjective well-being and 
economic resources may result in diff erent outcomes. The more limited the individual’s 
economic resources, the stronger the correlation between the two variables (Hegedűs 
2002). In an international perspective, one fi nds that a certain level of material security 
is required, but in countries with more developed democracy in  the use of objective 
well-being indicators will not give decisive results. More precisely, the connection 
between the level of development and subjective well-being at a macro level does not 
necessarily mean that within a given society material relations play an important role 
(Lengyel 2002). With reference to German social well-being research, Lengyel (2002) 
proposes the following framework for explaining the terminology of objective and 
subjective well-being:
Table 1 The connection between objective and subjective well-being
Subjective well-being
Objective well-being Good Bad
Good Well-being Dissonance
Bad Adaptation Deprivation
Source: Berger-Schmitt and Noll (2000), (quoted by Lengyel 2002, p. 15)
Lengyel contends that, when taking the whole of society into account, the fewer the 
deprived and the closer the evaluation of objective well-being is to subjective appraisals 
of wellbeing, the more balanced the functioning of that society is.
Of particular interest for research into migration is the volume “Culture and 
Subjective Well-being”, edited by Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (2000), for the essays 
in the book look at the eff ect of individual variables on subjective well-being alongside 
the diff erent cultures typical of diff erent societies. Comparative analyses suggest that, 
in richer countries which function according to democratic principles, subjective well-
being is higher. One of the starting statements provided in the research of Inglehart and 
Klingemann (2000) is the contradiction that although the satisfaction and happiness 
indexes of more advanced countries are higher on average, there are some countries 
that display lower levels of subjective well-being than their level of development would 
indicate. One of these countries is Hungary. The authors conclude that the socialist 
past and the high proportion of workers employed in the industrial sector exerts a 
signifi cant negative eff ect on subjective well-being, while economic development 
infl uences it positively. These implications cannot be overlooked when the situation 
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of immigrants is scrutinized, since migrants often come from less developed and non-
democratic countries.
As for Hungarian society, subjective well-being (and particularly satisfaction 
and happiness) have been examined by Lengyel and Janky (2002). For both 
variables they analyzed the impact of economic, social and cultural resources with 
the help of individual and contextual variables. Their examination concluded that 
in Hungary, trust (refl ecting social embeddedness) exerted a more powerful eff ect 
than economic resources on wellbeing. The extent of subjective well-being was 
signifi cantly infl uenced by the level of trust in the social environment. Regarding 
models which attempt to explain subjective well-being, Diener and Suh (2000) 
warn that the causal relation between the dependent and explanatory variables 
is not always unambiguous because the direction of causality cannot always be 
determined by cross-section analyses. Taking the previous fi nding, for example, it is 
not clear whether people who have higher levels of trust evaluate their subjective 
well-being more highly, or conversely, whether satisfi ed people tend to trust their 
environment to a greater extent.
Indicators of objective well-being
The degree of objective well-being was examined along several dimensions using 
the questionnaire from the research described herein, of which two dimensions are 
highlighted in this chapter. One variable was household net income, while the other 
was a property index – a standardized, additive index – created according to the assets 
of respondents1. The net income of host country households did not exceed HUF 
150,000 for 50% of the sub-sample. The most commonly chosen income category 
– 18% of the sample – was HUF 150-200,000. As for the immigrants, the mode and 
median of the sub-sample fell into the same income category, HUF 150-200,000. It 
may be noted, however, that there was a very high proportion of missing data about 
income (44%)2. The sub-samples of Hungarians and immigrants slightly diff ered in 
this regard. More immigrants refused to answer the income question (53%) while 
only 40% of Hungarians refused to supply the requested information. The “no-answer” 
pattern is similar for the two groups. Due to a lack of suffi  cient data about income, it 
was expedient to use a property index in addition (and often instead of ) household 
income to gauge objective well-being3. The property index gives an approximate 
1 The index includes the following items: car of less than 3 years old, holiday cottage, valuable art object, 
digital camera, automatic washing machine, mp3 player, PC, colour TV, credit card, bank account, cell phone. 
After standardization of the number of properties, values were added up to create the index.
2 Örkény and Székelyi (2010a) faced a similar problem and therefore did not examine income because of the 
“extremely high rate” of non-answers.
3 In some parts of the analysis the 19 income categories of the survey were further simplifi ed to “below-
average”, “average” and “above-average” categories. The below-average group had an income of less than HUF 
110,000, the average group had a family income of between 110,000 and 250,000, and the above-average 
group had household income of above 250,000.
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economic picture of those who were reluctant to identify their income. In both 
sub-samples, those in the lowest income categories were overrepresented from the 
group of those who refused to report on their incomes (and this proportion was 
slightly higher for immigrants). Above the bottom income category, the readiness to 
reply increased considerably, then started to decrease again towards the top income 
bracket (see Figure 15 of the Appendix). The correlation between the two indices 
for those who answered the question was 0.614; and was slightly higher (0.651) for 
Hungarians than for migrants (0.539).
On the basis of the property index, the property status of migrants was found to 
be better than that of the Hungarians. The value was -1.07 for Hungarians and 2.14 
for immigrants; the diff erence not being notable if we consider that the standard 
distribution for the Hungarian mean was 5.61 and that of the immigrants 7.1 – but 
the results of T tests show a signifi cant diff erence. What partially explains the diff erent 
means is that, in the sub-sample of immigrants there are a higher proportion of qualifi ed, 
young, active people whose fi nancial standing is also presumably better4. Comparing 
the two sub-samples, the largest diff erences were found between age groups. In all 
age groups for immigrants the mean property index was positive; the highest was for 
the 50–59-year-olds at 4.75. For Hungarian society, only the property index of those 
below 29 was positive, for the next two age groups it was around zero but did not 
diff er signifi cantly from the group of below 29. In the age group above 50, however, it 
dropped below –1; a signifi cant deviation from the value of the youngest age group. 
Data for income showed similar results: in the Hungarian sample younger generations 
appeared to be better off  fi nancially (up to 49 years of age), while immigrants above 
40 reported to being in better fi nancial circumstances. Naturally, the “inactive” had low 
incomes in both sub-samples. It is not surprising then that the age variable negatively 
correlated to household income; the connection being stronger in the Hungarian case, 
and weaker but positive for the migrants.6 
Objective and subjective well-being can both infl uence a person’s position on 
the labor market. The proportion of Hungarians who do not undertake regular wage 
earning activity is much higher at 54% than that of the migrants, which is 32% on 
average. There is a considerable diff erence between the two inactive groups using the 
property index (–2.92 for Hungarians and 2.01 for migrants). The state and length of 
inactivity must have diff erent causes for the two groups.
In terms of cultural resources, similar diff erences can be discerned. These were 
measured using the variables of “level of education”, “use of the Internet” and “number 
of languages spoken”. For the four categories of schooling, the mean property index 
4 See Dorottya Kisfalusi’s research in this book.
5 From the age groups within the immigrant sub-sample the diff erences were only signifi cant at a low (0.05) 
level.
6 Pearson’s correlation coeffi  cient was –0.281, at a 0.000 signifi cance level for Hungarians, and 0.112, at a 
0.087 signifi cance level for migrants. Household income was measured using 19 categories, while age was 
recorded as a continuous variable.
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of migrants in all categories was higher – except for those with secondary education 
certifi cates, where the results were similar. The most conspicuous diff erence was found 
in the category of “maximum eight primary grades” of schooling: here, migrants had 
a mean of 1.15, the corresponding fi gure in the Hungarian sub-sample being –4.46. 
Schooling and household income was far more strongly correlated for the host society. 
The Pearson correlation coeffi  cient was 0.535 for the Hungarian group and 0.139 for 
migrants.7
Örkény and Székelyi (2010a) attribute the weak correlation between schooling 
and labor market status to the migrants’ language and other diffi  culties in fi nding 
an adequate job to match their education The weak correlation between material 
resources and level of schooling for migrants is probably traceable back to this; in other 
words, it is not necessarily the higher educated that earn more.
In the questionnaire another index was used to measure cultural resources; namely, 
use of the Internet. Here, respondents could be divided into three categories: those 
who never used it, those who used it once a week/month and those who used it daily. 
A signifi cantly higher proportion of Hungarians – 48% – never used the Internet, as 
compared to 13% of the migrant sub-sample. Proportions of daily Internet users were 
almost the same for the two sub-samples for the same property category. When less 
frequent use of the Internet is considered, the diff erence is greater still. The mean 
property index for migrants who use the Internet once a week/month was over two 
points higher than for Hungarians, and that of non-users was 4 points higher. Internet 
use only showed a strong and signifi cant correlation with household income for the 
host society.
Finally, the objective well-being indicators were also compared with the number of 
spoken languages. In the sub-sample of migrants there were a far higher proportion 
of those who spoke two or more foreign languages. For Hungarian respondents, a 
mere 8.3% reported to speaking more than one foreign language (compared to 59% 
of migrants). This is presumably why – similarly to Internet use – a positive correlation 
between the number of foreign languages and household income can only be found 
in the Hungarian sub-sample, as a positive answer actually has some “resource value” 
for that group. The same reason must underlie the fact that there are no considerable 
diff erences between sub-samples in terms of the number of spoken languages, though 
for the category of “no other languages spoken” the Hungarians lag behind by two 
points. There is nothing surprising about fi ndings concerning info-communicational 
tools and foreign languages, for being an immigrant implies the daily use of these 
instruments. As for foreign languages (Hungarian for the majority of migrants) these 
are obviously required to succeed in getting about in a new environment, while 
immigrants rely on the Internet to maintain contact with home.
In sum, it can be said that the sub-sample of migrants benefi t from stronger objective 
well-being indicators, which can partly be attributed to their being better equipped with 
7 Household income was ranged into 19 categories, and schooling into 4.
64
cultural resources. Schooling, the number of languages spoken and the use of the Internet 
correlate to property or income less weakly for this group, as the sub-sample appears to 
be more homogeneous regarding these three variables than the Hungarian sub-sample. 
Our fi ndings confi rm the pattern that has been identifi ed in other pieces of research (e.g. 
Örkény and Székelyi 2010b): the proportion of younger, better educated, urban males is 
greater for immigrants, which shows in their greater ownership of economic resources as 
well. The diff erences between the two sub-samples are more conspicuous in the groups 
with some sort of disadvantage. Lower educated and inactive migrants are somewhat 
better equipped with economic resources than Hungarians. One explanation may be that 
migration itself requires the mobilization of resources; that is, migrants arrived to Hungary 
already in possession of some resources, be they material resources or psychological 
factors such as strong motivation or aspirations.
It is worth examining whether the homogeneity of the migrant sub-sample 
remains when the country of origin is looked at. The following groups of countries were 
diff erentiated: successor states of the former Soviet Union, China, Anglo-Saxon countries, 
former Balkan states, other Asian countries and the “other” areas (Africa, South America, 
and Near East). The means for these groups are the following: the table is topped by the 
Anglo-Saxons with an index value of 7.14, although the number of respondents in this 
group was very low (27 people) and the distribution was the greatest (see table below). 
This group is followed by migrants from the other Asian countries (with 4.88), the Chinese 
(3.51) and those from “other” counties (2.33). Last but one in the table is the group of 
migrants from the former Soviet areas (0.66). Those from the Balkans are placed last 
(–0.26). Since the most populous subgroup of immigrants from the former USSR came 
from Ukraine, it can be asserted that property ownership of migrants from geographically 
closer areas is closest to the average of Hungarian society. A similar pattern is found when 
examining average, above-average and below-average household incomes.
Figure 1 Property index means by country of origin
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Indicators of subjective well-being
Several questions in the survey probed the respondents’ subjective well-being. The 
aff ective dimension – happiness of the respondents – was measured using a 7-point 
scale. Satisfaction – the cognitive dimension index– was assessed using a group of 13 
variables. Questions related to the individual’s fi nancial standing, housing conditions, 
career, personal relationships, state of health, impressions about law and order, social 
prestige and future prospects. Since there were themes addressed by several questions 
and the mean of the answers were near identical and strongly correlated, they could 
be grouped. A principal component was also created from the variables to describe 
“satisfaction”. Separate satisfaction indicators were drawn up for the two sub-samples 
(which excluded career variables because the proportion of missing answers would 
have signifi cantly reduced the size of the sample).
Our variables were well suited to factor analysis on the basis of Bartlett’s test and 
the KMO criteria alike. The eigenvalues and the variances they explained would have 
justifi ed the creation of two principal components as well, but since all variables sat 
more strongly on the fi rst factor and the aim was to reduce the number of variables, 
the use of one principal component was decided upon. A similar pattern emerged for 
the majority society sample and the migrants, but the fi rst variance explained by the 
principal component slightly diff ered.
Table 2 Factors of subjective well-being
 Hungarian Immigrants
KMO 0.915 0.896
eigenvalue 1 5.76 6.19
eigenvalue 2 1.43 1.01
variance explained 1 52.39 56.313
variance explained 2 12.975 9.179
On the whole, the model accounted for the variability of the host society to a greater 
extent, while for migrants the fi rst two factors and the selected fi rst factor condensed a 
greater proportion of the information.
The fi rst principal component can be labeled “general satisfaction” in both samples as 
it was at least moderately strongly correlated to all variables (fi nancial standing, income 
and standard of living correlated most strongly to this factor) The second principal 
component was comprised of the interpersonal relations factor of satisfaction, as 
strongest correlation was found with the variables of friends and family. The latter factor 
suggests some sort of compensation, as in both sub-samples it negatively correlated 
to variables which recorded material satisfaction. In other words, besides the category 
of general satisfaction, there is a group of respondents who are less satisfi ed with their 
economic resources and emphasize their satisfaction with their interpersonal relations.
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Figure 2 Indicators of satisfaction8
The figure reveals that migrants testify to a higher degree of satisfaction (with all 
variables) than the host society: T-tests proved that the difference was significant 
in each case. The greatest variance is found with “future prospects”. In both sub-
samples answers were most widely deviated when future prospects and social 
prestige were examined; for Hungarians the question addressing health also 
produced a greater degree of standard deviation (N. B. valid answers to questions 
about careers were collected from far fewer respondents: 737 Hungarians and 309 
migrants).
Satisfaction correlates to age and level of schooling somewhat differently for 
the two sub-samples. For Hungarians, schooling significantly correlated to all 
studied themes, and most significantly to health. For migrants, by contrast, there is 
hardly any correlation with level of schooling. Age correlated to some variables in 
both sub-samples, most strongly to the indicator of health, which is not surprising. 
Compared to schooling, age appears to be a more relevant variable for migrants, as 
it correlates to more indicators (and more strongly to them) than for the Hungarian 
sub-sample.
8 “Finances” implies satisfaction with standard of living, household income and fi nancial standing, “housing 
conditions” means satisfaction with housing and its surroundings. “Personal relations” designates family and 
friendships.
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Table 3 Correlation coeffi  cients of satisfaction by schooling and age in the two sub-samples
 Schooling Age
 Hung. Sig Imm. Sig Hung. Sig Imm. Sig
Finances .283 .000 –.008 .863 –.057 .077 –.260 .000
Career .225 .000 –.003 .958 .066 .172 –.072 .210
Housing conditions .176 .000 –.029 .522 .114 .000 –.008 .850
Personal relations .249 .000 .087 .053 –.142 .000 –.230 .000
State of health .317 .000 .009 .845 –.441 .000 –.504 .000
Public law and order .077 .016 .001 .978 –.048 .130 –.246 .000
Future prospects .282 .000 .088 .053 –.123 .000 –.386 .000
Social prestige .172 .000 .062 .176 –.036 .261 –.284 .000
Principal component .310 .000 .036 .439 –.090 .006 –.318 .000
Examining the variable of happiness we arrive at similar results: on an imaginary 7-step 
ladder the migrants (5.04) occupied a higher step than the Hungarians (4.29); T-tests 
suggest that the diff erence is signifi cant9.
A subjective assessment of the current life situation of migrants is also refl ected 
by the answers given to the question of whether if they had stayed in their country of 
origin they would be worse (–1) or better off  (+1), or in the same situation (a positive 
value means a negative appraisal of their status in Hungary). Migrants generally 
reported that their fi nances, housing conditions, career and social prestige were higher 
after the relocation. The means of the answers to family relations (0.05) and state of 
health (–0.05) are around 0, but as regards friendship and a sense of familiarity, migrants 
indicated that they would have been better staying at home.
Figure 3 Assessment of migrants’ situation in Hungary compared to 
what their imagined situation would be in their country of origin
9 T-test = 14.28****
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When the variables are examined in pairs, signifi cant correlation can be found 
between the dimensions at a 0.000 level.10 Some regularity can also be discerned in 
the relationships between the indicators. External dimensions (such as fi nances, work, 
housing conditions, and social recognition) correlate more strongly to each other than 
to other variables. Personal relations variables (family, friends, a sense of familiarity 
as well as social prestige) also strongly correlate to each other. Out of the variables 
studied, health has the lowest correlation to the rest, and social prestige has a medium 
strong correlation to all the others. It is interesting that social prestige correlates most 
to having a sense of familiarity.
Since the number of dimensions was too high, some variables were combined 
along the mentioned categories. One variable which stood for external resources 
and one for personal relations was created (as the simple means of the previous three 
variables). The variable about social prestige was treated separately and the question 
about health was ignored.
Breaking down the data to geographic groups, it was found for each theme that 
those from Anglo-Saxon countries would have fared better if they had remained at 
home. It applies to all the other groups of countries that in terms of objective factors 
the migrants assess their decision to relocate positively and in terms of personal 
relations, they judge it rather negatively. Apart from the Anglo-Saxon countries, there 
are no signifi cant diff erences along any dimension with other groups of countries. In 
all groups, a negative assessment of changes in friendships and a sense of familiarity 
served to reduce the combined variable; that is, the loss of these factors are most 
painful.
Figure 4 Comparison between the actual situation of the immigrant in Hungary and the 
imagined situation in the country of origin, by geographic group
10 Principal component analysis was not possible for the size of the scales.
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When the distribution of answers to this question is measured against level of schooling, 
it is found that there is no diff erence between groups in their evaluation of personal relations, 
but there is a lot of diff erence when it comes to evaluating external dimensions. Those who 
had gone through a maximum of eight years of schooling judged their current situation to 
be better to the greatest degree than it would be at home. The higher the level of education, 
the closer the means came to zero and the distribution of answers increased. Diff erences by 
geographic category are signifi cant. As regards social prestige, the proportion of those who 
judged their social recognition to be better in Hungary also increased with a rising level of 
education, but the diff erences between the groups are not signifi cant.
Figure 5 Evaluation of the decision to migrate by level of schooling
Figure 6 Evaluation of the decision to migrate by age group
By age, no signifi cant diff erences can be found along any dimension. In the age group of 
30–39 years there are a slightly higher proportion of those who appraise their external 
conditions in Hungary to be better, but the diff erence is only signifi cant compared to 
those who are above 60.
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The imaginary situation at home versus the actual situation in Hungary was also 
examined using the principal component (incorporating the property index and 
subjective well-being). The results show that the property index correlates stronger 
to the variables. The correlation indeces reveal that the wealthier evaluate their 
decision to migrate positively in view of personal and external relations and social 
prestige. Satisfaction, however, only had a similar impact on the assessment of social 
prestige and external factors. In other words, a higher proportion of the more satisfi ed 
think that their fi nancial and social standing in Hungary is better than it would be at 
home. It should be noted though, that although the correlations were signifi cant, the 
connections between the variables were weak.
Table 4 Evaluation of the decision to migrate, by satisfaction and property index
 Satisfaction princip. comp. Property index
Social prestige
Pearson –.126 –.157
Sig. .008 .001
Satisfaction with external conditions
Pearson –.128 –.160
Sig. .010 .001
Satisfaction with personal conditions
Pearson –.077 –.176
Sig. .108 .000
Social resources and indicators of well-being
Social resources as such and their connection with objective and, more important 
still, subjective well-being, deserve separate attention. Social relations and their 
functioning as social resources are illustrated using two variables: number of friends 
and self-assessment of social standing. As for the former question, the respondents 
were asked how many friends they had. The results were categorized into three groups: 
“0” designates no friends, “1” means 1–10 friends, “2” means more than 10 friends. Social 
standing was represented by an 11-point scale (a “ladder”) on which the respondent 
was asked to place him/herself, as compared to the rest of society.
Some problems are met with when the number of friends is compared between 
the two sub-groups, for a migrant’s circle of friends may “double” as he/she may keep 
in contact with friends at home and establish new friendships in Hungary. It was 
nonetheless posited that a complete lack of friends must still be used as a qualitative 
indicator. We have found that this was far truer for the Hungarian sub-sample than for 
migrants: 10.3% versus 3.4% reported to having no friends For migrants, there were a 
far higher proportion of those with more than 10 friends (60.1%) compared to 34.7% of 
the Hungarian sub-sample. It is obvious that the friends of migrants include far more 
non-Hungarians: 91.5% of migrants reported to having “foreign” friends as compared to 
16.2% of Hungarians. 95.45% of immigrants also had Hungarian friends. The number of 
friends correlates to the property index and the principal component of satisfaction for 
both sub-samples.
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Figure 7 Number of friends (by terciles of satisfaction)
The fi gure well illustrates that it is most frequently respondents in the lowermost 
category of subjective well-being that have no friends. When satisfaction increases, 
so does the number of friends for both sub-samples, although more linearly for the 
Hungarian group.
Figure 8 Number of friends by terciles of property index
On the property index a similar tendency can be observed: respondents who fall in 
the lowest categories of the index have least friends. In the Hungarian sub-sample, the 
higher the category, the higher the number of friends, while for migrants there is no 
substantial diff erence for the categories, apart from the lowermost.
Looking at these results one may wonder whether a lack of social resources 
causes respondents to have low levels of satisfaction and objective well-being, or 
whether, conversely, the less satisfi ed and fi nancially worse off  have more diffi  culties in 
establishing friendships.
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When we examine the self-assessment of respondents by social status, we fi nd a 
1-point11 diff erence between the two sub-samples; members of the host society placing 
themselves lower, at an average of 4.48 points. A study of the correlations in pairs reveals 
that in both populations a positive and a medium-to-strong self assessment strongly 
correlates with the additive index of satisfaction. Pearson’s correlation coeffi  cients 
assume a value of 0.603 for migrants and 0.515 for Hungarians. This variable also 
correlates to the property index, the coeffi  cients being 0.351 for the Hungarian and 
0.217 for the immigrant sub-sample.
Well-being and deprivation
After having described indicators for objective and subjective well-being, an attempt 
is made to combine the two methods of assessment according to the logic outlined 
in the section on their theoretical background. Berger-Schmitt–Noll (2000) and their 
colleagues mention two situations of equilibrium (deprivation and well-being) in their 
description of the interrelation of objective and subjective well-being. Deprivation is 
the state in which the individual is disadvantaged along both dimensions, and well-
being is advantageous in terms of both subjective and objective criteria. In addition, 
the authors diff erentiate between “inconsistent” situations in which the extremes of the 
two dimensions are combined (e.g. a dissatisfi ed rich person a satisfi ed poor person). 
To construct the new variables, the property index and an additive indicator were used 
to combine questions about satisfaction (the question about work was removed to 
eliminate the high frequency of responses from “inactive” respondents). Subjective well-
being12 and the property index were found to correlate more strongly for Hungarians 
(Pearson’s correlation index value = 0.332) than for immigrants (Pearson’s correlation 
index = 0.201). This indicates that property and subjective well-being is more strongly 
correlated in Hungarian society.
A disadvantage of the satisfaction index built of two dimensions is that the number 
of members of each category is diff erent for the two sub-samples, since both the 
subjective and the objective well-being indicators for immigrants had higher values, 
meaning that deprived migrants are underrepresented and well-off  migrants are 
overrepresented. The correlation between the two variables makes their distribution 
more uneven. Since the correlation was stronger in the Hungarian subsample, there 
was a greater chance that a member of the host society would fall into the same group 
(i.e. both dimensions). The following table illustrates the structure of classifi cation, and 
the fi gure shows the distribution using this classifi cation.
11 T test = 10.301****
12 It speaks against the use of the previously analyzed principal component which describes subjective 
well-being that it was created separately for the two sub-samples (that is, the 0 values do not coincide, which 
would result in errors in comparison, so it was thought more expedient to involve the variables in another 
form). The correlation between the additive index of a simple sum total and the principal component is 
0.998****.
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Table 5 The structure of classifi cation
Terciles of property index
Terciles of satisfaction
<= 59.00 60.00–80.00 81.00+
<= –3.20 Deprivation Mean Adaptation
–3.19–1.95 Mean Mean Mean
1.96+ Dissonance Mean Well-being
The data clearly show that the two-subsamples do not tally, the majority of Hungarian 
respondents being shifted toward the “deprived”, and migrants towards “well-being” 
descriptors. The classifi cation “works”, as in both the whole sample and in the sub-
samples there are fewer cases which appear inconsistent (i.e. show dissonance and 
adaptation). When inquiries are made to respondents about their level of satisfaction, 
it would be intriguing to know who they look upon as the reference category for their 
comparative self assessment.
Table 6 The explanatory model of subjective well-being in the two sub-samples
 Hungarian Immigrant Hungarian Immigrant Hungarian Immigrant
 St. B. Sig St. B. Sig St. B. Sig St. B. Sig St. B. Sig St. B. Sig
Constant  .020  .073  .000  .000  .062  .000
Logarithm of 
property index
.200 .000 .197 .001 .073 .075 .119 .029 .066 .144 .151 .004
Higher 
education
.059 .237 –.043 .459 –.067 .101 –.110 .042 –.040 .376 –.075 .142
Age (reference below 29)
30–39 –.023 .694 .016 .807 –.007 .880 .030 .615 –.006 .903 .062 .284
40–49 –.063 .268 –.152 .021 –.061 .185 –.109 .075 –.095 .065 –.053 .372
50–59 –.078 .175 –.192 .003 –.056 .221 –.137 .020 –.050 .326 –.091 .112
60- .032 .557 –.152 .012 .018 .679 –.127 .023 .027 .570 –.035 .513
Has no friends    .043 .284 .055 .299 –.046 .305 .073 .154
Position on the social ladder   .614 .000 .411 .000 .473 .000 .345 .000
Fairness         .293 .000 .231 .000
Trust         .212 .000 .326 .000
Adjusted R2 4 7 39 23 50 44
In the linear regression model for the explanation of subjective well-being the principal 
component representing 11 variables is the dependant variable. The above table 
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shows the results of the three models generated for the two sub-samples where the 
explanatory variables are the property index, higher education diploma, age, friends 
(more specifi cally, the eff ects of a lack of friends), self-assessment on the social ladder 
and the principal components created about procedural justice and trust. The property 
index was changed in the model and replaced by the logarithm of the property index 
as an explanatory variable because of the uneven diof the original variable.
The fi rst model reveals that property has nearly identical explanatory power for 
the two sub-samples, and schooling does not correlate to the dependant variable in 
either group. For migrants, age plays a signifi cant role, as those respondents above 40 
deviate from the reference category.
The second model also included two variables which refer to social resources; 
namely, the presence or absence of friends and the self-assessment position on the 
social ladder. The latter immediately took the dominant role from all the explanatory 
variables, and the explanatory force of the property index decreased with its 
involvement, particularly for the host country sub-sample. The having or not having 
of friends did not have any explanatory force for either group.
The last model additionally took the respondents’ levels of trust and opinions about 
procedural justice into consideration and both largely contributed to increasing the 
explanatory power of the model13.In both sub-samples the explanatory power of the 
assessment of one’s social status decreased, while the eff ect of age was eliminated 
entirely for migrants as was the eff ect of the property index for Hungarians. The fi nal 
model has a somewhat greater explanatory power for the Hungarian sample than for 
the migrants.
In sum, it can be concluded that similar results were arrived at for the two sub-
samples, the studied indicators were similarly structured. The main infl uence on the 
subjective well-being of the respondents was exerted by their self assessment of their 
social positions, how much they trust their environment and how fair (they think) that 
existing conditions are. For immigrants, property also has an impact on subjective 
well-being, but its explanatory force decreases when the range of dimensions is 
increased. This presumably means that “property” does not exert an infl uence directly 
but through other resources obtained through it.
Correlation of well-being indicators with political activity and civic 
participation
Another aim of the analysis was the examination of the interrelation of well-being 
indicators and political activity for the two sub-samples. Answers to questions about 
political activity and civic participation in the questionnaire suggested that the 
immigrants were less politically involved than Hungarians. This is even though they 
are in a more favorable position in terms of economic, cultural and social resources, 
which enhances inclination to participate in both fi elds, in general. On the scale which 
13 See in more detail the chapters of Lilla Tóth and Dorottya Kisfalusi in this volume.
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measures interest in politics, immigrants lag half a point behind Hungarian respondents, 
and the result is similar for interest in Hungarian economic, social and political news. 
Another diff erence between the two sub-samples is that, while for Hungarians the 
property index and satisfaction positively correlate to political interest and the following 
of news (as well as to media use), no such correlation can be found with migrants.
The picture is diff erent when active participation is examined: the higher the category, 
the greater the extent of political activity and civic participation in both sub-groups. In 
the questionnaire a block of 12 questions were designed to collect information about 
political activity. These questions were transformed into a dichotomous index with 
“0” designating no participation in any political action and “1” designating some sort of 
political involvement. The dummy variable for measuring civic participation (whether the 
respondent was a member of any civic organization) was created using the same logic.14
The fi gures clearly show that as one moves upwards through the terciles of the 
property index, inclination to participate increases for both sub-samples.15 For the 
Hungarian sub-sample this increase is more even, while for migrants the number of 
organizational members and the politically involved doubles.
Figure 9 Organizational membership by terciles of the property index
In the highest and lowest property categories there are no signifi cant diff erences 
between the two sub-samples concerning membership in organizations, but in the 
intermediate income bracket a higher proportion of Hungarians reported to being 
members. In terms of political participation, signifi cant diff erences were found between 
the sub-samples.
14 See for more detail the research undertaken by Borbála Göncz contained in this book.
15 The signifi cances of the fi gures relate to two items: 1) the correlation between the well-being indicator 
and participation on the basis of Sommer’s d index where it is posited that participation depends on well-
being; and 2) the signifi cance of the variance between the two sub-samples using the T-test (which assumes 
independence of samples).
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Figure 12 Political participation by the terciles of the property index
What may account for the uneven distribution is that the terciles of the property index 
were formed using the entire sample, so the distribution of migrants within it is less even 
than that of the Hungarians. Since frequencies refl ect the distribution within and not 
between categories, and the number of people within a category was at least 70, even 
for migrants, this weakens the reliability of the results rather than distorts the results.
Another possible explanation may be that the ethnic composition of higher 
property groups is diff erent from the lower groups (e.g. the property index mean of 
those from Anglo-Saxon countries was far higher than that of the other geographic 
groups, while the inclination to participate is also stronger in the political and civic 
culture of the latter countries).
Figure 11 Political participation and organizational membership by country of origin
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The fi gure illustrates that this assumption was not groundless; the sub-sample of 
immigrants is not homogeneous. Those from Anglo-Saxon countries and from other 
Asian countries reported belonging to civic organizations and taking part in political 
action to a far greater extent than the rest of the groups.
There is less unambiguous correlation with satisfaction. In the Hungarian sub-
sample, as respondents report higher levels of satisfaction, we fi nd that in the second 
tercile the rise in the proportion of those participating and those who are engaged in 
activity comes to a halt. In the higher categories, lower political participation is indicated. 
For migrants, the increase in organization membership is steady according to rising 
level of satisfaction. The correlation between the two variables is weak but signifi cant 
for both sub-samples. In the sub-sample of migrants no signifi cant correlation is found 
between political participation and subjective well-being.
Figure 12 Organizational membership by terciles of satisfaction
Figure 13 Political participation by terciles of the satisfaction index
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The fi gures also reveal that the diff erence between the two sub-samples is greatest for 
the intermediate category of subjective well-being, with Hungarians being far more 
politically active than immigrants.
One may conclude from the results that the property index (which describes 
objective well-being) is signifi cantly correlated to political activity and civic participation 
in both groups, and with a higher level of property ownership the extent of involvement 
increases.
Less unambiguous is correlation to subjective well-being. For Hungarians a weak 
but positive correlation to political activity and civic participation is observable, while 
for migrants this only applies to organizational membership.16
In addition to an independent examination of subjective and objective well-being, 
the categories created by the combination of the two variables on the basis of Noll’s 
categories were also examined. Other chapters of this book are devoted to explaining 
compound, multi-variable models explaining participation, so here only whether any 
diff erences can be found on the basis of the “constellation” of well-being indicators is 
detailed.
Figure 14 Correlation of well-being with political and civic participation
The Hungarian sub-sample17 shows that those in deprivation are substantially 
underrepresented in terms of civic and political participation, and this also applies to 
the category which describes those who “adapt” (that is, whose ownership of property 
places them in the bottom tercile but who belong to the top tercile in terms of 
subjective well-being).
16 See also the essay by György Lengyel in this book.
17 Breaking the sub-sample of migrants into further categories decreased the sizes of groups so much that 
reliable conclusions were impossible to draw.
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The well-off  are slightly overrepresented among the politically active, while civic 
participation is highest for this group. Those who gave dissonant responses in terms of 
the well-being indicators – that is, those who own most property yet at the same time 
report to having the least subjective well-being – were slightly overrepresented as civic 
organization members, and more interestingly, they were politically the most active. The 
question may be asked whether greater political involvement in the dissonant groups 
is caused by the constellation of the two variables; that is, by the fact that the person 
has resources and yet feels frustrated, or if the diff erences are caused by the generally 
observable higher activity of more propertied groups. On the basis of Sommer’s d and 
Cramer’s v indices which examine the connection of the variables, one may presume 
that belonging to a certain well-being category and the degree of civic participation 
are correlated, yet the variance is not explained by belonging to the given group.
80
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Berger- Schmitt, R. and H.-H. Noll. Conceptual Framework and Structure of a European 
System of Social Indicators. Mannheim: ZUMA, 2000.
Berman, Y. and D. Phillips. “Indicators of social quality and social exclusion at national 
and community level.” Social Indicators Research 50 (2000): 329–50.
Cummins, R. A. “Objective and subjective quality of life: an interactive model.” Social 
Indicators Research 52 (2000): 55–72. 
Eckersley, R. “The state and fate of nations: implications of subjective measures of 
personal and social equality of life.” Social Indicators Research 52 (2000): 3–27. 
Hegedűs, R. “Szubjektív társadalmi indikátorok – szelektív áttekintés a téma irodalmából” 
[Subjective social indicators – a selective review of the literature on the theme]. In Gy. 
Lengyel ed. Indikátorok és elemzések. Műhelytanulmányok a társadalmi jelzőszámok 
témaköréből. Budapest: BKÁE, 2002, 35–48. 
Inglehart, R. and H. D. Klingemann. “Genes, culture and happiness.” In E. Dieter and E. M. 
Such eds. Subjective Well-being across Cultures. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000.
Lengyel, Gy. ed. Indikátorok és elemzések [Indicators and analyses]. Műhelytanulmányok a 
társadalmi jelzőszámok témaköréből. Budapest, BKÁE, 2002.
Lengyel, Gy. and B. Janky. “A szubjektív jólét társadalmi feltételei” [Social conditions of 
subjective well-being]. In Gy. Lengyel ed. Indikátorok és elemzések. Műhelytanulmányok 
a társadalmi jelzőszámok témaköréből. Budapest: BKÁE,  2002, 105–27. 
Örkény A. and M. Székelyi. “A bizalom szerepe a bevándorlók sikeres társadalmi 
integrációjában” [The role of trust in the successful social integration of immigrants]. In 
Örkény A. and M. Székelyi eds. Az idegen Magyarországon. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 
2010a, 123–69.
Örkény A. and M. Székelyi. “Hat migráns csoport összehasonlító elemzése” [Comparative 
analysis of six migrant groups]. In Örkény A. and M. Székelyi eds. Az idegen Magyarországon. 
Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2010b, 49–97.  
Veenhoven, R. “Development in satisfaction-research.” Social Indicators Research 37 
(1996): 1–46. 
81
APPENDIX 
 Hungarian Phi=0,251**** Immigrant Phi=0,319****
Figure 15 Proportion of no-answers to the question concerning income 
for diff erent categories of fi nancial standing
Table 7 Composition of sub-samples by schooling 
 max. 8 grades. vocational secondary tertiary total
Hungarian
N 362 212 291 135 1000
% 36% 21% 29% 14% 100%
immigrant
N 47 81 236 132 496
% 9% 16% 48% 27% 100%
Total
N 409 293 527 267 1496
% 27% 20% 35% 18% 100%
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Table 8 Diff erences in property index means by groups of countries
(I) groups of 
countries 
(J) groups of countries 
Diff erence of 
means (I-J)
Std. error Sig.
95%os Confi dence 
intervals 
Upper 
limit 
Lower 
limit
Countries of 
former Soviet 
Union
China –2.84469 .90720 .022 –5.4402 –.2492
Balkans .92153 .88208 .903 –1.6021 3.4451
USA/Canada/Australia/New 
Zealand
–6.48400 1.41984 .000 –10.5461 –2.4219
Other Asian –4.21610 .95696 .000 –6.9539 –1.4783
Other (Africa/Near East/South 
America)
–1.56629 1.02909 .650 –4.5105 1.3779
China
Countries of former USSR 2.84469 .90720 .022 .2492 5.4402
Balkans 3.76622 1.00223 .003 .8989 6.6336
USA/Canada/Australia/New 
Zealand
–3.63931 1.49745 .148 –7.9235 .6448
Other Asian –1.37141 1.06873 .794 –4.4290 1.6862
Other (Africa/Near East/South 
America)
1.27840 1.13377 .870 –1.9653 4.5221
Balkans
Countries of former USSR –.92153 .88208 .903 –3.4451 1.6021
China –3.76622 1.00223 .003 –6.6336 –.8989
USA/Canada/Australia/New 
Zealand
–7.40553 1.48237 .000 –11.6465 –3.1645
Other Asian –5.13763 1.04749 .000 –8.1345 –2.1408
Other (Africa/Near East/South 
America)
–2.48782 1.11377 .224 –5.6743 .6986
USA/Canada/
Australia/New 
Zealand
Countries of former USSR 6.48400 1.41984 .000 2.4219 10.5461
China 3.63931 1.49745 .148 –.6448 7.9235
Balkans 7.40553 1.48237 .000 3.1645 11.6465
Other Asian 2.26790 1.52811 .675 –2.1040 6.6398
Other (Africa/Near East/South 
America)
4.91771 1.57428 .023 .4137 9.4217
Other Asian
Countries of former USSR 4.21610 .95696 .000 1.4783 6.9539
China 1.37141 1.06873 .794 –1.6862 4.4290
Balkans 5.13763 1.04749 .000 2.1408 8.1345
USA/Canada/Australia/New 
Zealand
–2.26790 1.52811 .675 –6.6398 2.1040
Other (Africa/Near East/South 
America)
2.64981 1.17397 .214 –.7089 6.0085
Other (Africa/
Near East/
South 
America)
Countries of former USSR 1.56629 1.02909 .650 –1.3779 4.5105
China –1.27840 1.13377 .870 –4.5221 1.9653
Balkans 2.48782 1.11377 .224 –.6986 5.6743
USA/Canada/Australia/New 
Zealand
–4.91771 1.57428 .023 –9.4217 –.4137
Other Asian –2.64981 1.17397 .214 –6.0085 .7089
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CIVIC DISCUSSIONS ABOUT 
IMMIGRATION
György Lengyel, Borbála Göncz, Lilla Tóth, Gábor Király 
and Réka Várnagy
INTRODUCTION
This chapter details the experiences of civic discussions about migration and their 
interpretation by experts.1 The aim of this phase of research was to explore with a 
combination of methods how immigrants saw the process of integration and how 
members of the host society approached the immigrants, and what suggestions they 
both had to solve any problems. Civic discussions were organized in which non-expert 
participants could thrash out crucial immigration-related questions and formulate 
their recommendations after listening to the opinions of experts. In preparation for the 
discussions, a representative opinion poll and focus group discussions were conducted 
with members of the host society together with in-depth interviews with immigrants 
and interviews with experts. The results of this preparatory phase are not discussed 
here.2 The process of deliberation, forthcoming recommendations and their evaluation 
are the focus of this section.
One fi nding arising from the research is that, while the members of the host 
society, Hungary, are considerably under-informed about and have a tendency to 
reject immigrants, those who became informed during the discussions and could 
argue their positions appeared to be more empathic and tolerant than average. The 
topic of previously-conducted civic discussions in 2009 was not the civic participation 
and political activity of immigrants, but social integration in a broader sense. The 
method itself, civic discussion, must however be seen as an experimental form of 
civic participation and civic activity. In 2011, some experts were asked to evaluate the 
recommendations of the civic discussion of 2009. In addition to the conclusions drawn 
about the civic discussions, the outcomes of the evaluations are also presented in this 
chapter.
1 The research “Citizens’ Jury on the Integration of Immigrants” was carried out by the Institute of Sociology 
and Social Policy at Corvinus University of Budapest, with support from the European Integration Fund in 
2009.
2 An earlier version of this paper was published in A. Örkény and M. Székelyi, Az idegen Magyarország. 
Bevándorlók társadalmi integrációja [Alien Hungary: The social integration of immigrants] (Budapest: ELTE 
Eötvös Kiadó, 2010). Detailed results of the preparatory phase can be found in the study mentioned as well as 
at: http://www.etk.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=25740 
86
It may be said that the topic of participation – civic involvement – is currently 
witnessing a renaissance. Participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, the 
involvement of those concerned, consensus-seeking are all catchwords that covertly 
indicate that deeper processes which go beyond traditional participatory mechanisms 
and also require greater commitment from participants are in vogue. This revived 
interest in facilitating “participation” is due to a variety of reasons.
The tensions created between the principle of representation and the limitations 
of meaningful, sensible participation in modern pluralist societies have created as a 
response the idea of “deliberative democracy”, a version of which was delineated 
by Jürgen Habermas. Deliberative democracy off ers an alternative to other forms of 
political participation through its characterization of an “ideal small community” and 
“representative democracy” at the two endpoints of the political spectrum (Habermas 
1996).
Habermas stresses that it is not possible today to return to the (ideal) direct 
democracy model of small communities to solve contemporary problems. Complex 
pluralist societies are not able to simplify their intricate political processes to the level 
of face-to-face negotiations.
So-called “deliberative techniques” are designed to provide a solution to these 
problems. Their purpose is to involve those concerned (using a certain theme) into 
the preparatory process of decision making. These processes attempt to create a fi eld 
of communication in which members of the community can discuss matters of signal 
importance to them, allowing them to express their views and (perhaps) be molded 
by and mould the opinions of other participants. As a result, participants may then be 
capable of taking well-informed decisions and off ering recommendations on matters 
that aff ect their lives. The Citizens’ Jury (or civic discussion, as it is called here) is the most 
frequently used deliberative technique and was developed by Ned Crosby in 1971 in 
response to the perceived defi ciencies of mainstream American democratic processes 
(Crosby 1991, 1996). The two central elements of civic discussions – balanced debating 
circumstances and the providing of information to participants in an objective manner 
as possible – are theorized to give rise to a situation in which the selected panel 
members become capable of taking well-grounded decisions on the given matter as 
“lay sages” (Pataki 2007). In addition to the civic discussion itself and to the collective 
thinking process (i.e. group deliberation) the panel must take a stand on the issue in 
question either by providing recommendations or supporting or rejecting a given 
decision.
Although this method has primarily been used to assist in fi nding answers to pending 
problems of countries with a long democratic past (institutionalized democracies) it 
is nowadays more and more frequently used in developing countries such as India 
and new democracies such as Russia (Wakeford 2002). This “technology transfer” has its 
snags. In diff ering political cultures society reacts diff erently to deliberative processes 
and moreover, it is questionable how open decision-makers are to the deliberative 
approach, how much citizens are inclined to cooperate and how eff ectively the results 
can be used.
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The current authors know of no civic discussions about the issue of immigration 
or integration, but the topic has been researched using other deliberative methods3. 
In the research described herein, the immigrants’ panel also sat to deliberate – a new 
element. As the name of the method indicates, a citizens’ jury is designed to involve 
those who already belong to a political community in shaping special policy decisions. 
Rarely are civic discussions organized for groups who are little involved in traditional 
forms of manifesting political will.
EXPERIENCES FROM CIVIC DISCUSSIONS
Although the civic discussion was organized according to the accepted professional 
protocol of citizens’ juries, the method was adapted on several counts.
In view of the unsympathetic attitude of members of Hungarian society to the 
integration of immigrants, it is particularly important to examine how petrifi ed positions 
change – if they do – through a process that allows for deeper knowledge acquisition 
and the shaping of a subtler perspective on the issue.
A civic discussion is designed to involve the members of a political community 
into the decision-making process about public policy issues, thus those who are not 
endowed with traditional political rights (e.g. immigrants) are usually shut out of such 
deliberation processes. Organizing a discussion for immigrants was a challenge, not 
only because of the usage of a relatively rare methodological approach for involving 
those who are usually without a voice, but also because of the specifi c nature of 
immigration into Hungary. As the briefi ng material written for the participants 
emphasized (Göncz and Tóth 2009), the greatest numbers of people who wish to 
immigrate to Hungary are people of Hungarian ethnic origin who live in neighboring 
countries. However, the “most visible” groups of immigrants come from “alien” cultures 
(Asia, Africa, South America); these individuals also took part in the discussion. Diff erent 
language competencies and tensions due to diff erent cultural backgrounds created 
special challenges which needed to be addressed.
The project also allowed for the comparison of the panel of immigrants and that of 
the host society. Comparison of changes in group dynamics, opinions and themes in 
the two panels was a valuable experience and provided material for further analyses.
In the fi rst phase of the process – orientation of participants – the emphasis was on 
introducing and getting acquainted with the process and the theme of deliberation, 
rather than on actual deliberation by participants and experts. In this phase moderators 
also asked participants to highlight specifi c problems they would like to discuss and ask 
the opinion of the specialists about during the next phase (the next day).
3 Immigration was the theme, for example, of an all-European deliberative opinion poll (Europolis. A 
deliberative policy-making project - http://www.europolis-project.eu/), and an Italian deliberative opinion 
poll (IntUne - http://www.intune.it/research-materials/turin).
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Next morning the problems were sorted into groups (written down on pieces 
of paper/post-it notes and stuck up on a board). During the civic discussion the 
number of questions/issues and possible solutions steadily increased. Monitoring the 
discussion visually on the board enabled participants to determine which problems 
were of crucial importance and to “convert” them in the last phase of the process into 
recommendations. It would take too long to present the process in its entirety, so we 
will now only touch on the main issues which emerged for both panels.
During the discussion, experts helped the work of the participants. The selection of 
specialists was adjusted to the structure of the discussion on integration. Three critical 
topics were put up for discussion: “legal-bureaucratic issues”, “work and employment” 
and “education”. On the last day of the civic discussion, the verdict of the jury – the 
recommendations of the participants in the process – was formulated (see Appendix 
3). One of the advantages of the civic discussion method is that it ends with clear-cut, 
unambiguous statements, positions and recommendations that can serve as feedback 
– i.e. a lay evaluation of current regulations, prevailing problems and recommended 
solutions.
It needs emphasizing, however, that a great part of the recommendations cannot be 
regarded as being directly useful input for the use of legislators. The recommendations 
have a diff erent purpose (and diff erent advantages). The recommendations outline 
certain groups of problems that thematize the participants’ collective thoughts. 
Enhanced attention should be paid to these thoughts when existing systems are 
reformed in the future. In their present form the recommendations are most useful at 
the lower levels of decision-making and should serve as feedback about how ordinary 
people perceive government positions about certain issues and what their preferences 
are about certain public policy issues.
Analysis of the Hungarian panel
It should be stressed that the participants refl ected upon their own situations and their 
own expectations of the political actors from the beginning; in other words, they voiced 
that the often precarious social and economic situation of the Hungarian population 
needed to be recognized as well. This aspect, however, was gradually pushed into the 
background during the discussions and came to the fore again when recommendations 
were formulated in the last phase of the event.
From the beginning, this panel voiced fi rm expectations about immigrants – such 
as the need for them to pay taxes, deal with the situation of how they are housed (e.g. 
several families living in an overcrowded fl at), and handle their cultural self-isolation.
The underlying implications of these expectations and the panel discussions clearly 
revealed which nationality the panel members regarded as being typical immigrants: 
the Chinese. Despite the reading of the briefi ng material and presentations by the 
experts – who nearly all put great stress on of the peculiar nature of immigration into 
Hungary (notably, that a high proportion of migrants have Hungarian as their mother 
tongue and culture) panel members concentrated their eff orts on a more easily 
perceptible and identifi able group, on account of their diff erent physical features. Much 
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less time was devoted to discussing Hungarians from outside Hungary and this group 
of immigrants were only mentioned after the last lectures were given by specialists 
about bureaucracy. Thus the greatest number of “problems and expectations” were 
identifi ed with a group that is culturally and economically closed, has diffi  culty in 
speaking Hungarian and is isolated from Hungarian society in several regards.
This fi nding reveals that the average member of Hungarian society probably 
overestimates the impact of Chinese and other Asian migrants on the Hungarian 
economy and society, and has a tendency to overestimate any problems entailed 
by their presence in Hungary. The survey conducted within the research project also 
confi rms this presumption, as it revealed that Hungarians are most hostile to the 
Chinese from all the relevant groups of immigrants. The immigration of Hungarians 
from neighboring, non-EU countries was not perceived to be a weighty problem and 
no special signifi cance was attributed to it; the panel did not discuss specifi c issues 
concerning these immigrants.
Among the recommendations formulated in the Hungarian panel, only one is 
concerned with the situation of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries. Panel 
members did not deem the integration of Hungarians from outside Hungary to a 
problem needing a solution, while recommendations concerning the integration of 
less populous but culturally more isolated groups (such as the Chinese) comprised the 
lion’s share of recommendations.
Another noteworthy characteristic of the recommendations is a strong focus on 
education-related items among the proposals. Seven of the thirteen recommendations 
(or eight, if we include the proposal for an “integrated approach to immigration”) 
related to education. One reason for this is that, for participants, education was the 
most palpable topic; the presentations about education also being the most easily 
comprehensible to panel members. This may be refl ected in the recommendations.
A contributory factor may be that participants thought the lack of information 
about immigration and about cultural diff erences was a serious problem. The notion of 
creating of contact points between cultures was contained in several recommendations.
It is important to stress that panel members thought that knowledge of Hungarian 
was one of the main criteria for success in the process of integration. Knowledge of 
the Hungarian language appears to be a necessary (but not suffi  cient) condition in 
the recommendations; a prerequisite for any further integration to take place. This is 
confi rmed by a recommendation that proposed cutting back the time that a Hungarian-
speaking migrant who has studied Hungarian would have to wait before being granted 
a permanent residence permit.
Panel of immigrants
It was a serious challenge to ensure the collaboration of panel of immigrants. It is a 
critical and delicate problem to ensure that the right group dynamics – motivation of 
interactions, creation of balanced communicative situations and promotion of the fl ow 
of information – are facilitated, particularly in heterogeneous groups whose members 
have diff erent social, cultural and economic backgrounds. The immigrant panel was 
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a very heterogeneous group (eight of the fourteen members were Europeans, three 
Asians, one North American, one South American and one was African). The diff erence 
in countries of origin also meant diff erences in cultures, which were able to appear as 
potential rifts in the group. More substantial than the cultural rift was the potentiality 
of language problems within the group: six panel members were from Hungarian areas 
beyond the borders and were thus counted as being Hungarian speakers. It was feared 
that through their language competence they would dominate the discussion, which 
would severely violate the basic principles of the deliberative process. Additionally, the 
group of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries might have shared a common 
Hungarian identity, giving rise to a “we” vs. “they” disconnect.
The behavior of the participants, however, disproved these expectations. 
Language/communication problems, considered a potentially daunting prospective 
during preparation, did not arise at all in the panel. Most of the participants had a 
good command of Hungarian and the group listened to each other with attention and 
patience. The existence of a cultural rift can not be so unambiguously identifi ed. First 
of all, it should be stressed that the multicultural composition of the group was more 
to its advantage and ensured that the participants could thrash out a wider range of 
experiences and opinions. Diff erent norms and behavioral patterns caused no obvious 
tension in discussions; the panel members were open and receptive despite the fact 
that in the discussions the cultural diff erences were clearly manifest: some participants 
would only speak when asked to do so; others applied themselves eff usively to the 
topic. All we could conclude from the limited observations was that, in a multicultural 
group there are diff erences in the communicative competencies of individuals which 
however can be off set by a strong motivation to cooperate.
The attitude of the panel members was positive from the start, and they behaved 
with cordiality and responsiveness towards each other throughout the entire process. 
They mostly observed the rules of participation introduced during the orientation 
talk and adapted themselves to the structure of the deliberating process. During the 
discussions two attitudes were predominant: on the one hand, there was a sense of 
duty; participants felt that if the majority of society was so interested in their opinions 
as immigrants and in their experiences of the process of integration, then it was their 
duty to support them by taking part in the event. On the other hand, participants 
often voiced their skepticism about the fi nal outcome of the process; they frequently 
mentioned that they had no trust that any rapid changes would be made, nor did they 
believe that their work in Hungary would create signifi cant changes, although they 
looked upon the discussion as being a positive omen. Over the weekend the positive 
attitudes of panel members steadily strengthened (though their skepticism did not 
wholly disappear) and group cohesion perceptibly increased as the members got to 
know each other more thoroughly.
It was an interesting facet of the discussion that in creating their opinions, 
participants not only pondered about one another’s views, but also constantly refl ected 
upon the host society (“is it really good for the Hungarians if we come here?”) and they 
tried to take into account the presumed or real interests of the host society too. The 
91
importance of adaptation was a recurring motif of the discussions. This was eventually 
not formulated as a recommendation but apparently it was an expectation by the 
group members of themselves.
During the discussion the crucial issues (the topics of the debates) quickly 
crystallized. They can be sorted into fi ve groups: language competence, bureaucracy, 
job seeking, cultural diff erences and miscellaneous other issues (confl icts caused by 
diff erent appearances, preservation of own traditions). As participants were engrossed 
by these problems during the two days of the deliberation, their recommendations 
obviously also highlight these issues.
The majority of the recommendations – 27 – were formulated about legal rules, 
adherence to laws and administrative matters. It was clear from the debates that the 
most unpleasant or negative experiences of the immigrants arise due to red tape. In 
sum, the immigrants feel that: 1. it is not clear what they are expected to do (don’t 
know/don’t understand the statutes; don’t know what papers to acquire, or where; feel 
lost amidst the multitude of permits and applications); 2. they do not get the necessary 
assistance (no adequate explanations; no information; overburdened offi  cials do not 
pay enough attention to cases); and, 3. the immigration procedures are too long and 
costly. Their recommendations also refl ect these frustrations, as they partly focus on 
making it easier for immigrants to meet requirements, and partly on making the work 
of the offi  ces more constructive.
Concerning education, lots of good experiences were shared: it was felt to be a 
success by the majority that their children had become well adapted and successfully 
integrated into Hungarian schools, or they themselves had success in some educational 
institution or other. In some recommendations they proposed the institutionalization 
of these experiences – e.g. the introduction of multicultural lessons – in the curriculum.
The role of language competence was also emphasized in the recommendations: 
the immigrants regarded it as being a fundamental prerequisite for integration. It was 
crucial for them to have the opportunity to learn Hungarian and then to improve this 
knowledge. Job seeking was also a central interest of the panel, particularly because 
most discrimination was suff ered in this area. Immigrants proposed simplifi ed rules and 
more transparent conditions as remedies for decreasing their handicap.
EVALUATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS BY EXPERTS
As a follow-up to the recommendations of the non-expert civilians, in 2011 we asked four 
specialists to give their opinions about the proposals put forth during the deliberative 
event. Below we present the ideas of an expert from a non-profi t organization that 
deals with immigrants, one from the Ministry of the Interior, one from the parliamentary 
Ombudsman’s Offi  ce, and one from Offi  ce of Immigration and Nationality.
There was consensus from the experts about some of the recommendations, but 
there were some recommendations that the specialists appraised diff erently. As for 
legal rules and adherence to laws, specialists with legal qualifi cations unanimously 
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declared that, by nature, laws cannot be simplifi ed, but this problem can be overcome 
by ensuring better communication (i.e. providing informational materials). Several 
experts mentioned that before legislation on immigration is created, consultations 
are usually conducted with non-profi t organizations who deal with immigrants. 
However, the Ministry of the Interior offi  cial and the civic organization expert judged 
the eff ectiveness of the consultation procedure and the incorporation of the civil 
organizations’ recommendations into law quite diff erently. The proposal that schools 
get a “head quota” for each and every child attending school was unanimously 
approved, with some experts even saying that the children of immigrants should get a 
double quota.4 The elimination of the monopoly of the National Offi  ce for Translation 
and Attestation was agreed with. It was recommended that the years spent studying 
at university should also be included in the eight years required for naturalization, but 
several specialists stressed that if the immigrant had gained a permanent residence 
permit during his/her studies, those years were already included in the eight years.
Regarding bureaucracy, several recommendations – the experts claimed – had 
actually already been implemented over the few past years, but some of those still 
pending face legislative obstacles (e.g. online access to databases of other offi  ces,). 
As for online administration, several experts said it was imperative when aliens were 
registered that offi  cials should meet with the immigrants personally.
As regards recommendations about education, culture, tolerance and language 
competence, experts declared that there are too few immigrants in Hungary for 
the implementation of some proposals (cultural-leisure time programs to be jointly 
implemented with immigrants, putting a school per district in charge of language 
teaching, etc.). Experts of course deemed provision of support for improving the 
immigrants’ Hungarian language skills to be important (though they did not agree on 
the way to achieve this goal) and they also laid stress on the further training of teachers. 
There was also consensus about the need for the intercultural training of policemen 
(and other offi  ce workers) but several experts emphasized that examples of this could 
already be cited, as there are several non-profi t organizations who conduct intercultural 
training for these target groups.
For diff erent reasons, no expert agreed with the recommendation concerning 
work that a job webpage should be created that would list places ready to employ 
immigrants. Concerning the creation of the position of a mediator to mediate between 
employer and employee, several experts opined that the chance of fi nancing such a 
mediator was questionable.
4 Hungarian public education is mainly fi nanced by the central budget through a normative support known 
as the “head quota” provided after each student.
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SOME CONCLUSIONS
One of the major conclusions of this research is that, while the members of the 
Hungarian society are considerably under-informed about and unsympathetic to 
immigrants, those who acquired deeper insight into the facts of immigration during 
the discussions and could formulate their positions with adequate arguments were 
more curious, empathic and tolerant than average.
A related, cautious conclusion may be that, although in public thinking there are 
stereotypes about immigrants and these stereotypes are mostly negative, getting 
acquainted with real problems and with individual migrant histories may contribute to 
the dissolution or weakening of these stereotypes. Feedback from the civic discussions 
supports this inference.
When it comes to comparing civic discussions, identifying both diff erences and 
similarities are important. Similar ideas and recommendations appear in both panels. 
Of course, the two panels were not separated hermetically and they could have shared 
ideas during breaks. It is also probable that, exposed to identical information inputs, any 
other two identically structured heterogeneous groups would have identifi ed similar 
problems.
The similarities are most marked for the topic of “education” and “knowledge of 
the language”. The ideas about these two matters that are similar (though worded 
diff erently) in the two panels’ recommendations include encouraging the spontaneous 
organizations of immigrant groups, multicultural lessons at school and teaching 
immigrant children Hungarian before their integration into schools. The high priority 
given to language knowledge indicates that communication is a key issue for both 
groups – the Hungarian panel’s attitude clearly placed stress on this issue (e.g. were 
supportive about providing information about language courses or giving credit to 
immigrants for language acquisition), whereas for most questions they did not hold 
a positive stance. The immigrant panel also deliberated about several ideas and also 
recognized their own responsibility (i.e. suggested providing volunteer teachers). As a 
side eff ect of the process, both groups expressed the wish to get to know the opinion 
of “the other group” and to have more shared discussions.
To move on to the diff erences: one of the most spectacular diff erences is in the 
number of recommendations. The immigrants formulated nearly four times as many 
proposals as the hosts. The obvious reason is that immigrants apparently perceive 
and comprehend the problems related to immigration more clearly (and deeply), so it 
was easier for them to put forth possible solutions. By the same token, there are more 
specifi c recommendations about minor alterations to the existing system on their list 
(concerning procedures, bureaucratic processes or the assertion of interests). Host 
country members did not have such profound and personal knowledge about these 
themes, so their recommendations often only remained at the theoretical level.
Another important diff erence is that the topics of “laws and legal awareness” 
and “employment” are only included in the immigrants’ recommendations. These 
issues are enshrined in concrete propositions which reveal an understanding of the 
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legal background of immigration as well as some personal involvement. They tend 
to urge the relaxation of the current legislation that is found to be too severe (while 
mitigation of the rules was proposed by the host panel only for ethnic Hungarians 
from neighboring countries and immigrants who had earned their qualifi cations or 
diploma in Hungarian). A positive evaluation of or encouragement for immigration 
was missing from the recommendations and thus probably from the thoughts of the 
Hungarian panel, and the discussion did not modify this. Yet it is also worth noting 
that the Hungarian recommendations did not contain negative statements about the 
employment of immigrants, which is particularly interesting in the light of a recent 
opinion poll (also included in participant briefi ng material) which found that nearly 
three quarters of Hungarians agreed with the statement that “immigrants seize job 
opportunities from Hungarians”. It is hard to empirically examine the lack of a negative 
sentiment, but it may be equally attributed to the positive eff ect of the process of 
deliberation, to the weaker presence of negative stereotypes when deeper insight 
is gained about a topic, or to the constraint about representing such a strongly 
negative view to a wider group (so it did not reach the stage of being formulated as a 
recommendation). To further improve the method, it would be expedient to examine 
how a joint discussion between members of the host society and immigrants would 
deepen the knowledge of the two groups about immigration and how it could change 
the evaluation of immigrants in the two groups.
It should be noted that the recommendations were worded by lay people, aff ected 
(to a lesser or greater degree) by the given theme, so they should not be viewed as 
being expert proposals. However, it may be useful for political decision-makers to know 
about the problems, opinions and experiences of those concerned in the process of 
immigration and to take them into account when it comes to legislation. This fact was 
also stressed by the experts who evaluated the recommendations.
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ANALYSIS OF THE FOCUS 
GROUPS ON CIVIC PARTICIPATION, 
FAIRNESS AND SENSE OF JUSTICE
Éva Vépy-Schlemmer
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the results of two confi rmative focus groups conducted on the topics 
of fairness, justice, political and civic participation and action potential are summarized, 
with special regard being paid to comparing immigrants and Hungarian society.1 The 
focus group investigation was designed to assess the existence of a sense of fairness 
and justice, and thereby to complement and refi ne the results of the surveying.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH
In focus groups, participants discuss a given theme and through these group interactions 
we may acquire information otherwise only accessible with diffi  culty to researchers. 
The method is not only good for assessing people’s knowledge and experiences, but 
also helps researchers observe what arguments and what information contribute to 
changes in participants minds. To undertake focus group research, several factors 
(concerning structural, social and group processes) have to be taken into account, such 
as size and number of groups, their degree of “structuredness”, internal composition, 
homo/heterogeneity and whether the participants are acquainted or not, for these 
deeply infl uence group interactions. It is considered to be a drawback of the method 
that certain group eff ects (such as group pressure, conformity or confl ict avoidance) 
can cause certain opinions to remain latent and unvoiced (Síklaki 2006, Vicsek 2006).
The results of focus group research are characterized by their limited quantifi ability 
and a lower degree of standardization compared to questionnaire surveys; their 
reliability is thus lower but their validity is higher than for the former method. Some 
regard the higher degree of validity achieved by low standardization as being the main 
advantage of the method (Vicsek 2006). Analyzing focus groups can be done using 
various methods. In the research described herein, Vicsek’s (2006) two-component 
analytical scheme (which combines certain elements of constructivist and discursive 
1 I herewith express my gratitude to Attila Melegh and Borbála Göncz for their valuable comments on the 
earlier working version of the paper which made my analysis subtler and richer.
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psychology) is utilized. In analyzing the transcribed text of the focus group discussions, 
the aim was to explore the contents, structure and dynamism of the group discussion 
to outline the changes in the topics of conversation (Oblath 2007). The backbone of the 
analysis is given by the moderator’s guiding questions which determined the course 
of discussions. In describing the succession of themes an examination is made of what 
vistas opened up, what peculiar discourses and well-shaped standpoints appeared 
(Melegh 2010). First, however, I give a brief review of the recruitment process, the group 
composition, individual and group characteristics and the general atmosphere of the 
talks.
THE FOCUS GROUPS THAT REPRESENTED THE IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
HOST SOCIETY
The two eight-member groups met for three hours each in Budapest, in a room 
assigned for quantitative research at Ipsos Co., on 17-18 August, 2011. Recruitment was 
determined by use of pre-set quotas. With a view to the research goals, we recruited 
two homogeneous groups, one of immigrants and one of Hungarians to represent the 
host country. The groups were heterogeneous by gender, age, schooling and country 
of origin. Recruitment was carried out by use of a fi ltering questionnaire fi nding people 
in street, and right before the discussion additional fi ltering was also done to confi rm 
the eligibility of the participants.
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE IMMIGRANTS’ FOCUS GROUP 
DISCUSSION
Presentation of the participants
After a description of the research and the technical circumstances of the discussion, 
the moderator asked the participants to briefl y introduce themselves.  There were 4 
men and 4 women between 21 and 50 years of age, the mean age being 30. Most 
had residence permits which were acquired with the intention of gaining permanent 
residence. The individuals had been in Hungary for between 2–13 years. Two were 
unemployed, 1 was studying and the majority had paying jobs. As for the country of 
origin, 2 were from Africa, 3 from Serbia (1 Serb, 2 Hungarians), 1 from Macedonia (Serb) 
and 2 from Ukraine (1 Ukrainian, 1 Hungarian). It should be noted that neither Chinese, 
nor Vietnamese persons could be included, although as a group they were to feature 
frequently in the discussions. The majority of participants had completed secondary or 
tertiary education. They were moderately active in civic matters: only 3 mentioned that 
they had participated in public aff airs or were members of some non-profi t organization 
(see Table 1 presenting the personal data of the participants in the Appendix).
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The atmosphere and tone of the discussion was calm, informal and friendly. There 
was nothing obviously disturbing participants and they were all interested to hear the 
others and become familiar with the topics. Being aware of the time limit, they accurately 
adhered to the agenda of the moderated discussion and they were satisfi ed with its 
circumstances and the moderation process. It is important to note that, although the 
participants had a good command of Hungarian and followed the process actively and 
accurately, those who spoke somewhat slower or more hesitantly resorted to English 
spontaneously as a mediating language for clarifying concepts more exactly. This did 
not interrupt the fl uency of the conversation, since everyone spoke English, and in fact 
made the process even more fl uent, richer and subtler.
Civic activity
First, participants spoke about what ideas the basic concepts of civic activity brought 
to their minds, mentioning certain cases and examples as well. In their interpretation, a 
public issue was any event of common interest that aff ected everybody. This defi nition 
was further elaborated: 
“It aff ects me directly, not indirectly; after all, the problem of an individual might aff ect 
me directly just as well, but it is not a public matter which aff ects people directly. There 
are always some isolated groups in society that are not aff ected by such questions. 
[FOR EXAMPLE?] A man living in the provinces, tilling the land, sustaining himself.  He 
is not aff ected by all the public issues that aff ect a person in the city. A person who is 
dependent on society. These are very few in number, so we may say a public matter is 
one that aff ects everybody.” V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
Participants enunciated that public aff airs included politics, education, health issues, 
economy, market, legislation, and also the acceptance of pluralism. They considered 
under the term “citizens” duties voting, tax payments, registered work, adherence to 
laws, and also ethical, “decent” behavior. Their feelings about the term “citizen’s duty” 
were, however, negative, as for them it designated obligation, the compulsion to 
observe some rules. One of them added that it was not necessarily negative when it 
was aimed at a certain goal. The goal could be a better, faster developing country that 
would ensure well-being and a better life for all.
Hearing the term “civic activity”, the members of the group mentioned various aid 
agencies (e.g. The Red Cross) or environmental protection, the aim of which might be 
to create a more livable city or to help people. Somebody mentioned the promotion 
of social dialogue and that actually all non-profi t activities belonged to that category.
“The fi rst to come to my mind were those who act to protect the environment and 
animal rescue non-profi t organizations. Then I remembered the foundations, the 
Shelter Foundation (…) I think more and more organizations are emerging that 
stimulate people to take responsibility. The fi nal goal is to change the thinking of 
people, which I think is a very good goal.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
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Among civic activities, mention was also made of selective garbage collection, energy-
saving and other politically neutral activities. These activities could be government 
fi nanced, but it was also expressed that at the level of the individual these activities did 
not depend on having citizenship. When Hungary was compared with their countries 
of origin, two contrary opinions and experiences were voiced:
“At home, the institutionalization of non-profi t activity is still rudimentary – as least 
it was 4-5 years ago when I left. Besides, at home I lived in a small town where there 
were not so many stimuli as in a big city, and there were not so many possibilities to 
be active, for civic activities. I think Hungary is far further ahead in this regard than say 
Serbia.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
“I came away two years ago, not even two, but in the area I used to live [Central Bácska] 
environment protection was fairly well organized, and many other things functioned 
fairly well. I daresay it was even more organized in smaller towns and communities 
because perhaps people depend more on one another, they know each other, they 
are more cooperative than here in Hungary. (…) In the community I came from things 
were well organized. In addition to that, it was the same with cultural events, I felt the 
cohesion of the people, mutual aff ection, readiness to help more there.” V3 (WOMAN, 
HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
As regards municipal elections, several group members remarked that they kept away 
because of a shortage of time or a lack of information or interest. The following opinion 
was also voiced about participation:
“If you look at it closely, how great a variety there is of Hungarian citizens within 
local governments, you will fi nd it far greater than among people who take part 
in municipal voting. Basically it’s up to the social stratum or the disposition of the 
individual whether he/she takes part in municipal politics or not. Once you’ve 
got integrated into society it’s immaterial what you will be in the district (…) it is 
independent of what you are – Hungarian citizen or not. Anyway, there are very few 
people who take an active part in politics.” V1 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
In addition, they did not seem to know for sure who had the right to take part in local 
government elections. Many thought only Hungarian citizens could vote, while others 
claimed that immigrants had the same rights:
“As far as I know, when you are settled permanently, you belong to a certain address 
offi  cially, then you have the right to vote for a municipal government. Not for the 
parliament, but for the local government, yes.” V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
“Permanent residence is not enough. You must have a Hungarian ID card or passport.” 
V2 (MAN, NIGERIA)
“An ID card doesn’t mean Hungarian citizenship. I have a Hungarian ID card.” V7 
(MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
It was also made explicit that the three notions (public matters, citizen’s duties, civic 
activity) were intertwined: 
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“A citizen has obligations which are related to public issues.” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN 
FROM UKRAINE)
“To solve the problems of public matters, there may be some solutions which are 
rooted in citizens’ obligations. What are only sort of ethical questions, they are mainly 
connected to the area of civic activity.” V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
“I can connect them insomuch that citizen’s duties and civic activity are both public 
matters – with the diff erence that civic activity is optional, closely dependent on the 
person’s mental constitution. (…) But going to the polls, voting, would be the duty 
of all people living in society. I’d place it a step higher than civic activity.” V1 (MAN, 
HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
Distributive justice
The concept of distributive justice was fi rst ruminated on using the three statements 
presented below.
1. Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its 
functioning.
The immigrants opined that this approach was a fair but not humane solution; the 
extent of one’s contribution was hard to measure, and besides, the principle of solidarity 
should also be used.
“The state itself doesn’t work like that. There is some common solidarity; irrespective of 
who pays what tax, all make use, say, of the public roads or health care. At present the 
state works in such a way that you can’t implement this idea.” V7 (MAN, SERB FROM 
SERBIA)
“It wouldn’t be humane. Those who have to pay less tax to the state out of no fault 
of their own would receive proportionally less support, whereas just the opposite is 
necessary. From a smaller income you pay less tax. When you live in straightened 
circumstances, you have to get more aid, more support.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM 
SERBIA)
“Those who don’t contribute anything shouldn’t get anything – that would be the 
fairest. Why should I keep someone because he is not willing to do anything to keep 
himself in order?” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)
2. Everyone should partake equally of goods produced.
Many of the participants did not think this was fair, but concerning the system of social 
welfare benefi ts, the principle was accepted:
“Lots of people simply have no access to work. If this [benefi t] was also withdrawn, 
it’d be far worse than now till some new solution were found. I don’t know what that 
new solution should be. It isn’t perfect now, but we haven’t anything else at present.” 
V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
Similarly to the discussion about the concept of civic activity, the concept of 
working for the public good was also touched on:
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“If your goal is money and getting a share, you’d surely not work, just pocket your 
share. If you have a higher goal to work for, say, society, or anything, then you’d work 
for that and not for the money.” V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
3. Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and 
should get as much as they need.
The group members regarded a state which worked by this principle as being a fair 
one, but they thought that this principle was impossible to implement in practice; it 
would only remain an ideology – albeit the ideal situation of a society (the survey data, 
by contrast, reveal that the majority supported this statement).
“If this was to be controlled legally, people would have to be forced to contribute to 
the best of their abilities. (…) If there was such fair judgment, this would be the most 
reasonable, but who would decide, who would check what someone’s ‘best ability’ is?” 
V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
Participants also thought there were certain groups in Hungarian society who ought 
to receive a greater share of the goods produced than the rest, such as the disabled, 
the poor, the sick, mothers who rear their children alone, pensioners, the aged, and also 
immigrant foreigners who wanted to work but who had failed to obtain the offi  cial 
permits to do so.
Out of the three statements, the third was preferred by most of them as being the 
most desirable system of distribution, but there was someone who spoke up for the 
fi rst:
“I liked the fi rst idea best. All should receive as much as they contribute to functioning, 
with some exceptions, say, for the mentally or physically disabled. Able-bodied people 
who don’t work because they are loath to work should not live on welfare benefi ts.” V6 
(WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)
Out of the three statements, the second was regarded as being most typical of 
contemporary Hungary.
After discussing the above-presented three statements, the group members 
discussed – on the basis of three models of distributive justice – whether people 
involved in given situations get more from society than they contribute to common 
expenditure, or whether they contribute more than they get. The following statements 
were used for discussion:
1. An entrepreneur of high socio-economic status employs lots of people, 
providing a living for them but he employs some of them in the “black” 
economy, illegally, not paying tax for them.
This was judged in strongly negative terms by the participants:
“It’s bad not only for the foreigner, it’s not good for any citizen, it’s only good for the 
entrepreneur. He has lots of money, but for people it’s not good.” V8 (MAN, SIERRA LEONE)
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But the evaluation of the situation was not quite unambiguous:
“It’s a necessary evil – when you have no other choice to fi nd work. When you have no 
special qualifi cations, after all, it gives a chance for someone not to starve to death, 
but he won’t be registered, so he won’t be insured. It’s good for the employer because 
he must pay a great deal [of tax] for an employee; maybe this is his only possibility to 
hold his ground, by not paying into the Hungarian tax system, because it’s awfully 
much. In this way, he can preserve the jobs of those who are employed legally and 
offi  cially. He won’t go bankrupt, for it’s really an enormous sum he has to pay for an 
employee. (…) He is useful to society because he creates jobs. By employing ‘black’ 
workers he also contributes [to society] because those persons don’t starve to death, 
they have a chance to earn money. I think it is a necessary evil.” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN 
FROM UKRAINE)
“The question is why he employs them illegally. Because he can’t aff ord to give them a 
legal job, or because he wants to save money? If the latter is the case, he probably only 
takes his own interest into consideration, then he acts in a negative way.” V7 (MAN, 
SERB FROM SERBIA)
2. A retired old lady, who has worked throughout her life and paid all she was 
expected to contribute can now hardly make ends meet on a government 
pension.
“It’s surely not fair, but how to solve the problem? What’s there to be done about it? 
Nothing. Or withdraw from others, but that would have bad consequences. When 
you have a country with a fairly poor economy, this problem simply can’t be solved. 
Maybe it could be prevented but it is very hard to handle it when it is there.” V7 (MAN, 
SERB FROM SERBIA)
“It’s sad. I think everyone pensioner lives like that, all who haven’t had some good 
position or high salary.” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)
“You must see what work the person has done, how much he earned. For instance, 
he may have been a soldier, gone to another country and when he comes back, one 
arm or leg is missing. You must see the person you want to support. Someone who’s 
been to war ought not to get the same pay as one who has sat in an offi  ce all his life.” 
V2 (MAN, NIGERIA)
“I know two people like that. I was reluctant to speak because they are at the two 
extremes. One worked in a mine, he’s got practically nothing for a pension, and he 
inhaled all that dust, everything in the mine. The other one worked in a noted offi  ce 
and he goes ‘hawaiing’ every year with his children and grandchildren. I mean by 
‘hawaiing’ travelling abroad, not to Budapest.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM 
UKRAINE)
3. A middle-aged woman who has lost her job is on the dole but works as a 
cleaner for families, illegally.
“When there’s no other way, it’s the only thing to do. When you have a family, children, 
there’s nothing else. Then it’s a must.” V4 (WOMAN, MACEDONIA)
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“This must be put in the category of forgivable sins, for a middle-aged woman is really 
hard put to fi nd a new job when she’s lost one. She may still have a family to take 
care of. I’d place this woman, who is committing tax fraud, in another category please 
than the factory owner in the fi rst example. I think the person we talked about at the 
beginning was not a small businessman who employed workers illegally to keep his 
business going, but he gave work to many people. So I don’t think he gives work to 
people to remain on the surface. The two categories of tax fraud are perfectly diff erent. 
(…) The woman might have contributed to society through the best of her abilities, 
and this connection between society and her became broken. From that moment, 
society cannot satisfy her requirements, she doesn’t get what she needs, so she must 
act one way or another.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
Procedural justice
Individuals enter into some relationships with the state that do not match what they 
expect to get, or what they feel have contributed to the common good. In everyday life 
there are many interactions with the state during the administration of offi  cial matters. 
Participants mentioned many examples of unfair, unjust treatment and situations 
related to administrative procedures. The most frequent associations included being 
“cold-shouldered”, having “knots in the stomach”, of the experiences being a “waste of 
time” and “stressful”. However, the experiences are diverse:
“I met people who felt they belonged to another world there behind the glass wall. 
But I have good experiences, too. I don’t want to discredit all who work in Hungarian 
public aff airs or customer services. There are indeed negative examples, maybe the 
overwhelming majority of the cases are like that, but you must give credit to the 
exceptions.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
Unanimously unfavorable were participants’ opinions of the Offi  ce of Immigration 
and Nationality (OIN). In reference to this offi  ce they used words such as “tough place”, 
“purgatory”, “condescension”, “protectionism”, “bribery”.
“If you survive it, you can stay, like in Paradise.” V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
“Disrespect for deadlines, compelling [you] to do lots of unnecessary trips to meet 
missed deadlines... An ombudsman would have quite a lot to say if he tried to acquire 
a residence or permanent residence permit in Hungary incognito. (…) I think many 
unnecessarily documents are required and some documents must be translated for 
no purpose.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA) 
“I was turned down three times, to begin with. Then I managed to get a work permit 
using some slush money. Through some infl uential connections and all that. Because 
I was not found eligible for the job I was appointed to by my boss, despite knowing 
three languages. There was no explanation why I wasn’t suited for the job.” V5 
(WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)
Participants all agreed that the OIN did not explain its decisions adequately and 
it was not always clear what the rules in a given situation were and what they were 
supposed to do. There was also a participant who found that the administrators usually 
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acted according to the rules, very rigorously and strictly keeping to regulations. The 
immigrants also thought that other clients received diff erent treatment, and this 
treatment depended on how long they had stayed in the country and whether they 
had Hungarian ancestors.
Individuals and groups may equally receive unfair or unjust treatment during 
daily administrative procedures, but also through regulations which apply to them. 
When asked how much they could do against injustice or unfair treatment alone or in 
cooperation with others, they said: 
“I think as long as you are in such a [defenceless] situation, you don’t even think of 
such things.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
“It’s all subjective, we try to cause as little trouble, to put up with as much as possible, 
to be as kind as possible. (…) We are not in the position from which you can make 
objections.” V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)
“In the street I wouldn’t tolerate it that a person should talk to me like that, but there I 
must put up with it because I am at their mercy. When Miss Smith decides not to put 
a tick next to your name, you can go back two or three months later. You must do 
everything, you just sit and shut up, for where can you go? Shall I write to the Prime 
Minister? Who shall I write to, where shall I go?” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM 
UKRAINE)
Immigrants and fairness
Social groups may diff er in the extent to which they feel defenceless. The respondents 
claimed that there were groups that had to suff er more injustice and unfair treatment 
than others: the poor, the sick, the unemployed, the children or pregnant women, but 
immigrants were also mentioned; immigrants who…
“are deprived of the freedom of choice.  They can’t work even if they want to, they can’t 
study because they must struggle to make a living. I think their situation is the worst, 
for they haven’t a chance to decide.” V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)
Some concrete situations were also mentioned in which injustice or unfair treatment 
was suff ered:
“The doctor. They see on your health card that you aren’t a Hungarian citizen, and it is 
not sure they will behave the same way to you as for Hungarian citizens, although you 
pay health insurance, or it’s paid for you.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)
“One of my bosses liked me very much, he told me directly that I shouldn’t say I 
was Hungarian from Voivodina. So that people shouldn’t know, as they don’t like 
foreigners. Now, I don’t want to meddle with politics, but whose fault is it that society 
is turned against foreigners? Against Hungarians living outside the borders, in the fi rst 
place? This generated a sort of defi ance in me, which I never had before. And I say right 
away that I’m a Hungarian from Voivodina, and we can make it clear right away if I’m 
wanted or not.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
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“Hungarians are given priority if there is a possibility to choose, they employ 
Hungarians rather than foreigners. That’s discrimination.” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN 
FROM UKRAINE)
Immigrants experience discriminative treatment in several ways, not only in the labor 
market and health care, but, for example, in shopping centers, too. There was one 
participant who had positive experiences as well:
“I’ve been to many places alone at night. There has never been any problem, the 
Hungarians accept me.” V8 (MAN, SIERRA LEONE)
Apropos the following situations, respondents were asked to consider whether in the 
following situations, the specifi ed person gets more from Hungarian society than he/
she contributes, or vice-versa (he/she contributes more than he/she gets).
1. A Chinese immigrant employs Chinese and Hungarian people in his shop 
selling cheap Chinese goods.
“The Chinaman is also an immigrant, if he had enough to set up a business, why 
shouldn’t I start a Russian shop and employ Hungarians if I had the possibility? I’m 
legal, I pay all I have to, I think it’s good for the state because I pay tax.” V6 (WOMAN, 
RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)
“I agree. If someone wants to make a living in Hungary, even a business of his own, 
he should do so because it’s good for the state that he pays tax. If we say that he pays 
all the taxes it means he contributes to everything. He also creates a workplace if he 
employs a Hungarian or he may help his compatriots.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM 
SERBIA)
“It’s perfectly all right. If the Hungarian state allows him to live here, to start a business 
and to employ Chinese and Hungarians, too.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM 
SERBIA)
2. A Hungarian from Ukraine works 12 hours a day in construction. He is designated as 
being an unskilled worker. He pays his taxes, lives with nine of his colleagues in a fl at 
and visits his family every three months.
“I’ve had such experiences, too. They were kept amidst inhuman conditions, guarded 
by dogs, German shepherds, on some deserted premises. The windows were broken 
and in the autumn when they were supposed to have been paid, the contractor said 
that a concrete mixer had disappeared, somebody had stolen it, so they wouldn’t 
be paid and they could go home. This is the better case, this worker one is registered 
and all that. It’s awful enough as it is, but there are far worse cases.” V5 (WOMAN, 
HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)
“I try to see the other side, the positive side. This man stays in Hungary legally. He must 
have chosen this job because he found no work at home. He would surely work closer 
to his family if he could. This is what he can do, but at least he works legally. He pays 
tax to the state, this is acceptable, as a makeshift solution.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN 
FROM SERBIA)
“As long as the country is poor, there’s nothing that can be done about it. They couldn’t 
pay more or provide better circumstances, entrepreneurs employ the cheapest labor. 
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Pressure should be put on large companies, or legislation should be improved through 
economic development.” V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)
“The exploiter should be somehow restrained so that he couldn’t exploit him.” V3 
(WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
The government,  political decision-makers, offi  ces and authorities have diff erent 
attitudes to immigrants. In the opinion of participants they should ensure:
“integration [of migrants] in[to] society. They shouldn’t allow enormous masses 
of immigrants to come into the country, which would undermine the functioning 
of Hungary, to make another country of it. Instead of aggravating their situation 
[the incumbents in power] should integrate these people into society so that they 
can become real Hungarian people. Not in terms of nationality, but in terms of the 
country.” V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)
The group members argued that the integration of the immigrants could be promoted 
along the following lines:
“There should be integration programs like the gift parcel in Israel. They help them fi nd 
work. That would require a change in Hungarian mentality, too; to understand that 
I’m not a worm who wriggled herself in here because I get much more money and life’s 
much better. They should accept me as a person who works, and not hinder me. Like 
in the offi  ces, at work Hungarians are given priority.  Sometimes we have the same 
knowledge as Hungarians; things shouldn’t be made harder.” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN 
FROM UKRAINE)
“They should be given work, that’s all.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
“It is perhaps the media that could help improve this, to help foreigners be more 
accepted.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)
To the question of how tolerant Hungary is and what the decision-makers and offi  ces 
do to help the immigrants get their due, they voiced the following opinions:
“Hungarian society on the whole is more rejection focused, the politicians are also 
rather unsympathetic – I think they suck up to society. I don’t think that individual 
politicians would turn down Hungarians from abroad, if we speak of Hungarians 
outside the borders. They just suck up to society.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM 
SERBIA)
“I think it’s the job of the politicians to reconcile two peoples, it’s not up to the 
Hungarian people to decide who should come to Hungary and who shouldn’t.” V6 
(WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)
The respondents felt a certain hierarchy about which foreigners were accepted by 
Hungarians. They thought that the Chinese were accepted most easily, followed by the 
English and others from the West, and last were Hungarians from outside the borders.
“A Chinaman is admitted far quicker than a Hungarian from Ukraine. (…) You 
should just pop into the Immigration Offi  ce to see how many Chinese get permanent 
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residence permits every day, while a wretched Hungarian from Ukraine must produce 
scores of documents to receive one.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)
“I’m a foreigner, but someone from the EU is from a diff erent continent from mine. I am 
from Africa. What he can do, I can’t do. He is a foreigner and I am one, too, but there is 
a diff erence between us.” V2 (MAN, NIGERIA)
“The Hungarians who used to live in the territory of historical Hungary are not 
welcome. They told me, many people, that I shouldn’t say I was a Hungarian from 
abroad. I can’t understand it, I’m just as Hungarian as they are. It’s also strange that 
Asians are accepted more easily, Hungarians regard them sort of exotic. (…) You 
haven’t experienced it because you are not Hungarian, though you are from Serbia. 
I am from Serbia and I am Hungarian. They look at me diff erently than at you. You 
are an interesting phenomenon, a curio. You came here to study as a Serb, you 
speak Hungarian, you speak broken Hungarian. I don’t speak broken Hungarian, 
that’s a problem. I even speak better than some Hungarians. That’s an even greater 
problem. Do you understand? They think a peasant from Bácska has come here 
to be unemployed while he/she has some rich plot of land at home.” V3 (WOMAN, 
HUNGARIANS FROM SERBIA)
“I think they treat the Chinese as they do partly because they are cheap labor, probably 
they won’t cause unemployment problems. (…) A Chinese person is not out for 
unemployment benefi t, he/she can fi nd some work around a Chinese bazaar.” V7 
(MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)
The topic of the 2004 referendum2 was also touched on:
“In 2005 the attitude of Hungary was made clear; remember that they voted No.” V5 
(WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)
“I was listening to Kossuth Radio every morning, they repeated at least 20 times during 
that one hour that you should vote against it. Then I went about my business.” V3 
(WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
Comparing Hungary with their country of origin, as regards the reception given to 
foreigners, the interviewees stressed:
“In the past 15 years it has never happened that someone wanted to relocate to 
Serbia.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
“Ukraine is perfectly open. We don’t care that a Georgian or Armenian has moved 
in. It simply doesn’t happen that we should be hostile to them. Mind you, we don’t 
experience it in Hungary, either, except for the offi  ces. It’s great, there’s nothing.” V5 
(WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)
About the representation of their interests and the opportunities for changing attitudes 
towards foreigners, they voiced the following ideas:
2 In a 5 December 2004 nationwide referendum Hungarian voters were asked whether ethnic Hungarians 
residing in nearby countries should receive dual Hungarian citizenship. Since only slightly more than 37 per 
cent of eligible voters cast their ballots, the motion failed. 
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“The local government’s usual concern is to relocate a bus stop because it disturbs 
somebody. I’ve never heard a mayor say that in this district 50 Russians, 30 Chinese 
and 25 Africans are living. He’d like to give work to everyone. That’s how I’d promote 
myself [if I were him]. I know they [the immigrants] are here, they need me, we’d like to 
help. Instead, what I hear is that someone has pinched the money and now we have 
to build a sewage system.” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)
Seeking legal remedy at the ombudsman’s offi  ce was an option also raised, but 
participants were very skeptical about this:
“My letter will be the 625th, he won’t deal with my case.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN 
FROM UKRAINE)
“By the time he comes to read it, your residence permit has expired three times and you 
have to go home. We’d better keep a low profi le.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE HOST SOCIETY FOCUS GROUP
Introduction of participants
After the description of the research and the technical details of the discussion, the 
moderator asked the participants to briefl y introduce themselves. 4 men and 4 women 
took part; namely Hungarian citizens aged between 20 and 57, with the average age 
being 40. Half of them had been through secondary or lower education, half had tertiary 
schooling, 2 were students, the rest were employed. All were actively involved in civic 
programs, half of them as members of some non-profi t organizations. They claimed 
they were open and receptive toward immigrants (see Table 2 about participants’ 
personal data in the Appendix.)
The atmosphere and tone of the discussion was calm, informal and friendly. 
Nothing disturbed the participants and they all listened to each other and the topics 
with interest. They adhered to the discussion agenda by more or less keeping to time 
limits, but several times the moderator had to repeat or explain a question or task. 
Group members were satisfi ed with the circumstances and the moderator.
Civic activity
The participants fi rst expressed their ideas about the basic concepts of civic activity, 
mentioning concrete cases and examples. When it came to the term public matter, it 
was described as something …
“that we turn away from. (…) When a public issue concerns everybody, we say it’s not 
my business. (…) When it’s a public issue, we turn away. Many ignore it, they don’t feel 
it’s their business, either.” V6 (MAN)
Several group members thought that all of the problems which aff ected everyone were 
public aff airs, but they also added that what aff ected everyone was always somebody 
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else’s business, not “my business”. Someone mentioned low participation rates in 
referenda as an example of how people avoid engaging in public matters.
“If you take attendance at a referendum, you will see that they are struggling to reach 
the threshold of 50% in some areas, because of this ‘others will solve it, my opinion 
doesn’t count’ attitude. People don’t care, they don’t believe that their vote, their ideas 
are the solution.” V5 (MAN)
Among public concerns they mentioned environment protection, natural disasters, the 
homeless, public health care, infrastructure, transport, education, jobs and some also 
listed the political and spiritual cohesion of the country here. One of the participants 
embedded the question in a broader perspective:
“Public matters can be divided into two groups basically: local and national matters. 
Local matters are connected with everyday life, work, neighbors, shoveling snow, 
keeping pets, cats, hangover (…) There are then the more important matters, ranging 
from participating in elections, referenda to crime, social welfare problems and the 
like.” V7 (MAN)
The term citizen’s duty reminded them of voting, paying taxes, abiding by the law, 
defending the country, giving help, rearing children, ethical, humane behavior, 
protection of values and solidarity, and also cherishing traditions. Students’ obligations 
to learn well in government-fi nanced tertiary education, as well as support for drop-
outs from school were also mentioned. The term citizen’s duty elicited both positive 
and negative feelings.
“Duty sounds a bit severe. It’s to be done compulsorily, whereas some things we listed, 
for example, providing help with disasters is not a compulsory thing for people. The 
word duty suggests it is. We ought to have such an expectation of ourselves.” V4 
(WOMAN)
By civic activity the embracing of some cause such as the work of activists for the 
protection of animals or the environment was understood. Participants thought that 
in ideal cases civic activities were devoid of political overtones, but in practice it was 
not so clear:
“They are not free from politics, for there are civic organizations that the given power 
or government, it doesn’t matter which one we speak about, has set up or supports in 
order that their policies be put through to the people down there, under the banner 
of the civic organizations. [However, we have e.g.] “Solidarity for Csömör Society”. It’s 
perfectly free from politics. It includes pro-Fidesz people, all sorts, even pro-Jobbik 
[extreme right] members, pro-MSZP, and believers.” V7 (MAN)
“I have the impression that everything is linked up with everything in general. The non-
profi t organizations, civic activities are connected to the economy and politics, they 
can’t be separated.” V1 (WOMAN)
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Speaking of their own lives, they typically mentioned selective garbage collection, 
preference for Hungarian products, pooling of opinions, participation in cultural events 
and cherishing of traditions as civic activities.
The moderator guided the discussion by listing various civic activities, asking the 
participants to evaluate how eff ective they were and if they had personal experiences 
of them. Opinions diff ered about the popularity and eff ectiveness of phoning into a 
radio program.
“I’m sure there are people who can be infl uenced in this way. I think it is important, 
not only for political questions but for both political and non-political questions.” V2 
(WOMAN)
“I don’t think they have any infl uence, because everybody watches or listens to a 
channel that suits his/her political affi  liations. If their opinion was diff erent, they 
wouldn’t follow that program.” V1 (WOMAN)
A participant said he had phoned into a radio program exactly about the topic of 
admitting foreigners (Hungarians from Transylvania) into Hungary, to tell them his 
opinion.
There were confl icting opinions about the eff ectiveness of newspaper articles or 
comments, too.
“Everyone looks at pages, news reports that are close to them anyway. That’s why it 
can’t mobilize many people.” V3 (WOMAN)
“At the end of the Metro newspaper there is a letter, readers’ letters. Very interesting 
things can be read there, things that have no political bias. There were a few things 
that could even change me (…) after all, they can be eff ective.” V5 (MAN)
About participation in some illegal protest action, the following was said:
“These are not always eff ective, in vain do they want to do something to preserve our 
historic buildings; there is always a counter force whose fi nancial interest is that you 
shouldn’t achieve your goal. Permanent protests, lawyers, all are mobilized in vain, 
all able-bodies people, nothing happens. When in the 7th district historic buildings 
were to be demolished and sold for a song to investors, in vain were the protests; the 
counter-interested group is always stronger.” V1 (WOMAN)
About legal, organized demonstrations one of the group members said:
“As for the events of the past 20 or 21 years, none of these protests or demonstrations 
has achieved a single goal.” V7 (MAN)
When the theme was donating money to a political organization, the participants 
agreed that no political party is in need of the salary of ordinary people.
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“I sure wouldn’t [give them anything], they get enough. No need to donate. I think they 
rake it in together. To support them, my foot! I can’t really sympathize with any of the 
parties. I wouldn’t give money – even if I had enough – to any party.” V5 (MAN)
When the discussion was about buying or not buying certain products due to 
consideration for principles (political, ethical, environmental), several people said they 
preferred Hungarian goods and buying from the growers directly in order to promote 
the recovery of the Hungarian economy. Products from cosmetics fi rms who are 
known to carry on experiments on animals were also mentioned.
“Very often we decide [about buying] like this, saying if that’s all we can do, it may 
trigger off  a chain reaction: there will be more money, he can sell cheaper, invest more 
and even greater numbers will buy. This would automatically sustain itself.” V5 (MAN)
“I think I should step further, not remain within the borders. If I buy that Slovakian 
product, I help them too. I don’t [buy] within the country frontiers, not only Hungary 
but Europe is important, too.” V2 (WOMAN)
As for letters of protest and petitions, several respondents said they had signed some 
and thought that this form of protest was more eff ective than street demonstrations.
“I don’t remember exactly, they wanted to build a motorway or divert traffi  c there, so 
we signed the petition. There is a housing park there, families, small children, the noise 
would be too great. It was not implemented.” V3 (WOMAN)
“It’s more eff ective than demonstrating. When the necessary number of signatures is 
collected, it has a legal force. (…) There are better chances that will reach those who 
are in charge.” V7 (MAN)
“It’s far more human, if you will, it’s also far quieter to sign something than go out 
to demonstrate, destroy buildings, to cause sure harm to somebody. And who will 
pay for it? The citizen. They smash everything. With a petition I just scribble down my 
name.” V3 (WOMAN)
Regarding the wearing or placing of political badges and symbols, some people 
mentioned that the use of some symbols are regulated by law and can have a 
provocative impact:
“I think it’s rather provocative. I provoke the rest of the people. If I put on a badge of 
the extreme right, to provoke minorities and liberals. That has no use, no objective.” 
V3 (WOMAN)
As regards taking part in the work of a political organizations or movement, as it turned 
out, most of them had never been involved, and there were also diff erent opinions 
about it.
“I think it’s no longer civic activity when it’s about politics. It is political activity.” V1 
(WOMAN)
“I can imagine that I help with their work. And I’d also help in the elections, to promote 
participation on that day.” V2 (WOMAN)
113
Speaking of contacting politicians or municipal decision-makers, several participants 
stressed its importance and eff ectiveness, but there was some skepticism as well:
“I think you can lend help to politicians, too. It is a direct connection, when a lay person 
talks to a politician, for a civic person draws his opinion from everyday life, he may 
communicate the opinions of several people. I feel it’s important, because it’s not sure 
that he [the politician] lives in a milieu in which he can learn about these things.” V2 
(WOMAN)
“I don’t know, I haven’t been in this situation. Maybe I’m too pessimistic, but I don’t 
think that going up to the mayor or a deputy with our problems would greatly 
infl uence their decisions or anything.” V3 (WOMAN)
The respondents regard it as a citizen’s duty to take part in parliamentary elections.
“It’s natural that you go, it’s even your duty as a citizen, and that the county should 
improve, it should take the right course, that’s what we’d like.” V6 (MAN)
Regarding participation in local, municipal elections, the general opinion of the group 
was that it was at least as important as voting for national elections, or maybe even 
more important, for the given issues were closer to the everyday lives of voters.
Civic activity can take a variety of individual or organized forms. The participants 
had diff erent fi rst-hand experiences:
“Our civic organization – I don’t want to praise it to the skies – does lots of things. 
Starting with renewing playgrounds. We have a charity ball every year. There is an 
institute for the disabled in Csömör with a huge restaurant, and we have always given 
all of our revenue to that disabled institute.” V7 (MAN)
Their general opinion is that non-profi t organizations are useful and positive because 
they voice opinions about problems that perhaps others don’t even notice; they can 
take action about some important cause, not only for their own goals in the strict sense.
It was also made explicit that the three concepts (public aff airs, citizen’s duty, civic 
activity) were interrelated:
“There is some overlapping. Elections would go into all three areas, I think. An election 
is a public matter, a citizen’s duty as we said, and civic activity. All three apply to 
voting.” V5 (MAN)
“The work of a non-profi t organization is normally tied to some public matter, and 
it may also be related to our duties as citizens. When there is a natural disaster, civic 
organizations join forces to help people there. This is a public issue and civic activity 
as well. And helping others may as well be taken for being a citizen’s duty, after all.” V4 
(WOMAN)
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Distributive justice
The concept of distributive justice was debated along the lines of the three pre-
formulated statements below. The group weighed how much they agreed with and 
how fair or just they deemed them, one by one.
1. Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its 
functioning.
Many complemented this statement by declaring that everyone should get as much as 
he/she was able to contribute to society’s functioning, thus emphasizing the importance 
of individual abilities. The moderator however warned that it was important to evaluate 
the originally-worded statement. This generated the fi rst divergence of opinions. Some 
opined that the situation in the statement was not fair or just, it was utopian, had never 
been realized. Others claimed it was just, the animal kingdom worked according to this 
rule, and if the principle was put into practice, no one could “sponge off  the welfare 
network”. The problem was there was no way to measure and compare the extent of 
contributions.
2. Everyone should partake equally of goods produced.
“It makes no sense, for it will never be realized. The idea is beautiful.” V7 (MAN)
Many associated this statement with the idea of communism, and expressed that it was 
unjust, unfair, unrealizable and utopian.
3. Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and 
should get as much as they need.
The group members thought that this was the most attractive idea of the three and 
that it would be good to realize this principle in practice as it would result in a just and 
fair society. However, the term need was seen as being hard to interpret, as it could 
only be measured with diffi  culty. Besides this, participants primarily took the goods 
produced as being fi nancial resources (payments) which at fi rst shrunk the conceptual 
frame of the discussion but the moderator tried to extend it.
Compared to the third statement, participants generally regarded the fi rst two as 
being utopian, unfair and unfeasible (by contrast, the fi rst statement received most 
support in the questionnaire survey). The typical situation of contemporary Hungary 
was judged to be in accordance with the fi rst, or maybe the second statement, but 
participants also remarked that in practice these models were mixed; neither was 
predominant, the country was ruled by “chaos” in this regard.
After the above three statements were presented, the group members discussed 
– on the basis of three models of distributive justice – whether the following persons 
involved in a given situation were getting more from society than they contributed to 
common expenditure, or whether they were contributing more than they got.
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1.1. An entrepreneur of high socio-economic status employs lots of people, 
providing a living for them but he employs some of them in the “black” 
economy, illegally, not paying tax for them.
They thought it was wrong but frequently met with this situation in reality and many 
expressed sympathy for those involved.
“That’s the actual situation. But that has two sides to it, for yes, everyone should pay 
the tax he is liable to pay, but probably the tax liability would be so much that nobody 
would have to lie about it. Those lie who are forced to lie.” V1 (WOMAN)
“Both of them fare well, only the state is left out of the business. You often hear: why 
should I keep the state, why should others sponge off  me? Shall I pay yet another 
politician? But you may also think that it’s what we’d do. Just search your own 
conscience, to be quite frank, I would do the same if I were in their place (…) I am 
lenient towards the entrepreneur because he provides work.” V5 (MAN)
“But the job taker doesn’t fare well, for if his employer doesn’t pay health insurance 
after him and – God forbid – he has an accident and is hospitalized, he may get a bill 
for millions for the treatment.” V4 (WOMAN)
Contradictory opinions were voiced whether the entrepreneur gets more than he 
contributes or contributes more than he gets.
“I think the entrepreneur contributes more than he receives. He pays some tax, he also 
pays tax after his profi t – as much as he reports, of course. Thirdly, even if he didn’t 
report anything, just scoop up the money, even then he gives money to people so that 
they can invest. That means capital is circulating. We all pay V.A.T. When people have 
no money, they can’t buy anything, there is no V.A.T., the whole thing grinds to a halt.” 
V5 (MAN)
“He doesn’t contribute more. He takes out more, because he doesn’t pay for those 
people, it doesn’t matter how many. He sells the product anyway, he profi ts more.” 
V8 (MAN)
“It makes a diff erence how many he pays and how many he doesn’t pay. If he pays 
[taxes for] 120 employees correctly and doesn’t pay for 10, he evidently contributes 
more than he receives. That’s why I asked for the proportions. If we take the whole 
staff , 130 people, 10 is negligible. He gives jobs to 130, after the great majority he pays 
taxes. Then why does it bother anyone that he doesn’t pay for ten people? Should 
he sack them, rather than pay tax? That would really be the wrong thing to do.” V4 
(WOMAN)
2. A retired old lady, who has worked throughout her life and paid all she was 
expected to contribute can now hardly make ends meet on a government 
pension.
“She gets less than she contributed throughout her life. That may be said of my 
grandmother. If her children didn’t help her, she would be in dire straits.” V4 (WOMAN)
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3. Middle-aged woman who has lost her job, is on the dole but works as a 
cleaner for families illegally.
The participants sympathized with the woman, thinking it was a true-to-life, and 
negative situation.
“Unfortunately that’s what there is, we are realistic, we understand it.” V6 (MAN)
Procedural justice
Individuals enter into some relationships with the state in which they receive less than 
they expected to get, or what they feel they have contributed to the common good. 
In everyday life there are many interactions with the state during the administration of 
offi  cial matters. Participants mentioned a lot of unfair, unjust treatment and situations 
in connection with administrative procedures. The most frequent word associations 
included “bureaucracy”, “corruptibility”, “waste of time”, “circuitousness”, “nerviness”, 
“cold-shouldering” and a short story by the Hungarian writer Kálmán Mikszáth (Korlátfa 
[barrier]). Experience was gained at various places in diverse procedures. Many 
complained of the manners of administrators and their lack of competence although 
much depends (for the clients) on their expertise and helpfulness. Participants often 
met with malpractice and had the opinion that, without aggressiveness or at least a 
fi rmness of purpose, it was impossible to arrange offi  cial matters with success.
“They slight you, as if you were supposed to know what to submit, in what order. 
They only tell you what you ask, and that has to be dragged out of them, too.” V3 
(WOMAN) 
“I have a more or less comprehensive picture. It depends on the local government, 
the municipal assembly. On the town clerk, on his deputy, they are in charge of 
maintaining lawfulness in the offi  ce. The clerk and his deputy have calling hours, 
you can go and launch your complaints. The people who work there… what sort of 
people are they? What is their personal attitude? There is no diff erence in their salary.” 
V7 (MAN)
“It depends on the person. There are places where they are very kind indeed. They 
are astonishingly kind, they are wholly human. It’s not dependent on money, on the 
salary they get.  It’s humanity, how you treat people. I used to work in customer service, 
I earned as much as my colleague but she treated people in such a way that when 
somebody came in, I left the offi  ce. Gosh, how ashamed I was that I was working 
there. There were examples like that.” V2 (WOMAN)
Individuals and groups may receive unfair or unjust treatment during their daily 
administrative procedures, but also through regulations which relate to them. When 
asked how much they could do against injustice or unfair treatment (alone or in 
cooperation with others), if they experienced any, they said: 
“It must be gross malpractice or grievance that would make you say: Goddamn, I will 
get entangled in yet another case, defy the offi  ce, undergo another procedure. That 
must be a very grave thing. Okay, once I survived, all right.” V5 (MAN)
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Immigrants and fairness
Social groups diff er in the extent to which they are defenseless. Respondents named 
certain social groups that have to suff er more unfair treatment of injustice than the rest. 
They thought that Roma, foreigners and the aged are groups which are handicapped 
in the sense that they must tolerate more injustice. To the question of why immigrants 
are in this situation they listed several reasons such as language, poor knowledge of 
laws and administrative procedures. Some quite extreme opinions could also be heard.
“You must be careful with them, they whip out a knife.” V6 (MAN)
“When a foreigner enters somewhere, he expects to be helped by the person. I think 
a foreigner raises his voice much more quickly when he doesn’t like something. (…) 
An Italian would raise his voice, that is, what I saw involved an Italian chap; in two 
minutes he was shouting at the offi  cial.” V3 (WOMAN)
“Foreigners have a diff erent mentality. Not all foreigners can be identifi ed. A European, 
African, Asian must have diff erent mentality… that may cause the diff erence. Asians 
can arrange their matters well, they arrive here with a sort of administrator, lawyer.” 
V1 (WOMAN)
The Hungarians were aware that immigrants might face diverse injustices; for example, 
they might be discriminated against in education, at offi  ces, the labor market, during 
police activity, etc. There is practically no legal remedy available to them except at the 
embassy. The cause for discrimination may be a general prevalence of prejudice (e.g. if 
an immigrant is judged by his country of origin or presumed fi nancial status).
“… I was startled that a Transylvanian Hungarian person was categorized diff erently 
to a Chinese person. The Chinese had priority, he was more welcome than the 
Transylvanian.” V1 (WOMAN)
“Apart from the embassy they can do nothing, their only defense is the embassy; we 
can do with a person who has come from far away what we want, to put it rudely. At 
most he can go to the embassy, that’s all.” V5 (MAN)
The respondents said that not only the evaluation and position of diff erent immigrant 
groups were diff erent, but there are diff erences individually between immigrants. It is 
an important diff erentiating feature whether the immigrant speaks Hungarian or not. 
Many group members declared that it was typical for immigrants to work illegally...
“but not all. Say, the Arabs try to set up grocery shops… things that can bring a little 
money. The Chinese help each other, they are a diff erent type. There are Romanians 
at quite a lot of places, they work illegally. They only do black work, they grab the job 
from Hungarians because they do the work more cheaply.” V6 (MAN)
“Immigrants are of two types. Maybe they are not exactly called immigrants, the 
foreign citizens who are working for foreign fi rms. They are also here among us 
somehow, immigrants as it were. Maybe when the fi ve years is over, he goes back. 
Or he doesn’t, because he has married a Hungarian girl. Then he’ll like it here. The 
immigrants are the ones who just want to live here, the others are guest workers; 
this is a possible diff erentiation. A layer has legal employment, they are categorized 
118
diff erently, and those people who have no safe workplaces are categorized in another 
way, they are diff erent… I think…” V1 (WOMAN)
“A Transylvanian Hungarian is a Transylvanian Hungarian, a Romanian is a 
Romanian. There is an enormous diff erence. Even though he lives in that country, 
there is an immense diff erence. If you don’t know the Romanians, you won’t know it.” 
V1 (WOMAN)
“I think the global economic recession [reinforces] extremists, each increase in poverty 
strengthens extremists. There were those tough moves by Fico. Since then, it must 
be lurking in the Hungarians’ minds: well, the Slovaks. I’m sure there are people who 
subconsciously or consciously condemn them more.” V5 (MAN)
It was the general opinion of the groups that, excepting some individuals, Hungary was 
prejudiced and unsympathetic to aliens.
Apropos the following situations, the respondents were asked to consider whether 
the mentioned person gets more from Hungarian society than he/she contributes to 
common expenditure or vice-versa, he/she contributes more than he/she gets.
1. A Chinese immigrant employs Chinese and Hungarian people in his shop 
selling cheap Chinese goods.
“I think he gets as much from Hungarian society as he contributes. His child gets the 
same, when a woman has a child, she gets child-care benefi t.” V6 (MAN)
“Yes, he immigrates, pays tax, becomes a benefi ciary of the Hungarian government, 
a constituent of it. He pays tax, he gets a country, state allowances. It’s ideal, I think.” 
V5 (MAN)
“I think, too, that he gets as much from society as he gives, if he employs everyone, 
Hungarians, too, legally. Where I live there are lots of Chinese restaurants, only Chinese 
work there.” V4 (WOMAN)
Facing this situation, participants fi rst wanted to judge the truth of the statement, 
and said it was not probable, but the moderator reminded them to stay on topic. One 
participant then declared that she had a negative opinion of this situation. Interestingly, 
the illegal employment of workers was immediately raised, and when speaking about 
the previously-discussed situation of the entrepreneur who employs people in the 
black economy, the discussants came up with several excuses in support of them. 
However, they then fi rmly declared that, concerning illegal employment, a Chinese 
person – or immigrant – should abide by the rules.
“If he has come to a country, he should keep the country’s norms and laws.” V1 
(WOMAN)
“He can choose which country to relocate to from China. He may choose a country 
where the taxation conditions are more favorable, if he doesn’t like the Hungarian 
system.” V4 (WOMAN)
“He may move on, but we can’t. He can go on, but we live here.” V6 (MAN)
The respondents claimed that the hypothesized Chinese individual was receiving from 
the Hungarian state as much as he contributed to common spending.
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2. A Hungarian from Ukraine works 12 hours a day in construction. He is 
registered as an unskilled worker. He pays his taxes, lives with nine of his 
colleagues in a fl at and visits his family every three months.
Contrary opinions were heard about this situation. On the one hand, participants found 
it realistic and thought that people might be forced to enter into such a situation, while 
others stressed he had chosen the situation, and when Hungarians went abroad to 
work, they were living under similar circumstances. As for the question of contribution 
to the state vs. what is received from the state, the following opinion was voiced:
“The Chinese person is an employer, the Ukrainian is only an employee, if we compare 
the two examples. The Chinese gives work to fi ve people, but here is this Ukrainian 
unskilled worker who came here to work, working 12 hours. Furthermore, take this 
dual taxation law between Ukraine and Hungary, the Ukrainian could choose 
whether to pay tax in Hungary or in Ukraine. So he fares better.” V7 (MAN)
The government, the political decision-makers, offi  ces and authorities have diff erent 
attitudes to immigrants. In discussing how to improve the status of immigrants, 
participants mentioned the elimination of prejudices and discrimination, among other 
things.
“… they should have representation at such places. They wouldn’t be forced to 
approach someone defenseless, alone in an alien country that speaks an alien 
language, full of emotions, maybe chauvinism. They should have someone by their 
side who would speak up for their interests in Hungarian, an interpreter perhaps. (…) 
it should be provided by the state.” V5 (MAN)
“In my view, quite a lot of things are provided for them (…) it’s another matter that 
many come here ignorant, unprepared. In Hungary 13 minorities have their self-
government (…). It is the duty of minority self-governments to help those who come 
from the parent country. Polish, Armenian, Greek, Croatian, Serbian, I don’t want to 
enumerate all the 13. Ukrainian minority self-governments have this duty under the 
local government act of 1993 to help those relocating from their parent country, if 
they have some concerns or problems and can’t arrange it through the embassy, trade 
representation, or consulate, you can knock at their door, no problem.” V7 (MAN)
The issue was raised that the Ukrainian was taking work from Hungarians, while others 
opined:
“… a Hungarian wouldn’t undertake the job for the pay the Ukrainian did, he works 
for any sum of money. It’s the same when we go to Germany, we also take a job for 
half the pay.” V6 (MAN)
They judged that if he paid tax after his work, he got from society as much as he 
contributed:
“He receives what he needs, that’s quits. He pays the tax that he’s due. He knew why he 
comes and receives it. He gets his money, takes it home, he does what he wants with it 
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after taxation. If he doesn’t spend it here, I say it’s quits. He would give more if he lived 
here, worked here, got incorporated into our society. But he goes home and spends it 
there.” V5 (MAN)
A COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF THE IMMIGRANT AND HOST 
SOCIETY’S FOCUS GROUPS
Civic activity
Regarding the concepts related to civic activity, both groups understood “general 
matters aff ecting everyone’ by the term public issues, mainly pertaining to education, 
health care and politics. Immigrants also included here the acceptance of pluralism, 
while Hungarians mentioned the political and spiritual cohesion of the country. 
Both groups diff erentiated between local and national public aff airs. Immigrants also 
mentioned isolated groups removed from involvement with public issues, who were 
not directly aff ected, such as self-subsistent rural people, thus diff erentiating national 
and Budapest-centered matters. A marked characteristic of the Hungarian group 
was skepticism about public aff airs, expressed by their rejection of them, stressing 
“everyone’s business is nobody’s business”.
As citizen’s duties, both groups listed participation in elections, observation of laws, 
paying taxes and ethical behavior. A further common feature was that in both groups 
emphasis was laid on the negative emotional aspects of the term duty (i.e. as being 
pressure on individuals).
The phrase civic activity was associated by both groups with environmental and 
animal protection, fi rst of all, stressing the non-profi t and politics-free aspects of these 
activities. One of the Hungarian group members was very skeptical, claiming that non-
profi t organizations were set up to be the mouth-pieces of parties, to have their political 
platforms accepted by society. Both groups laid stress on the importance of individual 
selective garbage collection.
The Hungarian group also mentioned a preference for Hungarian products 
and a refusal to buy the goods of fi rms which conducted experiments on animals. 
About the effi  ciency of other civic activities such as phoning into a radio program or 
writing newspaper articles or comments, opinions diff ered for Hungarians. There was 
consensus among them about the futility of taking part in illegal protest actions or legal 
demonstrations, and they also rejected the donating of money to political organizations 
or wearing/putting up political badges/material. By contrast, they deemed signing 
protest letters and petitions, contacting politicians and participating in parliamentary 
and municipal elections to be important and eff ective.
The immigrants typically kept away from municipal elections due to a lack of time, 
information and interest. What is more, they were not sure who was (and on what 
grounds) eligible to vote for the local government.
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A conspicuous diff erence between the two groups is that the Hungarians listed far 
more items as being public issues and citizen’s duties and civic activities than immigrants 
did. It was voiced in both groups that all these issues were closely interlaced.
Distributive justice
Both groups agreed that the goods produced ought to be distributed fairly, but the 
method and practice of doing this fair distribution was viewed diff erently. Should it be 
governed by the principle of contribution, of equality or of need? Fundamentally, both 
groups felt proportional distribution with contribution to be the most just, stressing the 
principle “if you don’t work, you don’t eat”, but in both groups the problem of measuring 
contribution objectively and the importance of social solidarity were also voiced, since 
there are always some people who can not contribute to the functioning of society 
out of no fault of their own, and they have to be provided for too. An immigrant noted 
that, at present, the extent of an individual’s contributions were not being measured 
correctly and people who contributed little received much. Another immigrant claimed 
that Hungarian society was working diff erently now, with solidarity for everybody 
because, for example, public roads could be used by all. About the principle of equal 
distribution of goods, both groups expressed their opinion that it was unjust, unfair and 
unfeasible. Distribution by need was thought to be just and fair by both groups, but it 
was also found impossible to implement because of the diffi  culty of interpreting the 
idea of or measuring “needs’ so this principle would have to remain an ideology only. 
Yet this model was most acceptable or desirable for both groups. They thought the 
second model was most characteristic of contemporary Hungary, but the immigrants 
also raised the thought that there were handicapped groups in society who would 
should receive more of the good produced.
The participants then deliberated on the basis of three examples whether the 
persons involved got more than they contributed or contributed more than they got. The 
entrepreneur who employed some workers illegally was negatively judged by several 
immigrants and with understanding by Hungarians. The immigrants argued that that 
situation was bad for the entrepreneur, for the employees and bad for the state. Some 
participants said it was a necessary evil because the workers at least received some 
earnings and the contractor could also survive in the teeth of immense tax burdens 
and would eventually create workplaces this way. The latter idea was voiced by the 
Hungarians, too, and this made them more sympathetic toward the entrepreneur, but 
about his contribution to society, opinions diff ered. The old lady struggling to make 
ends meet after a life of work was unanimously judged with sympathy as being a sad 
but realistic case. The Hungarians said she received less than what she had contributed. 
An immigrant also expressed the view that pensions should be determined by the 
services rendered; a soldier or a miner should not get less than someone who had sat 
in an offi  ce all his life. Both groups perfectly understood the situation of the middle-
aged woman who had lost her job; they thought her case was forgivable, frequent in 
reality and a sorry plight.
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Procedural justice
Concerning offi  ces and administration procedures, both group members mentioned 
lots of unfair, unjust cases. Their associations with the topic included “corruptibility”, 
“waste of time”, “red tape”, “stress”, “costliness” and “contempt”. Both group members 
complained about offi  cials’ manners and lack of competence, although much depended 
on their knowledge and helpfulness. In many cases they met with incompetence and 
malpractice. In both groups, however, positive examples were also quoted, thus the 
experiences are not wholly negative. The immigrants’ opinion of OIN was univocally 
bad. They said the OIN decisions were not adequately justifi ed, it was not always clear 
what the pertinent rules were or what was to do. There were also some who found 
that offi  cials had administered cases (too?) rigorously, adhering strictly to the rules. 
They had the impression that the treatment of clients in a diff erent position from theirs 
would also be diff erent. This depended on the immigrant’s length of stay in the country 
and whether the client was of Hungarian origin or not.  There was overt skepticism 
from both groups about the possibility for individual or group assertion of interests. 
As regards representing their own interests or their infl uence in changing attitudes 
to foreigners, the immigrants thought that local governments were incapable of 
embracing their cause.
Immigrants and fairness
Social groups diff er in their degree of defenselessness. The Hungarian group thought 
that the Roma, the foreigners and the elderly were handicapped social groups who 
have to suff er more injustice and unfair treatment than the rest. When asked why 
immigrants were also in this category, they described several reasons, such as the 
language barrier and lack of familiarity with legal and administrative procedures. The 
immigrants claimed that the poor, the unemployed, the children, the pregnant women 
and immigrants were discriminated against.
Both groups thought that injustice towards immigrants took diff erent forms. It 
could be found as discrimination in education, in offi  ces, on the labor market, in police 
activity or in health care. The Hungarians were also of the opinion that immigrants 
could not resort to legal remedy except at their embassy. The cause of discrimination 
was thought to be the prevalence of prejudices in the country when an immigrant is 
judged by his country of origin or fi nancial status, for example. The Hungarian group 
opined that the Chinese were treated more attentively than, for example, Hungarians 
from Transylvania; this opinion being shared by the immigrants, too, who even 
discerned a strong hierarchy in the Hungarians’ attitude towards immigrant groups. 
Their impression was that Hungarians welcomed the Chinese most warmly, followed 
by people from the West and least welcome were Hungarians from beyond the borders. 
They claimed that Hungary generally “rejected’ rather than “welcomed’ immigrants, and 
they stressed the responsibility of politics and the media.
The immigrant group voiced that better conditions for integration and work 
should be ensured, via e.g. integrative programs and the regulation of the media. As 
for integration, the Hungarians thought the elimination of prejudices would be the 
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solution at the national scale, and state-subsidized representation of the immigrants’ 
interests should be provided. A Hungarian former local government deputy expressed 
a critical opinion claiming that “quite a lot is ensured (…) that’s another matter that many 
come here ignorant, unprepared. Hungary has 13 minority self-governments (…) you can 
knock at their doors.” He was also convinced that in Hungary the Immigration Offi  ce 
functioned very well and that immigrants were treated adequately. In his opinion, 
Hungarians and Hungarian politics were sympathetic towards foreigners. “We have laws 
about foreigners, about immigration that many a western country could envy. It’s another 
matter how these laws function, but the people – in my humble opinion – are open and 
hospitable.”
Both groups deliberated about two hypothetical situations to decide whether the 
person involved got from Hungarian society more than he contributed or contributed 
more to common expenditure than he received. Immigrants found the situation of the 
Chinese immigrant who employed Chinese and Hungarians not to be a problem if he 
reported his employees and paid tax regularly, because he got what he wanted, and 
besides, he created workplaces.  The Hungarians also approved of this situation and said 
that the Chinaman received as much as he contributed. Regarding the entrepreneur 
who also employed illegal workers, the Hungarians mentioned several excuses for the 
employer, while when the possible illegal employment situation of the Chinese was 
also considered, they fi rmly declared that a Chinese person – or any immigrant – should 
observe the law. As for the example of the Hungarian from Ukraine employed as an 
unskilled worker in construction, opinions diff ered in the Hungarian group. On the 
one hand, they regarded the situation as being realistic and thought that the man was 
under pressure to take that type of job, others stressed that he had chosen this work 
and when Hungarians went abroad to work, their circumstances were similar. Someone 
said the Ukrainian was taking a Hungarian’s workplace, but another participant added 
that he did work that Hungarians refused to do. They concluded that if he paid tax in 
Hungary, he got as much from society as he contributed. The immigrant group was 
empathic to the worker’s situation and regarded it as positive that he was working 
legally.
Finally, it should be noted that although in the Hungarian group many emphasized 
that they and the Hungarians in general were open and sympathetic to foreigners, 
several remarks which implied prejudices arose: “you must be careful with them, they whip 
out a knife”, “I think a foreigner raises his voice much quicker”, “there are Romanians, at many 
places, working illegally. They only do black work, they grab the work from the Hungarians 
as they do it for less money”, while the Arabs or Chinese “are another type”, they open 
grocery shops and work legally. “If he is a human being, it’s all the same where he comes 
from. If he isn’t, then he shouldn’t come, if we mean an evil group, he shouldn’t come. (…) 
If he is correct, right-minded, honest and wants to come here, why not? Very many come to 
carry on foxy business, trickery, steal, cheat, lie.”
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Discourses and positions
During the group discussions no thorough-going dispute or heated confl icts arose 
about the examined topics. Yet some typical opinions and characteristic positions can 
be outlined and, by identifying them, more light can be shed on the dynamics of the 
discussions.
The normative principle of rendering services for the public good was markedly 
present in both groups when the general themes were civic activities, distributive 
justice and fairness. As for procedural justice, both groups judged their own situation 
similarly, feeling defenseless, incapable of protecting their rights or representing their 
interests. Concerning the attitude to immigrants, the need for discourse about the 
necessity of adequate legal representation for the immigrants arose in both groups 
and they also made attempts to identify various groups of immigrants by elaborating 
some selection principles. Also detectable in respondents’ discussions was a general 
discourse which included a critique of the current state of aff airs, existing xenophobia 
and a stressing of the responsibility of the state, politics and the media.
Finally, it is important to note that in the Hungarian group there is a sort of partial, 
latent duality of values concerning hostility to foreigners and illegal employment. On 
the one hand, they make it expressly clear that members of the Hungarian society – 
including themselves – are hospitable, but the country itself is not (but they also made 
comments during the talks that hinted at a less welcoming view of immigrants). On 
the other hand, it was conspicuous that they were permissive when it came to illegal 
employment by a Hungarian entrepreneur, while they strongly disavowed breaches of 
regulations by immigrants.
CONCLUSION
The results of the focus group examination have revealed several similarities between 
the two groups which may be important contributions to elaborating migrant-related 
policies in the future. It should be noted here that the discussions were in the Hungarian 
language and that the immigrants had lived in Hungary for an average of 5-10 years, 
which means they had a higher degree of integration and experience (i.e. resembling 
more closely members of Hungarian society).
By public aff airs, citizen’s duties and civic activities both groups understood more-
or-less the same issues and activities. Typically, the immigrant group kept away from 
public matters and did not take part in municipal elections, while the host society 
group expressed skepticism about politics. Both groups found the principle of 
proportional distribution of resources according to contribution to be just, but both 
also raised the problem of measuring the extent of contributions and stressed the 
importance of social solidarity. The distribution of goods using the principle of equality 
was deemed to be unjust, unfair and unfeasible in both groups. Distributing goods 
according to the principle of necessity was considered fair and just but unrealizable, 
for “need’ is a notion that is hard to measure or interpret. Yet this was the principle 
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of distribution both groups preferred. Another notable fi nding is that members of 
both groups feel that they have suff ered lots of unfair and unjust treatment when 
undertaking administrative procedures. This is important because earlier research on 
migration mainly attributed the diffi  culties foreigners faced in bureaucratic situations 
to institutional xenophobia. The respondents also expressed skepticism about the 
possibility of asserting their individual or collective interests. Both groups thought that 
immigrants were among those handicapped social groups that were exposed to more 
injustice and unfair treatment than others. Both groups argued that Hungary in general 
was unsympathetic towards foreigners, but was more attentive to the needs of the 
Chinese than, for example, to Hungarians from outside the borders of the country. Both 
groups also stressed the importance of eff orts to banish prejudices to promote the 
better integration of immigrants.
Some diff erences were also discernible between the two groups: the immigrants 
were characterized by their lower levels of participation in political and civic activity than 
the host society. In connection with political and civic activities, immigrants stressed 
the importance of rendering services for the public good more often than Hungarians 
did. The entrepreneur who employed workers illegally was judged negatively by several 
immigrants, while the Hungarian group members were essentially permissive about 
this situation.
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 Composition and characteristics of the focus groups
 Immigrants Hungarians 
 Total 8 8
Gender Male 4 4
 Female 4 4
Age 18–35 6 3
 36–55 2 3
 56+ 0 2
Schooling Secondary or lower 3 4
 Tertiary 5 4
Activity Active 5 6
 Inactive 3 2
Country of origin Serbia (Serb) 2 -
 Serbia (Hungarian) 2 -
 Ukraine (Ukrainian) 1 -
 Ukraine (Hungarian) 1 -
 Africa 2 -
 Near East 0 -
 China 0 -
 Other Asian 0 -
Civic activity Filter questionnaire. Q 53 – at least one ” yes” answer 1 8
 Filter questionnaire Q 64 – ”highly likely” answer 1 8
 Filter questionnaire Q 75 – ”yes” answer 2 4
3 Filtering questionnair question 5: Did you try to do any of the listed things in the past fi ve years? 1. 
Contacting a politician or local government deputy 2. Signing a protest letter or petition. 3. Taking part 
in a legal demonstration. 4. Boycotting certain products 5. Buying products for certain political, ethical, or 
environmental reasons.
4 Filtering questionnaire question 6: Suppose the Parliament passed a law which you fi nd unjust or harmful. 
How likely is it that in such a situation you could do something against it alone or in cooperation with others? 
1. Highly likely, 2. fairly likely, 3. not very likely, 4. not likely at all?
5 Filtering questionnaire question 7: Do you take part actively in, or work as a volunteer for one or more 
organizations? 1. yes. 2. no.
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ACTION POTENTIAL, DIGNITY, CIVIC 
PARTICIPATION AND SUBJECTIVE 
WELLBEING
György Lengyel
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I fi rst explore how exit inclination and sense of dignity correlate to 
economic, cultural and social resources in Hungarian society as a whole and for 
immigrants. Next, how all this infl uences social participation and subjective well-being 
is examined. Individual and collective actors are in possession of various skills and 
abilities which may improve their situations or prevent their deterioration. Forms of the 
latter – reactive – action potential include inclination for exit and voice, as explained by 
Hirschman (1970, 1978, 1993). If we are dissatisfi ed with the performance of a fi rm, we 
may warn the owner, refuse to buy its goods or avail ourselves of its services, or if we 
are share holders, we get rid of the shares. If we are dissatisfi ed with a party or a policy, 
we no longer vote for them or may try to write petitions, news articles, demonstrate or 
emigrate. By the same token, if we are dissatisfi ed with our social status, we may move 
away, emigrate, set up a business of our own, or go, outraged, to the streets in protest. 
Since, for immigrants, both the inclination to move and the tendency to start a business 
may be higher than for Hungarian society, it is evident to presume that exit potential 
(interpreted as being the combination of the former two inclinations) is also higher for 
migrants than the Hungarian society. Voice inclination, being taken for a form of civic 
participation, is among the dependent variables of this project and will be discussed 
later. Hirschman (1978) argues that exit and voice provide alternative solutions to 
a problem, and when the chances of exit are greater; the tendency to protest may 
weaken. It also seems expedient to presume however that there is positive correlation 
between exit inclination and various forms of civic participation as they are based on 
similar feelings and situational assessments. By contrast, the correlation between exit 
potential and subjective well-being is presumed to be negative, as exit inclination is 
probably fed primarily by dissatisfaction. It should be added that subjective well-being 
is understood here – similarly to with the majority of empirical well-being research – as 
being the hedonistic concept of well-being based on utilitarian traditions. It requires 
consideration, however, that components of the other dependent variable – civic 
participation – (such as public activity and involvement) have much in common with 
the eudaimonic concept of well-being as “good action” (Ryan and Deci 2001, Wood and 
Joseph 2009).
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There is a relatively rarely-used concept in empirical social research; dignity, which 
we tried to measure during our research. It can be presumed that the neglect of 
the problem of dignity may stem from it being an abstract notion, rarely injured in 
normal cases, and thus having little variability. But, giving it a second thought, one may 
easily realize that amidst conditions of wars, crises, suppression and defenselessness, 
the injury to dignity might take on a mass dimension and aff ect generations. Under 
the circumstances of both crises and consolidation there may be life situations and 
organizational settings in which dignity is easily harmed: old age, illness, hospitalization 
and imprisonment are likely to enhance the chance of grave and frequent injury to 
dignity (Kathib and Armenian 2010). Workplaces and various sites of everyday life – 
from transport to shopping – also off er multiple opportunities for potential harm to 
be caused to one’s sense of dignity (Hodson 2004). As this paper was written within 
the topic of research on the civic integration of immigrants, we can hypothesize that 
immigration is a life event for which examination of the concept of dignity might be 
important. Being an immigrant, ones dignity might be injured more frequently. This 
may particularly be the case in a country in which xenophobia is notably high (Göncz et 
al. 2011) and the level of trust is low (Giczi and Sik 2009, Tóth 2009). It appears therefore 
logical to hypothesize that the injury (or low level) of the sense of dignity could be 
paired with a high exit potential and greater civic social participation, and also that 
there may be positive correlation between dignity and subjective well-being. As will be 
seen, the relations are more intricate, and it is not always the victims of grievances that 
undertake civic action (Lengyel 1999, Klandermans et al. 2008).
This statement can be verifi ed if the immigrants’ socio-demographic specifi cities are 
used as control variables, for it is easy to see that immigrants constitute a special social 
group in terms of age, gender, schooling and economic activity. In the followings  the 
components of action potential and sense of dignity are fi rst described with the help 
of elementary statistical indicators. Next, I examine with cross tabulation and regression 
models what social, economic and cultural peculiarities exit inclination and sense of 
dignity both the Hungarians and the immigrants display. Finally, I also use regression 
models to explore how exit potential and sense of dignity correlate to civic participation 
and subjective well-being.
EXIT POTENTIAL AND SENSE OF DIGNITY
Exit potential is estimated from the factors of the inclination to migrate and inclination 
to entrepreneurship. If the respondent answered in the affi  rmative to any of the 
questions concerned, it resulted in a positive value for the exit index. Obviously, when 
they mentioned several factors, these were not added up but counted only once. The 
proportion of those who planned to move to another settlement or country was low 
for both Hungarians and immigrants at below 10%; the diff erence between the two 
sub-samples not being signifi cant. A little higher was the proportion of those who 
could imagine moving to another country (one out of ten and seven, respectively), 
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the diff erence being somewhat signifi cant. The real divergence was found with 
entrepreneurial inclination: in the Hungarian sub-sample about every eighth, (and for 
immigrants every third) said they would gladly set up on their own. As a combined 
eff ect of all this, nearly one quarter of the Hungarian sample were identifi ed as having 
an inclination to exit. Similar results were arrived at in an investigation on intention to 
migrate conducted in the late 1990s, but while the proportion of those ready to start 
their own enterprise was one fi fth, now it was only one eighth (Lengyel 1999). In spite 
of that, exit potential remained basically the same for the two years, which may suggest 
that, in the nineties, there was greater overlapping of those ready to enterprise and 
those ready to migrate than today, though the two groups are still positively correlated.
Table 1 Components of exit potential in 2011 (%)
Hungarian society Immigrants N (Chi-square)
plans to move to another 
settlement
8.6 7.9 1416 (n.s.)
can imagine relocating to another 
country
10.9 14.7 1390 (3.9**)
plans to settle in another country 6.3 7.9 1411 (ns)
would gladly become an 
entrepreneur
13.0 32.1 1319 (71.8****)
exit potential (any of the above 
components)
22.9 37.2 1500  (34.1****)
In general, the overwhelming majority of statements posited to measure human 
dignity were found by the people in both sub-groups to be true of their situation. For 
the sake of easier presentation, if we take the category of strong identifi cation, we 
see that a higher proportion of immigrants fi nd that these statements are perfectly 
true of them.
There is one component for which the same proportion of Hungarian and 
immigrant respondents exactly agreed; notably, that they have the right to act 
upon their beliefs. When, however, the “perfectly true” and “partly true” options 
are combined, the self-assessment of the immigrants is more positive. Measuring 
the correlation on the original 5-point scale, we always find a significant 
difference between the Hungarian and immigrant sub-samples in each case. 
Kathib and Armenian (2010) examined human dignity with fourteen questions. 
For considerations of content and because the Cronbach alpha value indicated 
redundancy, we only took nine questions into account when drawing up our 
indicator of dignity. The combined indicator was created by adding the scores 
given to the nine questions and regarding the members of the upper quintile as 
being people with full human dignity.
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Table 2 Components of human dignity in 2011 (proportion of “perfectly true” answers (%))
Hungarian society Immigrants
N (Chi-square, value 
measured on a 5-point 
scale)
When I am suff ering physically, 
people (other than my family) 
around me usually do not know it
24.9 29 1472 (31.3****)
When things go wrong around 
me I usually do not blame others.
29 36.3 1480 (14.7****)
I have control over life decisions 
and choices, such as where to 
work or when I can leave home
38.6 46.7 1478 (25.5****)
I treat people the same way I like 
to be treated by them
48.7 61.7 1475 (34.4****)
I am free to act upon my beliefs. 49.1 47.7 1471 (16.1****)
I have a high sense of self-respect. 21.6 38.6 1469 (73.6****)
I do not feel I need to depend on 
other people around me to get 
things done
32.6 39.6 1471 (13.8***)
I have the freedom to exercise my 
rights as a human being
46.4 61.3 1467 (51.8****)
I respect other people 47.5 67.1 1478 (79.7****)
Sense of dignity 46.4 61.9 1442 (30.9****)
If we take the means of basic breakdowns, we fi nd that Hungarian society and the 
immigrants considerably diverge in terms of exit inclination and sense of dignity.
Table 3 Exit potential and human dignity for Hungarians and immigrants (mean scores) 
exit inclination sense of dignity
Hungarians 0.23  0.46 
Immigrants 0.37 0.62  
F 35**** 31****
The breakdown reveals that exit potential is considerably higher for immigrants than 
for Hungarian society as a whole. (N. B. Using Hirschman’s other kind of response, voice 
– to be analyzed later – the tendency is that the immigrants resort to using it in far 
smaller proportions than members of the Hungarian society.)
Compared to less than half the Hungarian sub-sample, three immigrants out of fi ve 
thought that their sense of dignity was “above average”. As noted in the introduction, 
this cannot be independent of the special composition of the group of immigrants: 
they are younger, there are a greater proportion of men, they are more highly educated, 
their activity rate is higher and there are proportionately more entrepreneurs among 
them. The question is whether the diff erent exit potentials and diff erent levels of 
human dignity remain unchanged for Hungarians and immigrants if they are checked 
using socio-demographic control variables. There are two ways of testing this: either 
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with three-dimensional tables or with logistic regression models where immigration 
and the socio-demographic variables are jointly included.
Table 4 Exit potential and sense of dignity for immigrants and Hungarians by gender (%)
Exit potential N (chi-square) dignity N (chi-square)
male
Hungarians 25.5 466 (12.7****) 45.3 446 (21.6****)
Immigrants 38.1 231 63.5 255
female
Hungarians 20.4 534 (21.4****) 47.4 519  (9.7****)
Immigrants 36.2 232 59.9 222
The sub-samples retain their diff erence when exit potential is broken down by 
gender. For women the diff erence is even greater. In the immigrant group there are 
a comparably higher proportion of both men and women (nearly two-fi fths) who are 
willing to exit. By contrast, not only is the proportion lower for Hungarians, but men 
and women diverge: one quarter of men and one fi fth of women are inclined to exit 
(i.e. would be willing to change and move on in terms of geographic or social space).
In terms of dignity, no considerable diff erence is found between men and women, 
but the advantage of the immigrants remains even if the sample groups are examined 
through gender. Here, the sub-sample of immigrants displays a diff erence between 
men and women: while less than half of Hungarian men and women testify to having 
a keen sense of dignity, this proportion is nearly two thirds for male immigrants and 
three-fi fths for immigrant women. It is therefore verifi ed that the sense of dignity of 
immigrant women is lower than that of the men, but it is still higher than the human 
dignity of both Hungarian women and men.
Table 5 Exit potential and human dignity for  immigrants and Hungarians by age (%)
exit inclination N (Chi-square) dignity N (Chi-square)
-39 
Hungarians 37.8 396   (n.s.) 46.3 382 (19.9****)
Immigrants 42 290 63.9 277
40-
Hungarians 12.9 604 (31.4****) 46.4 582  (9.8****)
Immigrants 29.9 211 59.2 201
There is no diff erence in exit potential between the sub-samples when controlled 
for by age. At the same time, in terms of exit inclination the divergence between the 
younger and older generations is far greater for the sample of Hungarian society. The 
age distribution of immigrants is more homogeneous and they are younger on average; 
this is why age plays a lesser role in exit potential, even though it is still signifi cant.
When broken down to age groups, diff erences in sense of dignity between the sub-
samples still remain considerable. As can be seen, less than half the Hungarians and 
over three fi fths of immigrants have a strong sense of human dignity. Also, Hungarian 
society is not divided in terms of dignity into a younger and older group, while younger 
immigrants score more highly. However, even older immigrants have a sense of greater 
dignity than younger Hungarians.
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Table 6 Exit potential and human dignity for immigrants and Hungarians by schooling (%)
exit 
potential
N (Chi-square) dignity
N (Chi-square)
primary school, vocational 
training
Hungarians 18.8 574 (10.8****) 41.3 550   (ns)
Immigrants 31.8 132 50 120
secondary or tertiary
Hungarians 28.3 424 (10.3****) 53.4 414 (12.5****)
Immigrants 39.1 368 65.9 358
Higher education is an important explanatory factor for exit inclination for both the 
Hungarian and the immigrant sub-sample, but at identical levels of schooling the 
diff erence between Hungarians and immigrants still remains signifi cant. The higher 
the level of schooling, the smaller the diff erence (but it remains signifi cant and 
considerable).
Although there is considerable diff erence between less highly-educated Hungarians 
and immigrants in terms of dignity (in favor of the latter), the correlation is not signifi cant 
because within the immigrant sample there are too few people with a low education. 
The diff erence in dignity between Hungarians and the immigrants is even greater 
when the more highly educated are looked at. It is also found that schooling infl uences 
a respondent’s sense of dignity positively and signifi cantly for both sub-samples.
Table 7 Exit potential and human dignity for immigrants and Hungarians by “activity” (%)
Exit potential N (Chi-square) dignity N (Chi-square)
inactive
Hungarian society 16.3 540 (39.7****) 39.8 518 (14.2****)
Immigrants 34.2 158 58.9 151
active
Hungarian society 30.3 458 (4.6***) 53.9 445  (12.8****)
Immigrants 38.4 341 63.4 325
There is a particularly great diff erence between Hungarian society and immigrants 
concerning exit potential when the inactive people are considered. Inactive Hungarians 
are massively underrepresented among those who would choose one or another 
exit option. The diff erence between the active groups is less conspicuous but still 
signifi cant. Typically, inactive immigrants would opt to exit (emigration, relocation or 
entrepreneurship) in greater proportions than active Hungarians.
In terms of human dignity, the diff erence remains between Hungarians and 
immigrants to the benefi t of the latter when compared along the dimension of 
economic activity. Among the inactive the diff erence between the two sub-samples 
is considerably greater than for the active. However, there are a higher proportion of 
inactive immigrants with full dignity than active Hungarians.
When the combined eff ect of the above factors is examined with binary logistic 
models (not detailed here), we fi nd that gender does not play a noticeable role, either in 
exit inclination or in human dignity. The most important predictors of exit potential are 
age (i.e. being young) and economic activity. Schooling plays a smaller but signifi cant 
role.
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As regards sense of dignity, neither gender nor age plays a role. By contrast, 
education has a signifi cant and positive role, similarly to activity and the immigration 
status. These factors together provide a more exact and stronger prediction of potential 
to exit than human dignity.
Immigration status controlled by demographic variables, as well as schooling and 
economic activity, infl uences both the exit potential and the sense of dignity in a 
signifi cant, positive way. 
It can be stated in general that there is a signifi cant and positive correlation between 
exit potential and human dignity for both Hungarian society and for immigrants.
Table 8 Correlation between exit potential and human dignity for Hungarians and for 
immigrants (%)
human dignity: no human dignity: yes N Phi
Hungarians
exit potential : no 56.1 43.9 748
.1****
exit potential : yes 44.7 55.3 217
Immigrants
exit potential : no 43.4 56.6 304
.15****
exit potential : yes 28.3 71.7 173
For immigrants, human dignity is higher in both groups of high exit potential than for 
Hungarian groups, and the correlation between exit and dignity is somewhat stronger.
CORRELATION OF EXIT POTENTIAL AND SENSE OF DIGNITY WITH 
MATERIAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RESOURCES FOR HUNGARIAN 
SOCIETY AND IMMIGRANTS
From among material resources, the variables that directly or indirectly show labor or 
capital market presence are taken into consideration. The fi rst one is the “active-inactive” 
distinction (we consider the earners, the unemployed and those on maternity leave as 
being among the active. In terms of several attitude variables, students are also closer 
to this group than to pensioners and household dependents, yet they are considered 
as being inactive as they are not present on the labor market).
For Hungarians, every third active person (and among the inactive, only every tenth) 
displays inclination to exit, i.e. to move to another settlement, to go to another country 
or start an enterprise. The unemployed have notably high exit potential; two out of fi ve 
opting for exit. This rate is considerably up from results of fi fteen years ago, although 
for the whole population the proportions are unchanged (Lengyel 1999). Unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers – that is, those in marginal positions on the labor market – 
are underrepresented in terms of exit potential, when compared to the unemployed. 
Having an above-average income shows no correlation with exit potential – presumably 
because of the uncertainties of such data – but having above-average wealth greatly 
increases the chances of exit.
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Table 9 Exit potential and human dignity by material resources for categories of Hungarian 
society and immigrants 
Hungarians Immigrants
exit potential sense of dignity exit potential sense of dignity       
% N,  phi,sign. % N, phi, sign. % N,  phi, sign. %
N,  phi, 
sign.
Adult population 22.9 1001 46.4 963 37.2 500 61.9 478
Active population 32.3 
581  
.26 ****
50.8 561 .10**** 38.8 363 n.s. 62.9 348  n.s. 
Inactive population 10.2 420 40.3 402 32.8 137 59.2 130  
Unemployed 41.2 102  .15**** 36.4  99  .03* 71.4 14  .12**** 50.0   14  n.s.
Workers 29.8 446 . 15**** 54.5 433  .15**** 38.8 338  n.s. 63.4  320  n.s.
Leaders, 
professionals, white-
collar workers
31.5 327  n.s. 57.8 315 .11* 37.3 314  n.s. 63.2 399  n.s. 
Workers in marginal 
labor market 
positions
17.5 298  .08*** 39.0 272 .09*** 26.5 34  n.s. 31.3 32 .17****
Entrepreneurs 27.6  58  n.s.+ 69   55 .11** 38.5 109  n.s.+ 73.5 102  .4****
Individuals with 
above-average 
income
21.4 419  n.s. 51.7 412 .09**** 38.5 205  n.s. 60.6 198  n.s.
Households with 
above-average 
income
24.3 383  n.s. 51.2 369 .08** 43.9 173 .1** 59.1 171  n.s.
Those with above-
average wealth
28.8 416  .12**** 54.3 409  .14**** 43.5 306 .16**** 66.0 300 .11**
Housing conditions
(prefab, emergency)
23.0 273  n.s. 39.5 253 .08*** 30.6 235  .13**** 61.0 223  n.s.
Note: + measured only by migration components
In many regards, human dignity parallels exit potential and generally positively correlates 
to the indicators of labor and capital markets. While, for the unemployed, those who opt 
for exit are overrepresented, those with full dignity are underrepresented. Since human 
dignity comprises independence, justice, respect, freedom, self-respect and since in the 
lives of the unemployed each and every of these components is vulnerable, this fi nding 
may seem obvious. It is thoroughly documented in the sociographic and sociological 
literature how unemployment and marginal labor market position infl uence human 
dignity (Hodson 2004, Burawoy 1979, Jahoda 1999, Simonyi 2001, Liebow 2003).
At fi rst sight it might be surprising that the correlation between unemployment 
and human dignity is only weakly signifi cant. This is attributable, fi rst of all, to the 
low number, since there is a nearly 20% gap between workers and the unemployed 
in terms of human dignity. Considerably below average is the sense of dignity of 
those employed in marginal work. Compared to the adult population, professionals 
employed in the competitive sphere and white-collar workers in the public sphere are 
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also underrepresented in terms of dignity. Examined by sectors, those in the fi nancial 
sector, education and culture, as well as agriculture, report to having less dignity. 
Indices of income and wealth as material resource indicators are in signifi cant and 
positive correlation with dignity, although their eff ect is weaker than that of being an 
entrepreneur or occupying a central position in the labor market.
For immigrants, the indicators chosen to operationalize material resources explain 
exit potential and human dignity to a lesser extent. Though the inactive show below-
average inclination to exit, the correlation is not signifi cant since the greater active 
majority of immigrants have a close-to-average attitude. It is unemployment that 
stimulates them to an above-average extent to opt for exit. Besides, similarly to with 
Hungarian society, those who are better off  than average also show above-average 
inclination to be mobile.
Having an above-average sense of dignity is primarily contributed to by property 
status and entrepreneurship for immigrants. Migrants in marginal labor market 
positions experience injuries to their dignity to about the same extent as Hungarians 
do in similar situations. Professionals employed in the competitive sphere also feel that 
their dignity is below the average of the immigrants, though they are not so vulnerable 
as the former group. Their score is close to the average of Hungarian society.
As has been seen, immigrants diff er from Hungarian society on many counts, 
including schooling. Less than one in every tenth had no more than primary education, 
as compared to more than every third Hungarian. At the other end of the scale, 
compared to every seventh Hungarian, more than one in every four had tertiary 
education. Three quarters of the Hungarian sub-sample which represented adult 
Hungarian society spoke no foreign languages, and only every twelfth spoke two or 
more. For immigrants the proportion of the latter is nearly three fi fths, which is not 
surprising. It is the most marked cultural diff erence between the two sub-samples. 
When, among the recommendations concerning migration – such as those put 
forth after our earlier research – it is stressed that one of the major preconditions for 
immigrant integration is language knowledge, it must also be added that the key to the 
international integration of Hungarian society is also the learning of foreign languages 
en masse. As for the other important indicator of cultural resources – the use of the 
Internet – there are considerable diff erences to the advantage of the immigrants: while 
nearly half of the Hungarian adult population does not use the internet at all and nearly 
one third are daily users, only every eighth immigrant does not use it and every second 
uses it regularly.
When asked about their subjective well-being, over half of the Hungarian sample 
replied that they lived “below average” and nearly one third thought they lived at an 
“above average” standard of living. For immigrants it is the other way round; a quarter of 
them think they live worse and nearly half think they live better than average. A quarter 
of all Hungarians think they get more from society than they contribute, and nearly half 
think they get less than they contribute, meaning that they believe they deserve more. 
For migrants only slightly higher is the proportion of those who think they get more 
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than they deserve, but considerably lower is the proportion of those who feel they get 
less from society than they contribute.
Ten per cent of Hungarians claimed they had no friends; the corresponding 
fi gure for immigrants being a negligible 3%. A third of Hungarians and three-fi fths 
of immigrants said they had ten or more friends. As for cognitive mobilization, the 
situation is reversed. The proportion of Hungarians who often discuss political issues 
with their friends is one seventh – relatively low – but is even lower, (half of this) for 
immigrants. The number of friends indicator measures the extent of primary relations, 
while cognitive mobilization is meant to estimate its intensity. The latter also divulges 
much about a society’s inclination for participation. All this applies to the whole of 
Hungarian society. It is not known how intensely immigrants use their primary relations 
as profound friendships (for the purpose of mutual help and resource-enlargement, or 
whether they are merely used for recreational pastimes). It is a fact that immigrants are 
less interested in the public aff airs of Hungary than the majority, and they utilize to a 
lesser extent the potential of personal networks to satisfy their interests in public issues.
For Hungarian society, the majority of cultural and social resources reinforce the 
tendency to exit. Thus, Hungarians with a maximum of 8 years of education choose 
this option far less than the average, and tertiary graduates choose it to an above-
average degree (however, the eff ect of the latter is not signifi cant, owing to their 
small proportion). The great majority who do not speak foreign languages opt for 
exit in below average proportions, while those who speak two or more languages are 
open to exiting at a high (almost double the average) rate. The experience of info-
communication has a similar eff ect. Those who do not use the Internet show even 
less inclination than the little educated to opt for various forms of exit, while regular 
Internet users have a higher exit potential than the highly educated. In this case the 
statistical connection is particularly strong, which is attributed to the fact that the 
frequency of the cells is more even; nearly one third of respondents being regular 
Internet users. The three-grade scale variable which estimates subjective well-being is 
not strongly correlated with exit potential (it seems certain, however, that if the lower 
and upper quintiles of the eleven-grade scale were to be examined, the correlation 
would be stronger). Another indicator of subjective social status – the evaluation of 
the balance between the respondent’s contribution to and his/her benefi ting from 
society – suggests interesting implications. About a quarter of respondents felt they 
received more from society than they could contribute, and for these people exit 
potential was considerably below average. The most probable explanation is that aged 
inactive people are overrepresented in this category and they interpret their position 
in accord with dominant social stereotypes. As said above, each eleventh person self-
reported to having no friends, while exit potential is lower for them than for any of the 
so-far mentioned groups: 10 %. By contrast, those who have many friends show a far 
above average interest in exit options, and the correlation is nearly as strong as with the 
info-communicational cultural resource. The correlation is also strong and signifi cant 
in terms of cognitive mobilization. Those who never chat about political issues with 
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their friends have below-average exit potential, and those who regularly do have a well 
above-average inclination to exit.
For immigrants, the majority of cultural and social resources do not help to 
diff erentiate exit potential. At the same time, these subtler social categories (with 
one exception) have greater power to aff ect exit potential than for Hungarian society. 
The exception is with Internet use, since for those who do not use the Internet, exit 
inclination is very low for both sub-samples. The essential diff erence is that Internet 
non-users constituted nearly half the Hungarian sample at the time of the survey in 
2011, but only about one eighth of all immigrants.
Human dignity closely correlates with schooling; one and a half times as many 
tertiary graduates identify with having a dignifi ed self-image than those with lower 
schooling. Knowledge of languages and IT do not imply such great divergences. About 
half of the Hungarian respondents thought that they had below-average social status 
and their sense of dignity was also well below average, while the thirty percent who 
claimed to live better than the average also had an above-average sense of dignity, 
since the components of dignity and subjective social self-assessment both induced 
similar refl ections in the respondents. A correlation of similar direction and intensity 
was shown by the other indicator of subjective life quality which weighed the “give and 
take” balance between respondent and society. The sense of dignity of those who felt 
that what they received from society was far more than the eff ort they put into society 
is far more vulnerable than average, while those who think they contribute more than 
they get from society – who amount to nearly half of the sample – report to having 
more dignity more than the average.
The dignity of those who have no friends is considerably more vulnerable; from all 
resources, a lack of primary relationships (i.e. friends) causes the greatest drop in dignity. 
By contrast, people with many friends have a greater sense of dignity. This particularly 
holds true of cognitive mobilization, indicative of the intensity of friendships: those who 
often discuss political issues with friends and acquaintances have a sense of dignity one 
and a half times higher than average. For immigrants, the proportion of people with a 
sense of dignity is higher on average and for nearly every examined dimension, too. 
The exception is again for those who do not use the Internet: proportionately even 
fewer of them reported having a sense of human dignity than for the corresponding 
group of Hungarians. This (one-third) proportion, which is very low for immigrants, is 
equal with the proportion of those without friends. Those immigrants, however, who 
have no friends, constitute a very small group: for the Hungarian sub-sample it is 
every fourteenth person but for immigrants only every thirty-third that had no friends. 
The small group size may explain why the correlation is not signifi cant, although the 
proportion of the dignifi ed is very low for those with no friends.
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Table 10 Exit potential and human dignity by social and cultural resources for categories of 
Hungarian society and immigrants 
Hungarians Immigrants
Exit potential Human dignity     Exit potential Human dignity    
% N,  phi, sign. % N, phi, sign. %
N,  phi, 
sign.
% N, phi, sign.
Adult population 22.9 1001 46.4 963 37.2 500 61.9 478
Schooling: 8 grades 
of less
15.8 361 .13**** 36.7 341 .15**** 25.5 47  n.s. 40.9 44 .14****
Schooling: higher 
education
28.1 135  n.s.    62.7 134  .13**** 40.9 132  n.s. 69.5 131 .1****
Languages: knows no 
foreign language
18.1 725  .19**** 44.3 700  n.s. 27,3 73 n.s. 49.2 65  .13**
Languages: knows 
2 or more foreign 
languages
42.2 83 51.3 78 39.7 295 n.s. 66.7 282  
Internet use:
does not use it
12.2 482  .25**** 43.2 458  n.s. 12.3 65 .21**** 35.9 64  .23****
Internet use: uses it 
daily
36.3 317 50.7 304 43.0 251 70.0 237
Self-assessment of 
social status: below 
average
21.9 511   n.s. 37.5 488  .19**** 32.6 135 n.s. 50.0 126  .15****
Self-assessment of 
social status: above 
average
25.8 299 58.9 292 39.1 230 67.9 224
Subjective social 
status 2: gets more 
from society than 
contributes
15.6 257  .12**** 30.8 247  .19**** 32.9 143 n.s. 58.2 134  n.s.
Social self-assessment, 
subjective social 
status 2:  gets less 
from society than 
contributes
22.7 467 52.7 455 36.8 163 61.0 159
Friends: none 10.1 89  .2**** 25.3 75  .17**** 31.3 16  n.s. 33.3 15 n.s.
Friends: 10 or more 
friends 
34.9 301 56.3 293 36.3 271  n.s. 62.5 259
Cognitive 
mobilization: almost 
never speaks about 
politics with friends, 
acquaintances
18.0 428  .13**** 43.3 404  .15**** 37.3 260  n.s. 62.8 247  n.s.
Cognitive 
mobilization: 
frequently talks about 
politics with friends
34.7 144 64.3 140 38.9  36  n.s. 69.8 36
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Table 11 Multivariate analysis: impact of resources on exit potential and human dignity 
(Hungarians and immigrants) 
Hungarians Immigrants
exit potential human dignity exit potential Human dignity
Exp (B) Sign. Exp (B) Sign. Exp (B) Sign. Exp (B) Sign.
labor market activity 2.511 .000 1.401 .083 1.523 .219 1.312 .400
marginal labor market position 1.143 .661 .841 .473 .901 .844 .358 .042
unfavorable housing conditions 1.122 .560 .740 .076 .513 .003 .880 .569
leader, professional. white-collar 
worker
1.071 .727 1.431 .028 .433 .007 .890 .700
unemployed 1.809 .049 .684 .184 5.044 .029 1.366 .661
above-average income .683 .129 1.182 .377 .917 .765 1.084 .775
above-average household income 1.030 .898 1.030 .872 1.883 .025 .646 .110
number of friends
(base=0)
.000 .005 .850 .404
number of friends
1–9
1.108 .801 2.003 .025 1.037 .959 2.306 .191
number of friends 10+ 2.267 .048 2.757 .002 1.174 .817 2.016 .267
school: primary 1.242 .482 .822 .422 1.061 .897 .678 .374
Internet use (base=0) .000 .055 .000 .069
Internet use: weekly or rarer 2.489 .006 .584 .065 1.824 .248 1.361 .465
Internet use: several times a week 2.451 .004 .727 .229 4.387 .001 1.850 .095
Internet use: every, or nearly every day 3.709 .000 .567 .011 5.250 .000 2.358 .015
cognitive mobilization:
(base= never discusses politics with 
friends)
.110 .001 .284 .912
cognitive mobilization: rarely discusses 
politics with friends
1.221 .321 .896 .509 .763 .244 .918 .712
cognitive mobilization: often discusses 
politics with friends
1.729 .036 2.083 .002 .566 .181 1.053 .903
social self-assessment
 (base= below average)
.025 .000 .808 .457
social self-assessment:
average
.603 .045 1.469 .054 .816 .524 1.035 .911
social self-assessment:
above average
.574 .013 2.254 .000 .914 .757 1.342 .295
knowledge of foreign language
(base=0)
.087 .642 .158 .223
1 foreign language 1.434 .104 1.122 .578 2.052 .065 1.558 .219
2 or more foreign languages 1.786 .057 .833 .548 1.885 .079 1.770 .083
constant .049 .000 .291 .000 .142 .020 .289 .087
N, 
Nagelkerke R square 
Correctly rated cases (%)
870
.22
78.2
842
.14
62.6
446
.17 
70.3
434
.12
68.2
Note: Binary logistic regression, enter method
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In explaining exit potential, labor market activity and unemployment, the extent and 
intensity of primary social relations (number of friends and cognitive mobilization), 
subjective social self-assessment and digital literacy (frequency of Internet use) are 
the components of the material, cultural and social resources that play a great role for 
Hungarians.
For immigrants, a very strong positive impact on exit potential is caused by 
unemployment and a negative eff ect by being employed as a leader/employed 
professional/white-collar worker. Also negative was the eff ect of unfavorable housing, 
while the intensity of Internet use and household income positively infl uenced this 
factor. It can be said that both positive and negative factors may boost exist inclination.
In the Hungarian sub-sample, the likelihood of a high sense of dignity can be 
increased by having a leading, professional or white-collar job, by number of friends and 
by having a positive subjective social self-assessment. By contrast, intensive Internet 
usage, controlled using the eff ect of the other variables, suggests a lower-than-average 
sense of human dignity.
For immigrants, the latter phenomenon is quite the opposite; digital literacy 
enhances the sense of dignity. This may be due to the use of the Internet for recreational 
purposes or its use in extending the resource pool, and to the age distribution of users. 
For immigrants the most powerfully negative eff ect on dignity is having a marginal 
labor market position – as the table analyses have already shown.
The models more strongly explain exit potential and human dignity for Hungarian 
society than for immigrants. On the whole, the correlation of resources is stronger with 
exit potential than with human dignity in both sub-samples.
CORRELATION OF EXIT POTENTIAL AND HUMAN DIGNITY WITH CIVIC 
PARTICIPATION
Two components of civic participation – voice inclination and non-profi t organizations 
membership – were examined. (The variables are described in the chapter of Borbála 
Göncz, in this volume.)
Table 12 Correlation of exit potential and human dignity to voice inclination and membership 
in non-profi t organizations (Hungarians and immigrants [phi, sign])
Hungarians Immigrants
dignity voice potential
non-
profi t org. 
membership
dignity
voice 
potential
non-profi t org. 
membership
exit potential .1**** n.s. .05** ,15**** .16**** .07**
human dignity - .17**** .1**** -
ns
ns
voice potential - .25**** - .26****
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Two clarifi cation statements are needed here. First, it is true that for immigrants voice 
potential is lower and exit potential is higher than for members of Hungarian society. 
Second, the two forms of action potential are not signifi cantly correlated for Hungarians 
but are in signifi cant positive correlation for immigrants: every seventh immigrant takes 
part in protest action. For those whose inclination to exit is stronger, it is every fi fth person.
Table 13 Infl uence of exit potential and sense of dignity (controlled for resources) upon voice 
potential and non-profi t organizations membership (Hungarians and immigrants)
Hungarians Immigrants
voice potential
non-profi t 
organizations 
membership
voice 
potential
non-profi t 
organizations 
membership
Exp (B) sign. Exp (B) sign. Exp (B) sign. Exp (B) sign.
labor market activity 1.230 .371 1.202 .402 .673 .375 2.408 .030
marginal labor market position 1.304 .370 .512 .017 2.042 .374 3.104 .111
unfavorable housing conditions 1.088 .672 1.313 .142 .493 .043 .514 .016
leader, professional, white-collar worker 1.180 .387 .919 .644 .517 .109 .139 .000
unemployed .659 .226 .700 .316 .708 .767 .332 .337
above-average income .700 .132 1.780 .007 .935 .874 1.118 .749
above-average household income 1.412 .124 1.278 .228 .406 .035 1.210 .582
number of friends (base=0) 1.000 .161 .951 .301
number of friends 1–9 .999 .998 2.137 .056 1.431 .756 2.721 .409
number of friends 10+ .995 .989 2.022 .090 1.370 .783 3.760 .269
schooling: primary .783 .423 1.200 .511 .156 .123 .051 .010
Internet use (base=0) .442 .412 .001 .001
Internet use: weekly or rarer 1.146 .687 1.664 .092 5.659 .031 6.136 .019
Internet use: several times a week 1.220 .507 1.231 .463 2.475 .240 13.862 .000
Internet use: every day, almost daily .797 .398 1.199 .461 .959 .957 6.665 .009
cognitive mobilization: (base= never 
speaks about politics with friends)
.000 .000 .006 .271
cognitive mobilization: rarely speaks 
about politics with friends
2.252 .000 1.553 .020 1.513 .243 .657 .128
cognitive mobilization: often speaks 
about politics with friends
7.270 .000 2.746 .000 5.242 .002 1.049 .920
social self-assessment (base= below average) .242 .852 .022 .047
social self-assessment: average .658 .092 .972 .900 2.860 .051 .668 .316
social self-assessment: above average .865 .507 1.097 .650 4.088 .006 1.442 .307
foreign language, (base=0) .003 .145 .283 .058
knowledge of 1 foreign language 2.100 .001 .991 .966 2.536 .201 2.909 .053
knowledge of 2 or more foreign languages 1.884 .053 1.773 .060 2.920 .113 3.373 .017
exit potential .881 .554 1.027 .895 2.625 .004 .944 .832
sense of dignity 1.813 .001 1.034 .849 .979 .949 .691 .174
Constant .098 .000 .076 .000 .017 .006 .018 .006
N, 
Nagelkerke R square 
correctly rated cases (%)
842
.2
76.9
842
.16
74.1
434
.27
89.3
434
.32
79.0
Note: Binary logistic regression, enter method
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In Hungarian society, voice potential significantly positively correlates with human 
dignity and cultural resources (first of all cognitive mobilization and language 
skills). However, there is no significant correlation between exit potential and 
voice potential. This correlation does not exist at the elementary level either: 
about a quarter of the adult population was inclined to voice protest, and a similar 
proportion would choose it among those with exit option. By contrast, there is a 
significant positive correlation between voice potential and membership in non-
profit organizations: every one in six persons who is not a member of a non-profit 
organization (and more than two out of five members of non-profit organizations) 
have taken part in protests.
For Hungarians, a little more than a quarter are members of non-profi t 
organizations; this is signifi cantly correlated to cognitive mobilization (friendships 
also exert a positive eff ect, just on the verge of statistical signifi cance). Non-profi t 
organization membership is positively correlated with income and negatively with 
marginal labor market position. Exit potential and sense of dignity are not correlated 
to non-profi t organization membership when controlled for using resources. This is 
remarkable, because one of the components of human dignity is an ability to refl ect 
upon the social environment.
Voice potential is lower for immigrants than for Hungarian society. Having this 
characteristic applies to every seventh immigrant and correlates to exit potential, 
cognitive mobilization, positive social self-assessment and digital literacy. Above-
average household income and unfavorable housing conditions tend to decrease 
voice inclination, which suggests at fi rst sight that the role of material resources is 
mixed. Since, however, very broad dichotomous categories are used, and the level 
of signifi cance is low, we may assume that social and cultural resources play a more 
important role in explaining voice potential than material conditions do.
Also about a quarter of all immigrants are members of non-profi t organizations 
and membership is not infl uenced by either exit potential or having a sense of dignity. 
Cultural resources, on the other hand (primarily digital literacy and schooling), have 
a strong impact. Leaders, professionals and white-collar workers are involved in non-
profi t organizations to a below average extent, which is probably ascribable to the fact 
that there are more white-collar workers and professionals in the competitive sphere 
than “leaders” who are generally characterized by having above-average activity in non-
profi t organizations.
CORRELATION OF EXIT POTENTIAL, HUMAN DIGNITY AND CIVIC 
PARTICIPATION WITH SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
Subjective well-being is interpreted as being the mean of satisfaction and happiness, 
and for easier comparison we use the dichotomous categories of “not above average” 
and “above average” SWB.
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It does not hold that there is negative correlation between exit potential and 
subjective well-being: the connection was found to be negligible for both Hungarians 
and immigrants. If we examine subjective well-being by its components (because we 
suspect that dissatisfaction and exit potential may be correlated), we fi nd that there is 
no such correlation - and this applies to happiness as well. N. B. Voice potential, unlike 
exit potential, has a signifi cant correlation with subjective well-being. Those who have 
taken part in some kind of protest claim to be more satisfi ed and happier than the 
Hungarian average. For immigrants this correlation is not signifi cant.
Table 14 Correlation of action potential, human dignity and membership of non-profi t 
organization with subjective well-being (above-average SWB within each category, %)
Hungarians Immigrants
SWB sign. SWB sign.
exit inclination: no 40.1
n.s.
77.5
n.s.
exit inclination: yes 41.6 75.6
dignity: no 31.2
.21****
65.3
.19****
dignity: yes 51.7 83.4
voice inclination: no 37.7
.1****
75.8
n.s.
voice inclination: yes 48.5 80.6
non-profi t org. 
member: no
37.4
.1****
72.7
.15****
non-profi t org. 
member: yes
48.1 87.4
By contrast, a sense of dignity goes together with having above-average happiness 
and greater satisfaction for both sub-samples. The mean of subjective well-being is 
considerably higher for immigrants.
For Hungarians, neither exit potential nor voice inclination correlates with subjective 
well-being. Dignity and self-assessed social standing by contrast, show strong and 
positive correlation to satisfaction and happiness. It is not so much the number as the 
existence of friends that also positively infl uences subjective well-being, and digital 
literacy also has a positive impact. Under controlled conditions, there is a weak negative 
correlation between subjective well-being and labor market position (table analyses 
do not indicate  the latter). Unemployment itself is negatively linked to subjective well-
being, and presumably this causes the distortion of the activity eff ect in the model 
(remember: the unemployed belong to the “active” group). This is supported by the 
fact that if the unemployment variable is omitted from the model, the signifi cance of 
“activity” increases.
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Table 15 Controlled eff ect of action potential, sense of dignity and membership of non-profi t 
organization upon subjective well-being (Hungarians and immigrants)
Hungarians Immigrants
Exp (B) sign. Exp (B) sign.
labor market activity .573 .018 1.070 .883
marginal labor market position .758 .353 .310 .064
unfavorable housing .986 .946 .886 .706
leader, professional, white-collar worker 1.287 .198 .880 .781
unemployed .980 .954 .085 .016
above-average income .751 .214 1.165 .682
above-average household income 1.053 .815 1.459 .308
number of friends
(base=0)
.048 .068
number of friends
1–9
1.210 .640 3.916 .104
number of friends 10+ 1.892 .133 5.798 .034
schooling: primary .733 .302 3.809 .048
Internet use (base=0) .112 .001
Internet use: weekly or rarer 1.560 .182 1.315 .599
Internet use: several times a week 1.345 .337 4.730 .003
Internet use: every day, almost daily 1.878 .018 4.509 .002
 cognitive mobilization:
(base= never speaks about politics with friends)
.615 .623
cognitive mobilization: rarely speaks about politics with friends .849 .423 .730 .333
cognitive mobilization: often speaks about politics with friends 1.048 .869 .891 .855
social self-assessment
(base= below average)
.000 .000
social self-assessment: 
average
4.080 .000 2.531 .015
social self-assessment:
above average
9.848 .000 7.069 .000
foreign language
(base=0)
.861 .362
knowledge of 1 foreign language 1.019 .938 2.010 .184
knowledge of 2 or more foreign languages 1.212 .586 1.347 .539
exit potential .715 .136 .505 .044
sense of dignity 1.783 .002 2.207 .011
voice potential 1.385 .136 1.417 .477
non-profi t organization membership 1.306 .188 1.519 .323
Constant .145 .000 .051 .005
N, 
Nagelkerke R square 
correctly rated cases (%)
810
.4
77.2
410
.4
85.2
Note: Binary logistic regression, enter method
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In the sub-sample of immigrants, both the number of friends and cultural resources 
have a positive and signifi cant impact on subjective well-being and both exit potential 
and human dignity are related to subjective well-being, but the correlation runs in 
diff erent directions. Exit potential correlates to lower SWB, while a sense of dignity – 
similarly as with the Hungarian sub-sample – is positively correlated to SWB. It should be 
emphasized that under controlled conditions there is a negative correlation between 
exit inclination and subjective well-being, since in the two-dimensional table analyses 
this connection was not verifi able. In other words, given an identical combination of 
resources, high exit potential goes together with low subjective well-being.
Since SWB is operationalized as the mean of cognitive and aff ective aspects – 
satisfaction and happiness (after Inglehart’s proposition) – it is worth checking whether 
the two components of subjective well-being display equally negative and signifi cant 
correlation to exit potential.
When we tested these  with elementary table statistics  we found that exit potential 
was not related either to satisfaction or to happiness. Voice shows weak positive 
correlation to satisfaction and a strong positive correlation to happiness for Hungarians 
(immigrants who had never taken part in protests clamed to be happier, but the 
correlation is not signifi cant).
When examining the models controlled by resources (with components of SWB 
being separately included), we fi nd that the exit inclination shows no correlation to 
satisfaction under controlled conditions, but for immigrants exit inclination and a lack of 
happiness are strongly correlated. This causes the correlation between exit inclination 
and subjective well-being.
THE SOCIAL PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS: SOME CONCLUSIONS
Finally, an attempt is made to outline the social profi le of immigrants on the basis of the 
characteristics examined and a summary of conclusions is presented. For this purpose, 
a logistic regression model is built, the dependent variable of which is the dichotomy of 
immigrants and Hungarians, and the explanatory variables are the (formerly examined) 
resources and demographic variables, as well as action potential, dignity and civic 
participation.
As regards their positions on the labor market, a well-above average proportion of 
immigrants are entrepreneurs, leaders, professionals or white-collar workers. Concerning 
their living conditions on the other hand, more than average live in prefabricated 
housing, which is related to the fact that the overwhelming majority live in cities. Their 
foreign language knowledge is greater by magnitudes than average, and also they 
make above-average use of the Internet. They also have friends more than average. 
Cognitive mobilization, voice inclination and engagement in civic participation are less 
frequent than average. When endowed with the same resources, they have the same 
human dignity and exit inclination as average.
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Table 16 Characteristics of immigrants in terms of resources, action potential, civic participation 
and subjective well-being
Exp (B) sign. Exp (B) sign.
unfavorable housing 1.809 .009
foreign language
(base=0)
.000
above-average income .848 .566
knowledge of 1 
foreign language 8.458 .000
 above average 
household income
.784 .397
knowledge of 2 or 
more languages 68.487 .000
number of friends
(base=0)
.006 exit potential 1.129 .622
number of friends
1–9
.895 .843 sense of dignity .819 .383
number of friends 10+ 1.805 .290 voice potential .195 .000
schooling: primary .689 .450
non-profi t org. 
membership
.385 .000
Internet use (base=0) .060 active 1.323 .681
Internet use: weekly or 
rarer
1.689 .213 unemployed .465 .324
Internet use: several times 
a week
1.609 .217
leader, professional, 
white-collar worker
3.535 .000
Internet use: every day, 
almost daily
.806 .549
marginal labor m. 
position
1.154 .755
cognitive mobilization:
(base= never speaks 
about politics with 
friends)
.000
above average 
subjective well-
being
3.591 .000
cognitive mobilization: 
rarely speaks 
.490 .003 worker 1.347 .632
cognitive mobilization: 
often speaks 
.234 .000 age 40+ 1.760 .023
social self-assessment
(base= below average)
.973 entrepreneur 2.027 .023
social self-assessment:
average
1.042 .896 male 1.012 .958
social self-assessment:
above average
1.074 .815 constant .006 .000
N= 1500 ; Nagelkerke R square= 0.67, correctly rated cases:  88.6  %
Note: Binary logistic regression, enter method
As presumed at the beginning, exit potential is higher for immigrants than for Hungarians. 
This was verifi ed when simple proportions were compared, and was also confi rmed 
through checking using three-dimensional distributions and by the combination 
of activity, schooling and demographic variables. For immigrants there is an above 
average potential for exit and sense of dignity and a below average voice potential 
and average participation in non-profi t organizations. When, however, correlations 
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are controlled using a broader set of resources, exit shows no notable correlation 
to immigrant status, and the same applies to sense of dignity. Thus these particular 
characteristics of immigrants (above-average exit potential and a higher degree of 
dignity) must be attributed to a diff erent combination of resources and the diff erent 
age structure of the immigrant population. The below average voice inclination of the 
group of immigrants cannot be solely ascribed to their specifi c social composition, as 
it remains in the extended model as well. Though immigrants take part in non-profi t 
organizations in average proportions, the extent of their participation is lower than that 
of their Hungarian counterparts with similar social-economic conditions.
The starting hypothesis of this research was that there is positive correlation 
between exit potential and various forms of civic participation because both rely on 
similar situational assessments. This can partially be verifi ed. For immigrants there is 
positive correlation between exit and voice potential, when controlled for using 
resource variables.
It was also hypothesized that there is a negative connection between exit inclination 
and subjective well-being, which proved to be true, in part. Though in table statistics 
there is no signifi cant connection, the model which controlled with resources shows 
signifi cant correlation between these items for immigrants.
It was also presumed that immigration is a life event which may cause an 
individual’s sense of dignity to be injured; thus dignity might be lower for migrants than 
for the majority of society. This hypothesis was supported by experience gained from 
interviews and civic discussions (see part of the results in this volume) which included 
several examples. Though the examples are based on real life, the hypothesis however 
was disproved: immigrants do not have a lower sense of dignity. Tables indicate that it is 
higher, owing to the composition eff ect, while in the combined model the correlation 
is not signifi cant.
It is true that there is positive correlation between human dignity and subjective 
well-being, since they are subjective assessments with the same roots. The seemingly 
logical assumption – that injuries to ones’ sense of dignity (or low level of dignity) will 
be paired with a greater exit potential – was not substantiated: for both Hungarians and 
immigrants a greater sense of dignity goes together with greater exit potential. Those 
who would opt to change their lives, to emigrate or become entrepreneurs are not 
those whose dignity has been impaired but those who have a great sense of dignity 
and wish to live better lives.
Another logical presumption – that there is negative correlation between dignity 
and civic participation – was also disproved. In the sample of Hungarian society, a 
higher sense of dignity went together with greater voice potential. This correlation 
was not found with activity in non-profi t organizations or for the sub-sample of the 
immigrants as a whole.
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PRECONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
SENSE OF JUSTICE, IDENTITY, 
EMOTIONS, EFFICACY 
AND EMBEDDEDNESS
Lilla Tóth
INTRODUCTION
The participation of immigrants as active citizens in the democratic processes facilitates 
their integration into Hungarian society and enhances their sense of belonging. The 
improvement of such factors as trust in public institutions, participation in elections 
– for those eligible to vote – and a sense of belonging also constitute a part of offi  cial 
integration politics.1 
Literature about the conditions for collective action and political activity identify 
a few preconditions which explain individual participation. The current authors have 
examined the weight and characteristics of these factors for the two sub-samples, 
which represent the host society, on the one hand, and migrants, on the other. We look 
at the following factors: grievances, or observed incidences of unfairness, expectations 
regarding the effi  cacy of civic activity, identity, emotions (fear, anger), and social 
embeddedness. The eff ects of these factors on political and civic participation have 
been confi rmed in the majority of the examined cases (Klandermans et al. 2008).
Research about the connections between the integration of immigrants and their 
participation in collective political action (Klandermans et al. 2008) use the following 
explanatory variables in interpreting collective action: the eff ects of grievances, the 
perceived effi  cacy of action and the eff ects of identity, emotions, and embeddedness in 
civic networks. Any time people act to represent their group with the aim of improving 
the conditions of the entire group can be regarded as participation in collective action. 
While the social-psychological mechanisms of non-immigrant participation in 
collective action have been a topic of discussion in research about social movements 
1 The closing document of the 2010 European Ministerial Conference on Integration, held in Zaragoza, 
proposes that various indicators be introduced that assess the integration status of migrants in the Member 
States. One of the indicator categories is that of active citizenship. 
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(Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007) for quite some time, we know little about 
the participation of immigrants.  
According to classical theories about collective action (Berkowitz 1972, Lind and 
Tyler 1988), people participate in collective action to express grievances stemming 
from relative deprivation, frustration and perceived instances of injustice. 
Researchers of social movements, however, believe that the basic question is 
not whether the individuals participating in the protest are aggrieved, but whether 
those who are aggrieved engage in protest. Whether aggrieved individuals participate 
in protests and express their grievances is determined by factors such as effi  cacy, 
resources and opportunities (Klandermans 1984, 1997). 
In recent decades, the role of identity in protest behaviour has been examined by a 
number of sociologists and social-psychologists (Taylor and Whittier 1992, Simon et al. 
1998, De Weerd and Klandermans 1999).
The extent to which political processes can be infl uenced in the host country may 
be perceived diff erently by migrants than by members of the host society. As both 
collective identity and social embeddedness may be determined on an ethnic basis for 
immigrants, these factors play a key role in participation in protest activity.
GRIEVANCES
“ Grievance”, meanwhile, can be defi ned as outrage about the manner in which 
authorities handle a social or political problem (Klandermans 1997). 
According to the theory of relative deprivation, individuals draw comparisons with 
their own situations according to a certain standard; their own past, the situation of 
others, or such abstract concepts as fairness and justice. If the comparison leads to 
the conclusion that a person is not receiving what he or she deserves, the resulting 
experience is relative deprivation. A distinction can be made between individual 
or group deprivation based on whether the comparison is made at the level of the 
individual or at a group level (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996). The role of relative deprivation 
at the group level is of key importance as a driver for engaging in collective action 
(Major 1994, Martin 1986). The cognitive components (the awareness that the person 
or group is receiving less than expected) have a much smaller eff ect on participation 
than the aff ective components, or emotions (any feelings of dissatisfaction, discontent, 
or indignation).  
Justice-related norms 
The norm of social reciprocity (Gross and Latané 1974) is a term in social psychology which 
stipulates that we are obligated to return to others the goods, services, or concessions 
that they off er to us. This norm can be recognized in almost every society (Gouldner 
1960), with only certain small groups (children, the elderly, the ill) being exempt from 
having to comply. The function of norms is to ensure that individuals get back from 
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others what they have shared. The norm of social reciprocity strengthens bonds within 
a group – it facilitates trust and mutual commitment between its members.  
The norm of social commitment states that people are required to honor their 
agreements and fulfi ll their obligations. This norm ensures that the members of a group 
or society behave in a predictable manner.  
Norms related to the distribution of resources can vary based on the characteristics 
specifi c to the group where the distribution is realized. The norm of justice (Mikula 1980) 
often operates according to meritocratic principles, whereby rewards must be doled 
out in accordance with merit. In especially cohesive groups, the norm of meritocratic 
justice gives way to another standard of justice: the norm of communal distribution (Clark 
and Mills 1979, Fiske 1991), according to which resources must be distributed evenly, 
irrespective of the contribution of the given individual. The norm of social responsibility 
demands (with diff erent levels of severity of interpretation according to culture) that 
those who are unable to help themselves must be helped (Berkowitz 1972, Berkowitz 
and Daniels 1963). 
Social psychology research about interpersonal relationships has shown that 
people like to receive rewards that are in proportion to what they have invested. If 
it is perceived that allocation has been “unfair”, there will be discontent. In social 
relationships, it is not utilitarianism that produces contentment, but a state of balance. 
Those that receive proportionate rewards – those who feel that what they receive 
is in proportion with their investment – are more content than those who are over-
rewarded. Those who feel that they are unfairly under-rewarded are likely to experience 
the greatest disappointment (Hatfi eld, Utne and Traupmann 1979).
Experimental economics literature suggests that justice is not only a precondition 
for social harmony and a livable society – which are important determinants for the 
individual at the level of cognitive processes – but that it is also built on mechanisms 
that are based in, and reinforced at, the biological (neurohormonal) level. Experiments 
have shown that individuals want justice to prevail, even if it comes at a fi nancial cost 
and they do not personally benefi t from it (Fehr and Gachter 2000). Furthermore, it 
has also been found that the act of perceiving the triumph of justice creates a neural 
signal that is similar to that triggered by a biologically signifi cant, substantial reward 
(e.g. water in case of thirst) (De Quervain 2004). 
Previous research has also indicated (Civic Discussions on Immigration, see this 
volume), that Hungarian society expressly expect immigrants to assimilate into society. 
If they fail to do so, the hosts see this as a lack of loyalty, especially if immigrants 
participate in protest events or movements. In these circumstances, the appropriate 
behaviour of migrants is diffi  cult to decide: should immigrants stay away from protests 
in spite of their grievances or should they behave like any other citizens would do and 
express their dissatisfaction? 
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The theory of social justice – distributive and procedural justice 
When interpersonal comparisons are drawn based on abstract principles, the concept 
of justice often surfaces. The theory of social justice (Rawls 1971) distinguishes between 
procedural and distributive (economic) justice. 
Procedural justice signifi es fairness in processes where disputes are resolved and 
resources are allocated. One aspect of procedural justice involves the administration of 
justice, but the idea can also be used in a non-legal context, whereby some process is 
used for resolving confl icts or dividing benefi ts or burdens amongst members of society. 
Procedural justice concerns such aspects of the decision-making processes as fairness, 
transparency and interpersonal-relations; in other words, whether the authorities treat 
individuals with respect, and whether one can trust that they are acting without bias, 
to benefi t society.     
Distributive justice (fair distribution, economic justice) is what is believed to be fair 
allocation of goods. Distributive justice ensures that every member of society receives 
a fair share of the available resources. At the same time, while everyone agrees that 
goods should be allocated in a fair manner, there is no consensus on what “fair” actually 
means, as the equity-based approach (allocation in proportion to contribution), the 
equality principle and the principle of need can equally be applied here. The just 
allocation of resources, or distributive justice, plays a key role in ensuring the stability of 
a given society and the wellbeing of its members. Experiences of injustice on the part of 
individuals in a society can lead to a decline in subjective well-being and to discontent. 
Those dealing with distributive justice often associate the concept with human rights. 
They argue that society is (like individuals are), obligated to help those in trouble. Which 
principle of distributive justice is chosen by an individual can also be infl uenced by 
various social psychological mechanisms.    
Self-serving attributions  (Mullen and Riordan 1988), which distort explanations 
which refer to one’s own successes and failures, serve as a psychological mechanism for 
self-protection; a means to maintain one’s positive self-image and self-esteem. During 
this process, individuals see their successes as a result of internal, personal characteristics 
(mental abilities, motivation) and attribute their failures to external factors. Thus, those 
who enjoy a more favorable social status will have more of a tendency to attribute this 
to their own merits. The generalization of this in terms of principles of social justice may 
manifest itself in the selection of equity-based, meritocratic value system. An unfavorable 
social status can also prompt attributional distortion, insofar as the individual ascribes 
blame to external circumstances and rejects the possibility of personally changing this 
undesirable situation. A generalization of this may manifest itself in the preference of 
the principles of equality or need-based distribution. This type of distortion can also be 
traced using a diff erent line of logic: for those who receive less than average, equality 
would mean higher standards of living, while for those who are allocated more than 
average, equality would result in a decrease. 
The concept of interactional justice emphasizes the importance of interpersonal 
communication between decision makers and those aff ected by the decisions. It is 
a debatable question whether the interpersonal nature of justice may be interpreted 
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as a principle of justice in its own right, or as part of procedural justice. Numerous 
pieces of research have shed light on the two distinctive aspects of interactional 
justice: interpersonal/social sensitivity, which means the respectful treatment of others, 
and informational justice, which focuses on the explanation behind the decisions. 
These factors set the concept of interactional justice apart from both procedural and 
distributional justice (Colquitt 2001, Jouglard and Steiner 2005).
For the individual, at the level of everyday personal experience, justice means that 
people receive a share of the available goods in proportion to what they are entitled to; 
that institutions treat people in an appropriate manner; that people behave according 
to the rules of “fair play”; that injustices are handled in the proper fashion (Maiese 2003).
Some research indicates that people are more aff ected by how they are treated 
than the outcomes of a particular scenario in which the result directly concerns them 
(Tyler and Smith 1998). 
Since the regime change in Hungary, the International Social Justice Project (ISJP) 
has conducted research in four waves, using representative samples of the country’s 
population to examine the principles and ideals of justice people adhere to and the 
corresponding background values that people identify with. Processing the data 
by factor analysis revealed four latent dimensions of justice ideologies (Örkény and 
Székelyi 2011). According to the egalitarian statist approach, the government should 
take an active role and has a responsibility to maintain a state of relative equality. The 
second view, which is based on a fatalistic value system, questions whether we are 
able to recognize justice and whether it even exists in the fi rst place. This corresponds 
to the content of the standard questions featured in the questionnaire which were 
formulated to assess anomie (e.g. “it is impossible to fi nd one’s way in the world, but 
there is no point to it anyway”). 
The third dimension is that of the individualist, which stresses individual 
achievement and sees distribution according to merit to be the most just method 
(even if it is at the cost of increased social inequality). In the fourth dimension – which 
the authors call fair-meritocratic, in addition to individual achievement, solidarity 
towards the community also becomes a central element. The same series of analyses 
also measured the so-called “delegitimation potential”, an index to express the 
perceived level of justice. While the aforementioned four dimensions, which have been 
uncovered through the employment of factor analysis, correspond to the principles of 
distributive justice, statements used to measure delegitimation potential, in terms of 
their content, correspond to procedural justice. In Hungarian society, an individualist 
ideology seemed to be the most accepted ideology during the time periods examined. 
The popularity of fair-meritocratic values remained low throughout. The delegitimation 
potential, which also allows us to draw conclusions about the perception of procedural 
justice, remained the same for each period, at a level slightly higher than average.    
The results of the above-mentioned research, which spanned almost two decades, 
provide us with important information pertaining to the attitude of members of 
Hungarian society. The perception of justice of migrants who reside in Hungary, 
however, has not until now been the subject of research.  
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EFFICACY
Grievances in themselves do not adequately explain participation in collective action. 
The number of those who suff er grievances is always much higher than those who 
participate in collective action (Obershall 1973). Resources and opportunities provide 
adequate background for the mobilization of groups. People are more likely to take 
part in collective action if they believe that their participation helps remedy their 
grievances and if they fi nd the cost of participation acceptable. The key element of 
this instrumental approach to movement participation (Simon et al. 1998) is effi  cacy; 
whether the individual expects his or her participation to contribute to realizing the 
desired changes. 
IDENTITY 
In addition to the instrumental approach to movement participation, the second 
mobilizing factor that comes into play is the drive to satisfy identity needs. An 
individual’s strong collective identity, which ties her or him to a group, renders a 
person’s participation in collective action more likely. The various subcomponents of 
identity occasionally come into confl ict with each other; protesting union members 
can be accused of being disloyal to their employers, just as the behaviour of immigrants 
who participate in protests is often interpreted as an indication of disloyalty to their 
new home country. According to Berry (1984), migrants’ cultural adaptation in the 
host country can result in their integration (identifi cation with the cultures of both the 
sending and the receiving countries), assimilation (identifi cation with the culture of 
the host country exclusively), marginalization (when immigrants do not identify with 
either cultures) and/or separation (identifi cation only with the culture of the country of 
origin). Research experience shows that double identity – integration in Berry’s typology 
– renders individuals more satisfi ed with their situation (Sam and Berry 2006) and also 
increases the mobilization of the given group (Klandermans, Sabucedo, and Rodrigez 
2004). Research suggests that migrants with a double identity can be expected to feel 
more satisfi ed, or, if not, they are more likely to participate in collective action than their 
non-integrated peers. 
EMOTIONS
The signifi cance of emotions in collective action has also come to the forefront of 
interest in recent decades. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007) integrated 
four factors into their theoretical framework: grievances, eff ectiveness, identity and 
emotions. Later they proposed (Klandermans 2008) to supplement this with a fi fth 
component: social embeddedness. 
Social networks operate as mobilizing structures (Diani and McAdam 2003) and 
secure the resources which are necessary for individuals to invest in collective action.
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The emotions that precede movement participation can be described in terms 
of avoidance and approach. The fear that prevents people from taking action is an 
avoidance-oriented emotion, while anger is an approach-oriented emotion. There is a 
unique link between emotions and effi  cacy; when there is no perceived effi  cacy, people 
experience fear, and effi  cacy becomes associated with feelings of anger (Mackie, Devos 
and Smith 2000). 
SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS
Social embeddedness is usually equated with participation in some civil society 
organization. A positive correlation has been observed between participation in a 
volunteer organization and subjective political competence. People learn how political 
institutions operate through their experience with voluntary organizations. The thus-
formed social capital has a structural component – the social network itself – and a 
subjective component – trust and loyalty. The probability of political participation is 
proportionate to the occurrence of political conversations within the network and the 
amount of politics-related information accessed therein (McClurg 2003). 
According to the fi ndings of research conducted in the migrant communities of 
Dutch cities, the civic participation of migrants also increases political participation in 
such activities as voting and running for candidacy at elections as well as participating 
in assemblies and meetings (Tillie 2004, Van Heelsum 2005). We have no information 
as of yet about the eff ects of civic activity on non-conventional forms of political 
participation (demonstration, boycotts, protests, etc.). 
Research conducted between 2006 and 2009 within the framework of the 
LOCALMULTIDEM project explored the levels of trust of third country nationals 
residing in Hungary (Örkény and Székelyi 2011). The research compared mainstream 
societies and migrant groups living in eight major European cities. In Budapest, groups 
of Muslims, Chinese and ethnic Hungarians who had immigrated from neighboring 
countries were compared with the host society in terms of characteristics. They 
measured general trust in people, trust in relation to the institutions of the receiving 
country, and in trust in one’s own ethnic group and also examined the role these factors 
play in migrant integration. According to the authors’ original hypothesis, trust, in the 
case of capital-defi cient migrant groups, functions as capital and facilitates integration. 
Findings have shown, however, that in the case of immigrant groups, trust is not a 
cause but a consequence; immigrants have no choice as they are defenseless and are 
forced to place greater trust in people and the institutions of the host country. The level 
of trust of integrated immigrants decreases with the passing of time, as they lose their 
illusions. According to the fi ndings for the Budapest segment of the research, the level 
of trust is higher for immigrants than for the host society, with the exception of the 
ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries, who have less trust in institutions 
and members of the host society.   
162
Thus, according to research that has been undertaken to this point, the prerequisites 
of political participation are (Klandermans 2008): grievances (especially instances of 
procedural injustice); perceived effi  cacy; dual, ethnic-national identity; emotions (anger, 
and the absence of fear); and embeddedness in the institutions of civil society.In this 
research, when analyzing our own samples about immigrants living in Hungary and 
mainstream Hungarian society, we conducted our enquiry with consideration of the 
above mentioned factors. It was our aim to explore the unique features of these two 
groups with reference to the variables which are regarded as prerequisites for collective 
action and political participation.   
THE EXISTENCE OF PREREQUISITES FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE HOST SOCIETY AND IMMIGRANTS 
WHO LIVE IN HUNGARY 
We drew conclusions, through the perception of justice and fairness, regarding the 
grievances of the two groups and the role of these grievances in collective action. 
As regards justice, we enquired about the preferred principles of distribution – or 
distributional justice – and experiences pertaining to procedural justice.  
Distributive justice 
The principles of distribution and notions related to distributive justice were examined 
using three statements that were also related to political systems. In reference to the 
acceptance of the principle of equity (i.e. that individuals should receive from society as 
much as they contribute to it), the principle of equality (that everyone should receive 
an equal amount of the goods produced by society), and the principle of need (that 
individuals should contribute to the workings of society according to the best of their 
ability, and should receive as much as they need), signifi cantly diff erent results were 
found for the two groups. For both groups, the principle of need received the most 
support – in this respect there was no signifi cant diff erence between the two groups. 
In the immigrant group, more respondents agreed with a meritocratic equity-based 
approach and fewer supported an equality-based view than for the host society. There 
was some discrepancy between the collected data regarding mainstream Hungarian 
society (the hosts) and earlier fi ndings of the ISJP research conducted in Hungary 
(Örkény and Székelyi 2011). According to the latter, for each time period examined,2 
the approach most favored by Hungarian society was what they referred to as the 
individualist approach, which corresponds with our meritocratic category. The last 
period of ISJP enquiry took place in 2008. Now, four years after the economic crisis 
began, the principle of need is held in higher esteem and seems to be the most popular 
approach.   
2 Dates of data collection in Hungary: 1991, 1996, 2005 and 2008. 
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Figure 1 Preferred principles of distributive justice for the host society 
and the group of immigrants 
Note: The question was: “With which of the following statements do you most agree? 1. Everyone should 
get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning; 2. Everyone should partake equally of 
goods produced; 3. Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should 
get as much as they need”.
Host society – immigrants (equity-based principle) t = –3.054****3
Host society – immigrants (principle of equality) t = 4.291****
Host society – immigrants (principle of need) t = –2.72 n.s.
It was assumed that a person’s views about the just principle of distribution in a society 
was determined by multiple factors and that the subjective social situation, age, and 
level of education had a signifi cant infl uence on the perception and expectations of an 
individual or group as regards fair distribution. The quality of a subjective social situation 
can determine the kind of causal, attributional distortions that are known from social 
psychology (as described above), which, in turn, results in the selection of the principle 
of justice appropriate for the given distortion. 
With an increase in age, we may assume that there will be a shift; a decreasing 
tendency to choose a meritocratic approach, while the selection of the need-based 
principle will become more likely. A higher level of education can have two possible 
eff ects. It can either increase the popularity of the meritocratic value system, or it can 
decrease it, insofar as those with a higher level of education have a more complex and 
tolerant view of society, which can result in a scenario where a more favorable social 
status does not necessarily lead to a respondent preferring meritocratic principles. 
3 Levels of statistical signifi cnace indicated from here on as:  **** < 0.001, *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1.
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Table 1 Selection of the principles of distributive justice according to level of education in the 
immigrant and host subgroups (%)
Immigrants N = 445
Hosts  N = 904
Everyone should 
get from society 
as much as he/
she contributes 
to its functioning
Everyone 
should partake 
equally of goods 
produced
Everyone should 
contribute to the 
running of society 
as best as they can, 
and should get as 
much as they need
Total
8 primary grades of 
schooling and under
Immigrant 44 31 25 100
Host 30 31 39 100
Vocational training 
school
Immigrant 52 7 41 100
Host 37 21 42 100
general or specialized 
secondary school 
Immigrant 39 15 46 100
Host 38 22 40 100
institute of higher 
education
Immigrant 49 14 38 100
Host 44 18 38 100
Total Immigrant 44 15 41 100
Total 36 24 40 100
Note: Pearson Chi square value: Immigrants: 15.695**; Hosts: 14.978**
Table 2 Selection of the principles of distributive justice according to age in the immigrant and 
host subgroups (%)
Immigrants N = 448
Hosts  N = 904
Everyone should 
get from society 
as much as he/
she contributes
to its functioning
Everyone 
should partake 
equally 
of goods 
produced
Everyone should 
contribute to the 
running of society 
as best as they can, 
and should get as 
much as they need
Total
X- 29
Immigrant 41 15 44 100
Host 30 29 40 100
30 -39
Immigrant 49 14 38 100
Host 31 26 43 100
40 -49 Immigrant 53 8 38 100
Host 43 17 40 100
50 – 59
Immigrant 46 10 44 100
Host 38 19 43 100
60- X
Immigrant 25 34 41 100
Host 36 27 37 100
Total Immigrant 44 15 41 100
Total Host 36 24 40 100
Note: Pearson Chi square value: Immigrants: 21.657***; Hosts: 14.010*
There is a connection between education and which principles of distribution are 
selected. In the host group, with higher levels of education, there is a parallel increase 
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in the tendency to select the meritocratic principle. Among immigrants, there is a break 
in this trend between the levels of vocational training school and secondary school. 
For general secondary school graduates, the popularity of the equity-based concept 
of justice decreases by over ten percent. A possible explanation for this may be that for 
migrants, a general academic-type education is less marketable in a foreign culture – it 
off ers less of an opportunity for practicing one’s skills – than vocational/professional 
training. The need-based approach is popular at all levels of education, with one 
exception: only a quarter of those with only primary education chose this option. 
With age, the popularity of meritocratic values increases for a while, then, after the 
age of 50, it decreases for both groups. It appears that, with increasing age, the danger 
(and fact) of decreased productivity does not increase the appeal of meritocratic 
distribution principles. While, for the host society, the acceptance of the principle of 
equality fl uctuates across the diff erent age groups, for migrants, it only increases for 
respondents above the age of 60.   
Table 3 Selection of the principles of distributive justice according to social status4 in the 
immigrant and host subgroups (%)
Immigrants N = 448
Hosts  N = 904
Everyone should 
get from society 
as much as he/
she contributes
to its functioning
Everyone 
should partake 
equally 
of goods 
produced
Everyone should 
contribute to the 
running of society 
as best as they can, 
and should get as 
much as they need
Total
Subjective social status; 
low 
Immigrant 37 24 39 100
Host 31 25 43 100
Subjective social status; 
average
Immigrant 42 13 45 100
Host 39 23 39 100
Subjective social status; 
high 
Immigrant 51 17 32 100
Host  35 25 40 100
Total Immigrant 44 15 41 100
Total Host 36 24 40 100
Note: Pearson Chi square value: Immigrants: 8.727*; Hosts: 4.482 not signifi cant 
Of the above-mentioned variables, subjective social status statistically has the weakest 
connection with choice of the principle of justice. For migrants, a higher social status 
increases the chances that the meritocratic principle will be selected. In case of the 
host society, the principle of equality is equally accepted by each status group. For 
migrants, however, in accordance with our previous assumptions, it is respondents 
from the group with the lowest social status that most commonly select this principle. 
4 Subjective social status was originally assessed using the following instruction: “Please defi ne your place on 
a scale where 0 marks the lowest social status and 10 marks the highest”. We used this to formulate for the 
cross table analysis a three-element “Subjective social situation” variable, whose values are: 1. bad, 2. average, 
3. good
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Then, it loses some of its popularity at the level of “average” social status, and – contrary 
to our expectations – slightly increases again for those with the highest social status. 
This latter increase (of a few percent) can be accounted for by the aforementioned 
explanation regarding the nuanced thinking of those in a better social situation.     
The notions embraced by the immigrant group are clearly more meritocratic and 
less equality-oriented than for the host group. If we examine where these groups 
placed themselves on the left-right orientation scale, some inconsistencies can be seen, 
primarily with reference to chosen values on the part of the host group. With regards to 
political attitude, the host group are positioned more towards the right, but based on 
their choice of principle of distributive justice, they are of a leftwing orientation.    
 
Figure 2 Distribution on the left-right scale, host society – migrants 
Note: The question was: “Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where ‘0’ means ‘the left’ 
and ‘10’ means ‘the right’”? Hosts – immigrants t = 3.409****
 
The fi gure shows that immigrants tend to place themselves closer to the centre, while in 
the case of the host society, there is a slight shift to the right. Our fi ndings correlate with 
one of the conclusions of the 2009 research project “Immigrants in Hungary”: migrants 
generally tend to position themselves in the centre of the left-right scale (Örkény and 
Székelyi 2010).
The results of the homogeneity analysis suggest that the position of the individuals 
on the left-right scale is independent of the chosen principle of justice.  
In addition to principles perceived as being preferable, we also asked questions 
how respondents perceived their own situation, in terms of what they contribute to 
society and what they receive from it. Results indicate that the majority of Hungarian 
society feels that their contributions exceed what they receive from society. This is a 
condition best characterized by disillusionment and disappointment. The majority 
of the immigrants see these two things as being balanced in their case. There is 
presumably a dynamic relationship between a general sense of satisfaction and the 
perception of whether the exchange with society is fair. Those who feel more satisfi ed 
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see the balance of contributions and benefi ts as being more favorable, and those who 
perceive gains from the exchange are more satisfi ed.  
Figure 3 Perceptions of individual contributions and benefi ts 
Note: The question was: “What do you think of your own situation? Do you think on the whole you get more 
from society than you contribute to common expenditure, or do you contribute more than you get? ”0” 
means you get much more than you contribute, “10” means you contribute much more than you get”. 
Hosts - immigrants t = 6.295****
If we group the same data diff erently, it becomes even more evident that, for migrants, 
the situation of “balance” (which gives reason to be satisfi ed) is much more commonly 
reported; fewer feel that they are getting the short end of the stick in their exchange 
with society. 
Figure 4 Personal investments and social benefi ts 
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In relation to fairness, we asked respondents to evaluate the behaviour of political 
decision makers. The striving of the political elite for fairness could be an important 
factor in ensuring that justice prevails. In this case, we observed that immigrants have a 
more optimistic outlook, perceive a higher incidence of fairness; they place greater trust 
in politicians. At the same time, there is a defi nite tendency to be orientated towards 
the centre for migrants; the majority tries to refrain both from passing judgment on, 
and from being overly enthusiastic about, politicians. A quarter of the host society 
has a severely negative opinion about the fairness of politicians. They do not agree 
at all with the notion that politicians during the decision making process take into 
consideration the interests of people like them. If we merge the categories, nearly two-
thirds of the host society place little or no faith in politician’s fairness. Only one-third of 
the immigrants hold the same opinion.  
Figure 5 Perception of fairness on the part of politicians
Note: The question was: “How true is the statement that ‘politicians are fair to people like you in their 
decisions?’ ‘0’ means you don’t agree with this statement at all, and ‘10’ means you fully agree with it.” 
Hosts – immigrants t =  -34.669****
Procedural justice  
The survey questions covered all important aspects of procedural justice. Our aim 
was to fi nd out what impressions individuals had received about administration in 
general and when dealing with Hungarian administration offi  ces. To what extent is 
the informational dimension of justice – whereby administration offi  ces off er adequate 
justifi cation and clarify the rules – realized? Administration processes – even in case 
of a favorable outcome for the individual – often make for a negative experience, as 
administrators, legislators, and law enforcers may make no obvious eff orts to minimize 
the informational asymmetry between clients and administrators (and their behaviors 
may suggest that it is in their interest to sustain it). A defi cit of informational justice 
increases a sense of anomie. When there is a decrease in individual effi  cacy and sense 
of competence in controlling one’s own life, the sense of external control increases. 
The apathy which develops in parallel with negative experiences (at fi rst one does not 
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understand the course of the administration processes – what happens and why – then 
one loses interest altogether) starts a downward spiral in which ignorance reinforces a 
sense of defenselessness and vice versa.  
Procedural justice, in its clearest form, means proceedings occurring in accordance with 
the rules. The relevant question was aimed at fi nding out whether respondents felt that 
their case was generally handled according to rules and regulations. The questionnaire 
survey did not explore the possible contradiction whereby if informational justice is 
not apparent – in other words, it is not possible to know what the rules are – than it is 
impossible to determine whether the process was conducted according to regulations. 
One’s assessment based on the principle of neutrality – in other words, one’s 
experience as to whether the case of another client in the same situation would have 
been handled in the same manner – can depend on a familiarity with the rules and 
knowledge gained through networks. Considerations of neutrality are usually based 
on indirect experiences and superfi cial impressions. Furthermore, the lower the level 
of informational justice, the greater the grounds for conspiracy theories relating to the 
principle of neutrality.  
The concept of procedural justice also comprises the element of good will (or at least 
an absence of malevolence); people tend to perceive situations where administrators 
show eff ort and good will as being more just. Another important dimension is respectful 
treatment; procedures where the dignity of the participants is not harmed (where the 
client is treated with respect even during the smallest personal interactions at the 
level of gestures and references) appear more just than situations that have a similar 
outcome but damage human dignity. If, in these dimensions, the level of perceived 
justice is high, the given outcome will be perceived as being more favorable. Also, a 
decision that is deemed favorable will infl uence the perception of justice in general. 
The acceptance of the decision – one’s identifi cation with it – is more complete if the 
situation is favorable in all other dimensions of procedural justice.   
Thus informational justice – which manifests within the framework of interpersonal 
relationships and is experienced during actual participation in administration processes 
– and social sensitivity – which manifests in communication – are both important 
aspects of procedural justice. Whether decisions are adequately justifi ed, whether it 
is possible to know what the rules are, whether offi  ces and administrators adhere to 
these rules, whether they operate without bias and in accordance with the principle 
of neutrality, whether they are committed to resolving a given situation, whether 
they relate to people with the proper measure of respect – along with the ability to 
recognize positive or acceptable outcomes on the part of the client – all contribute to 
whether individuals experience the world that surrounds them as being fair and livable, 
or, to the contrary, as a place that will only bring them further grievances in the future. 
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The various elements of procedural justice show strong correlation and are clearly 
arranged into a single structure, as also evidenced by the results of the principle 
component analysis of the two sub-samples5. 
Table 4 Principle component of procedural justice 
Immigrants
Principle
component
Hosts Principle 
component 
1 1
The offi  ce explained its decisions adequately. .811 .805
It was clear what the rules were in the situation and what you had to do. .810 .783
On the whole your matter was dealt with according to the rules. .829 .861
A client in a similar situation would have been treated similarly. .760 .800
The offi  ce did its best to solve your situation. .872 .891
You were treated with due respect. .842 .834
The matter was solved favorably for you.  .884 .872
The solution was acceptable to you. .880 .882
Variance explained 70.050% 70.869%
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin6 .935 .926
Bartlett7 2460.900**** 5170.719****
In both the host and immigrant groups, as regards the perception of procedural justice, the 
various dimensions are structured into a unifi ed, consistent impression. Consistent situations 
may be one of the factors that play a role in the development of this consistent impression. 
For example, if, during an administration process, the rules are clear, then the manner of 
treatment will also be respectful. On the other hand, cognitive processes which are usually 
involved in the formulation of impressions lead to consistent impressions. Just as in any 
scenario of impression formation, there are central and peripheral components involved. 
Central components play a signifi cant role in the development of the given impression, 
while the peripheral ones will have little or no infl uence at all. As the factor loading and 
communal values of the presented variables are almost equally high, we are not able to 
distinguish between central and peripheral components. We can, however, say that the 
favorability of the outcome, the result, and its acceptability have the highest values.  
5 Prior to the principle component analysis, we had the Cronbach’s alpha value checked for the items 
indicated here. This reliability index, which expresses the inner consistency of the scale between 0 and 1, 
was, in our case, 0.948. 
6 The KMO test is an important indicator for determining how suitable variables are for factor analysis. In this 
respect, values above 0.9 fall into the ‘excellent’ category.
7 The value of the Bartlett test shows (at the level of highest signifi cance) that variables are strongly correlated.
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We also looked at how factors such as the time spent in the receiving country, the 
subjective social situation and the age of the individual eff ect the perception of procedural 
justice. It can be assumed that migrants who have been residing in Hungary for a longer 
time, during the course of their integration into local society, have acquired some of the 
mainstream attitudes, and therefore perceive situations as being less and less just.  
The extent and success of their integration was measured with the help of subjective 
status and the length of time spent in Hungary. 
In case of the host society, we only had an appraisal of subjective status at our 
disposal. We would like to note here that while subjective status can also be regarded 
– albeit only at a very abstract level – as a dimension of procedural justice, which is 
related to outcomes and acceptance, here we interpreted it as an explanatory variable. 
Possession of a (higher education) degree can have diff erent eff ects. The fi rst type 
of eff ect concerns the dissatisfaction hypothesis: it is possible that having the status/
education of an intellectual makes the individual more sensitive and critical when it 
comes to evaluating social phenomena and procedural justice (i.e. with a degree of 
higher education, the world seems more unjust). The second approach concerns the 
satisfaction hypothesis, according to which a degree in higher education results in an 
elevated social status, and, thus, increased satisfaction. It also improves the respondents’ 
perception of justice: the world seems like a more just place.    
Table 5 Explanatory model for measuring procedural justice for immigrants
 Beta  Sign. Beta   Sign. Beta   Sign. Beta  Sign. 
Subjective social status
.144** .004 .122 .014 –.079 .156 –.078
.161
Duration of stay in Hungary .087* .083 .028 .578 .050 .299 .048 .324
Attachment to Hungary .245**** .000 .165**** .001 .166**** .001
Satisfaction .399**** .000 .400**** .000
Higher education   .031 .519 .035 .487
English-speaking cultural 
background
–.020 .688
Adjusted R2 .024 .078 .178 .177
We assessed subjective social status using the following question: “Where would you place 
yourself on a scale where ‘0’ marks the lowest and ‘10’ marks the highest social situation?” 
This variable, along with the time spent in Hungary, in the fi rst two-variable model (with 
a very weak explanatory potential), appear to have a signifi cant eff ect. By introducing 
the “attachment to Hungary” aspect, both factors lose their explanatory potential and 
the signifi cant eff ect of the newly-introduced factor is apparent in the second, still weak 
model. Migrants’ perception of the dimensions of procedural justice during administration 
processes is more aff ected by the extent to which they feel close to the receiving country 
than by their perception of their own social situation, or by the length of time spent in 
that country. The satisfaction factor (the principle component of satisfaction with regards 
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to the important areas of life) signifi cantly improves the model’s explanatory potential, 
and remains signifi cant and the most strongly impactful factor even when further factors 
(higher education, English-speaking cultural background) are introduced. 
The fact that the involvement of other variables changes the value (and signifi cance) of 
parameters leads us to conclude that satisfaction is the only factor that has a robust eff ect on 
the perception of justice. At the same time, the causal relationship can function in the opposite 
direction as well, which means that a perception of justice aff ects one’s sense of satisfaction. 
Higher education, or lack thereof, does not explain the perception of justice, and 
nor does having a diff erent socialization backgrounds such as coming from an English – 
or non-English – speaking environment.  We also examined the eff ects of these factors 
on the perception of procedural justice for members of the host society. In this case, we 
were only able to include subjective status, higher education, sense of attachment and 
sense of satisfaction into the model.   
 
Table 6 Explanatory model for measuring procedural justice in the host society 
Beta Sign. Beta Sign.
Subjective social status .231**** .000 –.007 .861
Attachment to Hungary .141**** .000 .062* .069
Satisfaction .418**** .000
Higher education –.012 .722
Adjusted R2 .074 .180
In the fi rst two-variable model, the eff ects of both subjective social status and attachment 
to Hungary are signifi cant. By introducing the factors of satisfaction and higher education, 
the explanatory potential of the model, in comparison to the previous one, increases 
considerably, but still remains weak. While the explanatory potential of attachment 
decreases and that of subjective social status becomes non-existent, the sense of 
satisfaction seems to have a signifi cant eff ect on the perception of justice. The possible 
eff ects of higher education are not shown in this model. It seems that the principle 
component value of satisfaction, which is the composite index number of satisfaction in 
reference to diff erent facets of life, contains certain aspects of social status and, to some 
extent, emotional closeness to Hungary. Those who at the given moment reside in the 
country and feel attached to it are more likely to feel more satisfi ed than those who must 
live in a country to which they do not feel a sense of belonging. The satisfaction factor also 
partially contains a subjective evaluation, or imprint, of this situation.     
In both the host and immigrant groups, the sense of attachment and satisfaction 
are the two factors that most infl uence the perception of procedural justice. 
When comparing the individual elements of procedural justice, it becomes apparent 
that immigrants perceive justice and fairness more favorably than the hosts (the values 
of the t-test undertaken to compare the two groups suggest a signifi cant diff erence in 
every dimension). There can be a number of explanations for this: perhaps third-country 
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migrants had already acquired negative experiences with administration processes in a less 
civilized, less rule-of-law setting, and, thus, regard conditions in Hungary relatively more 
positively because of the contrast. The social-psychology mechanism of either justifying the 
decision to migrate or the irrevocability of this decision can also play a role, insofar as that, 
following the decision, the chosen alternative – or a situation that is otherwise deemed 
unalterable (in this case, moving to Hungary) – is always perceived as being more favorable. 
The unique Hungarian tradition for pessimistic evaluation, as has been recorded while 
conducting numerous questionnaire surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer), can also serve as a 
potential explanation for the above-mentioned phenomenon. It is worth noting that when 
direct methods of investigation – such as in-depth interviews, or a focus group setting – are 
employed, administration processes are perceived much more negatively.  
Table 7 The perception of procedural justice of the host and immigrant groups (t-value signifi cance) 
t- value
The offi  ce explained its decisions adequately. -12.354****
It was clear what the rules were in the situation and what you had to do. -8.647****
On the whole your matter was dealt with according to the rules. -8.647****
A client in a similar situation would have been treated similarly. -11.339****
The offi  ce did its best to solve your situation. -12.291****
You were treated with due respect. -10.455****
The matter was solved favorably for you.  -13.626****
The solution was acceptable to you. -14.851****
Figure 6 Perceptions of procedural justice  
Note: The question was: “We would like to know what your general impression was of the administration 
processes of Hungarian offi  ces when you had to arrange something. How true are the statements below? 
5 – Perfectly true; 4 – Partly true; 3 – Neither true nor untrue; 2 – Rather not true; 1 – Not true at all.”
 1. The offi  ce explained its decisions adequately; 2. It was clear what the rules were in the situation and what 
you had to do; 3. On the whole your matter was dealt with according to the rules; 4. A client in a similar 
situation would have been treated similarly; 5. The offi  ce did its best to solve your situation; 6. You were 
treated with due respect; 7. The matter was solved favorably for you; 8. The solution was acceptable to you.
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Another important question is the central role of previous socialization: whether 
the perception of justice in Hungary of groups originating from countries of varied 
political systems is diff erent. Is the group of ethnic Hungarians who have immigrated 
from neighboring countries diff erent in this respect from other groups? Will the unique 
characteristics of the country of origin or the characteristics of the Hungarian ethnic-
cultural community be more determinative? 
In the latter case, native Hungarian speakers could be expected to perceive the 
fairness of administration processes as being more unfavorable in comparison to other 
migrant groups; their judgment will be closer to that of the host society.  
Further divisions within the group of immigrants showed that administration 
processes typically deemed as being just by immigrants were evaluated slightly 
diff erently by the diff erent groups. The Mongolians saw the situation as most just, 
followed by immigrants of Hungarian ethnicity, then by Russians, Japanese and 
Ukrainians. The greatest negative divergence from the average was shown by Israelis, 
then Serbs, then Turks and Chinese. Within the group of migrants, English speakers did 
not seem especially critical. The reason for this is not necessarily any harmonization 
of Hungarian administration processes to the norm of English-speaking countries. It 
is possible that third country nationals who arrived from “developed” countries are 
received in administration offi  ces more warmly, that the organizations that employ 
them have greater prestige and are more eff ective at supporting them and representing 
their interests in administration processes. In this case, it is not that English native 
speakers perceive the situation to be more favorable, but in fact that the situation is 
more favorable for them. 
When looking at the native Hungarian speakers in the immigrant group, we also 
explored whether previous socialization and the political-cultural characteristics of the 
sending countries could have an eff ect on how the situation in Hungary was perceived 
in terms of procedural justice. What is more determinative: the possible cultural 
similarities with mainstream Hungarian society or the distinctive characteristics of the 
sending country? 
There were two groups where we saw that the divergence from the average in 
perception matched the opinion held by the mainstream migrant group of the given 
country. In comparison to the majority of immigrants, native Hungarian speaking 
migrants from the Ukraine, similarly to Ukrainian immigrants, perceived administration 
processes as being more favorable, while native Hungarian speaking immigrants 
from Israel, much like Israeli immigrants, saw administration as less favorable. While 
the situation in Hungary is perceived as most favorable in terms of procedural justice 
by Serbian Hungarians, native Serbian speakers are the second most critical group 
after the Israelis. Our data did not make it possible for us to explore two important 
considerations: if, and to what extent, this may be connected to the alleged or actual 
grievances suff ered by members of the group of ethnic Hungarians immigrating from 
neighboring countries in their countries of birth, and exactly how, after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav war infl uenced the perceptions of Serbs, and Serbian migrants 
in Hungary. In this respect, we only have in-depth interview material from previous 
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research8, according to which mainstream Hungarian society was less welcoming of 
Serbian immigrants, as compared to migrants of other ethnicities. 
Effi  cacy 
In terms of participation in collective civic and political action, one of the key factors 
is perceived effi  cacy. The questionnaire was formulated to measure this in two ways, 
one being a question aimed at measuring anomie, addressing the issue of personal 
agency – the degree to which individuals feel they can infl uence the course of their 
lives. The research shows that migrants have a greater sense of inner control than the 
hosts. While migrants have made at least one decision of serious consequence in their 
lives – the decision to migrate – hosts may not have, to the same degree, experienced 
situations that could be characterized as autonomous decision making.
Figure 7 Individual effi  cacy, inner control 
Note: The question was: “How true of you are the statements below? 
You can hardly infl uence the course of your life” 
The second question explored whether respondents could see any chance for 
changing – on their own or together with others – an unjust decision made at a high 
level of administration. With an estimation of an “extremely low general chance”, the 
host group, to a small degree, were more inclined to believe that they would be able to 
do something about an unjust or harmful law. 
8 Civic Discussion on the Integration of Immigrants, 2009.
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Figure 8 Collective effi  cacy 
Note: The question was: “Suppose a law were being considered by Parliament that you considered to be 
unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would 
be able to do something about it?”
Emotions – fear
Fear is an avoidance-oriented emotion; it decreases the chance of one’s participation in 
collective action. In this respect, the group of immigrants is in a more advantageous 
situation, as they experience fear less often than members of the host society. The 
relative absence of fear of migrants can also be explained by the composition of the 
group, which is unique in this respect as well; those who – as a result of their personality 
or for other reasons – experience fear more often are considerably less likely to become 
immigrants. 
Figure 9 Fear 
Note: The question was: “Some people are often afraid, some never. How often are you afraid?”

 


		



	



	








!"!"$
  "!

""$
"# $$
 $$
 $$



	



	
	

	 







 "#" #%
 !#"


!% #
#
!%
$!

177
Identity 
Identity is a signifi cant component when interpreting the integration of both hosts 
and immigrants, as well as explaining civic and political participation. Group identities 
represent motivational strength and contribute to maintaining behaviour and attitudes 
that conform to the standards of the group.
Our research also looked at the categories primarily used by the host society and 
immigrants when they defi ned themselves.  
Figure 10 The signifi cance of categories of identity 
Note: The question was: “We are all a part of diff erent groups. Some are more important to us than others 
when we think of ourselves. In general, which from the following list is most important to you in describing 
who you are? And the second most important? And the third most important?”
As for categories thought to be important in terms of identity, the two groups only 
showed diff erences in connection with political party affi  liation and being European. 
While 18 percent of the host society were of the opinion that political party affi  liation 
was the most important factor in one’s self-defi nition, in case of the immigrants, only 
7.5 percent felt the same way. As regards the question of identity, being European, 
according to 16.7 percent of the migrants, was the most important thing. Only 7.8 
percent of the host group was of the same view. Grouping migrants who chose the 
category of being European (as most/second/third most important) by mother tongue, 
on the one hand indicates that some Asians also choose this category and, on the 
other hand, reveals an interesting fact: in comparison to native Hungarian speaking 
immigrants, a greater proportion of Arab and Turkish migrants fi nd being European to 
be more important.    
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Figure 11 Proportion of those choosing European identity (as one of the three most important 
categories) in the various migrant groups 
Level of education only shows a signifi cant correlation with choosing “being European” 
for the immigrant group. For immigrants, the higher the level of education, the greater 
the proportion of those who consider their being European an important part of their 
identity (Pearson Chi square value: 11.535*). Within the host society, the proportions of 
those who give importance to their European identity are as follows; primary school 
graduates: 33 percent, graduates of vocational schools: 15 percent, graduates of 
general secondary schools: 44 percent,  and those with a degree in higher education 
only 9 percent. 
Political party affi  liation is a much more relevant category for the hosts. Bringing the 
left-right scale into the equation, it becomes apparent that for those in more extreme 
political positions, this category defi nes their identity to a much greater extent than 
for those who occupy more moderate political positions. This corresponds with social 
psychological – and everyday – experiences where the more extreme the attitude, the 
greater its role in shaping identity.   
Figure 12 Proportion of those who chose political party affi  liation as an important identity 
element, by left-right scale – host society
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Aside from assessing the signifi cance of categories of identity, we also examined to 
what extent respondents experience a sense of attachment to Hungary. For the 
immigrant group, attachment to the country of birth was also recorded. 
Figure 13 Sense of attachment for the host and immigrant groups 
Note: The question was: “How close do you feel to… Hungary ? Your country of origin?” 
The sense of emotional attachment to Hungary was equally strong for both subsamples. 
It is apparent that immigrants are not more attached to their country of origin than to 
Hungary, and, interestingly, the absence of attachment to the country of origin is a 
more common occurrence than a weak bond with Hungary for this group. The fact that 
immigrants felt they had ties to both Hungary and their home country is indicative of a 
dual sense of attachment and the integration of immigrants.    
Table 8 Sense of attachment to place – immigrants  
Closeness to your country of origin 
TotalNot close 
at all
Not very 
close 
Close Very close
Closeness to 
Hungary 
Not close 
at all
0 2 2 2 6
Not very 
close 
1 12 24 15 52
Close
6 55 96 100 257
Very close
8 59 46 70 183
Total 15 128 168 187 498
The following categories were established based on the above cross table: 1. Has no 
attachments: those who do not feel very close, or not close at all, to their country of 
origin or to Hungary; 2. Attachment to Hungary: those who feel no – or very little – 
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sense of attachment to their native country, but feel close or very close to Hungary; 3. 
Attachment to country of origin: those who feel no – or little – emotional attachment 
to Hungary, but feel close or very close to their country of origin; 4. Dual attachment: 
those who feel close or very close to both Hungary and their country of origin. 
Figure 14 Occurrence of types of attachment among immigrants 
From the perspective of integration, it is a positive development that almost two-thirds 
of the immigrants can be characterized as having dual attachment, which can be seen 
as indicative of successful integration. Interestingly, the second most common type of 
attachment is to Hungary, which presumably indicates a tendency toward assimilation. 
The proportion of those feeling attached only to their country of origin– signaling 
segregation, or, as Barry (1984) refers to it, separation – is less than ten percent. Finally, 
those who experience no sense of attachment to any country – a position resulting in 
marginalization – constitute only a few percent.  
The subjective aspects of social embeddedness – trust 
While the structural aspect of social embeddedness, or social capital, comprises the 
networks  which individuals belong to, its subjective elements are the loyalty and 
trust that are forged in these relationships. Participation in non-profit organizations 
is extremely low for both the immigrant and host groups – over two-thirds of the 
respondents in both groups said that they did not participate in the work of any 
non-profit organizations. 20 percent of hosts and 14 percent of immigrants are 
members of one organization. In terms of trust in public institutions, the group 
of immigrants gave a more positive response. The hosts place much less trust in 
Parliament, the Police, the Hungarian government, the Office of Immigration and 
the local government.  
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Figure 15 Institutional trust 
Note: The question was: “Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10 how much you personally trust each of the 
following institutions to usually make the right decisions. ‘0’  means that ‘you do not trust an institution at all’ 
and ‘10’ means ‘you have complete trust’.”
This higher level of trust of immigrants reconfi rms the results of previous research. The 
LOCALMULTIDEM project (Örkény and Székelyi 2010) also found a higher level of trust 
for immigrants and noted the phenomenon whereby a long time spent in the host 
country caused this originally higher level of trust to decrease to that of the mainstream 
society. The compensation for social (and other) capital defi cit was off ered as an 
explanation: migrants have no choice but to place their trust in the institutions of the 
receiving country, as this constitutes their only capital. After they have been integrated 
to some extent, this compensatory mechanism weakens and the hosts’ lack of trust also 
becomes characteristic of the immigrants. This, to some extent, goes against the idea 
(Klandermans 2008) that trust is a product of integration and its level should increase 
in parallel with increased embeddedness in society. In this later case, we would need 
to fi nd an explanation for the lower level of trust of the host society when compared 
to immigrants.  
For the group of immigrants, general trust is also greater; they have more of a 
tendency to agree that people can be trusted. 
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Figure 16 General trust
Note: The question was: “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people? 1. People can almost always be trusted;
2. People can usually be trusted; 3. You usually can’t be too careful in dealing with people; 4. You almost 
always can’t be too careful in dealing with people.”
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the previously-presented variables, the members of the host society and the 
group of immigrants have diff erent prospects for participating in political activity. 
With respect to grievances, perceived injustice and unfair treatment, members of 
the host society have a more negative view of the situation, and therefore are more 
motivated about and thus more likely to participate in political activity. Immigrants 
perceive all dimensions of administration processes to be more just. Satisfaction and 
a sense of attachment to Hungary generally increase the chances of a more positive 
perception of situations involving procedural justice for both groups. Immigrants of 
Hungarian ethnicity, in contrast to the host society, generally perceive Hungarian 
administration processes to be more just.   
As per their choice of principles of distributive justice, it is apparent that a needs-
based approach is most popular, while an equality-based approach is least preferred 
by both groups. Immigrants, however, choose meritocratic, equity-based principles 
signifi cantly more frequently. In terms of how much is received from the society 
and how much is invested by the individual, immigrants perceive the situation to be 
balanced much more often than members of the host society. 
Effi  cacy, as pertaining to one’s infl uence over the course of one’s life, is perceived 
as being better by immigrants, while intervening in governmental decisions is seen as 
more eff ective by members of the host society. It remains a question whether individuals 
who feel that they are able to shape their own lives choose political participation as a 
means of doing this, or fi nd other ways of doing so. In critical life situations, one way to 
solve to problem is to choose the option to exit; to leave behind the critical situation 
and fi nd a new place to live. Migration can be interpreted as being such a problem-
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solving mechanism, and it is likely that migrants prefer this approach. This means that 
they may believe that they have control over their lives, but do not lend much credence 
to collective action.   
As regards emotions, the absence of fear makes political participation more likely. In 
this respect, immigrants are in a better situation as they experience fear less frequently 
than the host group. The questionnaire was not suitable for exploring the other defi ning 
emotion: anger.   
Integration and dual identity are conducive to political participation on the part of 
migrants. Strong emotional ties to both Hungary and the native country indicate that, 
in this dimension, there is no reason why activity should fall shy of that of the host 
society. As for the signifi cance of the individual categories of identity, there are two 
notable diff erences between the two groups: in the categories of being European and 
political party affi  liation. Being European is a more defi ning component of identity for 
immigrants, while Hungarian society – primarily those who place themselves on the 
more extreme ends of the left-right scale – considers political affi  liation to be more 
important. 
In terms of the structural indicator of social embeddedness (membership in a non-
profi t organization), the degree of embeddedness is equally low for both groups. As 
regards its subjective aspect, however, which is measured through general trust and 
trust in institutions, the immigrant group seems more embedded, which – if we accept 
Klandermans’ (2008) approach – increases the likelihood of their political participation. 
Insofar as we interpret trust as being a compensating mechanism for a defi cit of capital 
(Örkény and Székelyi 2010), the higher level of trust of immigrants (compared to 
Hungarian society) is not an indicator of embeddedness, but rather its very absence. 
For this reason, it can be considered a factor that decreases the probability of political 
participation.  
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POLITICAL OPINIONS AND 
JUDGMENTS
Pál Juhász
INTRODUCTION
In our questionnaire that surveys the situation and opinions of Hungarian society and 
immigrants there are two questions – besides those connected to satisfaction and 
trust – which are related to issues that were examined in the World Values Survey and 
the Eurobarometer survey which explored the attitudes of the population of European 
countries in 2009. One of those questions is to what extent the respondents regard 
themselves as being capable of infl uencing the course of their life, while the other 
one is whether the state should redistribute income for the benefi t of the poor. As the 
questions in the surveys were formulated diff erently and their context and placement in 
our survey was diff erent to that of value system surveys, we cannot make comparisons 
about actual distributions of responses, but we can use the lessons of the value surveys 
to assist in interpreting the opinions we collected. 
The research of the World Values Survey across a widening circle of countries started 
in 1981 and was inspired by Ronald Inglehart’s book which was published in 1977 
(Inglehart 1977). The questionnaire surveys created by Inglehart and colleagues have 
already been, according to the internet page of the organizers of the survey series, 
carried out on representative samples in fi ve waves: in 1981, 1990 and – as the number 
of the countries involved in the survey increased rapidly which led to the extending of 
the surveying – in 1999-2000, from 2005 to 2007 and fi nally in 2009–2010. 
DO WE SHAPE OUR OWN DESTINY?
In Inglehart’s cultural evolutionary scheme, within the population of individual 
countries, parallel to economic development, there is an increase in the proportion 
of those people who identify with the secularist values of material success and “self-
assertion” (instead of traditional religious values). Correspondingly, beyond the concerns 
of satisfying elementary needs, an increasing appreciation for “postmaterialistic” (or 
postmodern) values is evident. According to Inglehart – in accordance with the cross-
sectional analysis of each survey and the shifts observed in successive surveys – the 
increasing satisfaction of primary needs and the need for “self-realization” (along with 
empathy and tolerance) of respondents increases (a new and personal spiritual kind 
of religiosity appears within this context as well). “Self-assertion” can become a realistic 
need if a person takes on the responsibility for shaping their own destiny and trusts other 
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people and institutions through their belief that their deeds make sense and they can 
take responsibility for the consequences of those deeds.
The results of the research, carried out in an increasing number of countries, are 
habitually collated by the team Inglehart manages using a coordinate system. Along 
the vertical axis, the average of the index of “secularized” values appears, while along the 
horizontal axis the average of the index of “self-realization” is displayed. Hungary, after 
the processing of the results of the penultimate (fourth) and the last (the fi fth) waves 
still appears on the survey’s website in the neighborhood of countries – mostly from 
the Balkans – for which the choice of materialist-secularist values signifi cantly exceeds 
the level that would be expected on the basis of the country’s state of development. 
For the dimension of “self-realization”, however, Hungary is signifi cantly below the 
predicted level. On the materialist–secularist axis, countries neighboring Hungary are 
placed ahead of what could be predicted from their economic capabilities, but at the 
same time they are ahead of Hungary in terms of “self-realization”. Only in Romania is 
the level of trust in people and institution at a similarly low level to Hungary. And there, 
similarly, it is only a minority of people that feel that they can infl uence their own course 
of life. 
In 2003, while testing the statements in Huntington’s book on the clash of 
civilizations (Huntington 1996) using the results of the third wave of the survey, Inglehart 
and Norris (Inglehart and Norris 2003) aimed to prove that, from the viewpoint of the 
future of democracy, those cultural absolutes which stem from the past, and which 
lead Huntington to predict the forming of antagonisms between nations with Muslim 
(and Greek Orthodox) and Western (Protestant and Roman Catholic) traditions, are 
not so fateful. Value surveys in countries with a Muslim majority show that the citizens 
of such countries also hold democratic values. The supposed “intolerance” of Muslim 
traditions appears not in the areas of freedom of speech or assembly, but in relation to 
gender equality and non-conformist sexuality. The citizens of Muslim countries think 
diff erently from those of Western countries, but in “matters of Eros not of Demos” (of 
course, not trusting in the optimism of such analyses, and having seen the problems 
which arise over the issue of the immigration of Muslims and having experienced 
the tensions which arise over the issue of terrorism, English Conservatives and then 
German Christian Democrats formulated the principle of “muscular liberalism” on the 
basis of Huntington’s world view. This claims that cultures should break away from the 
relativist political ethics of multiculturalism and immigrants should be expected to 
accept basic liberal legal and political principles) (as summarized in the introduction 
of Inglehart 2003).
Behind Huntington’s and Inglehart’s debate are two types of thinking about 
economic development (or simply, growth). Inglehart, although he should by no means 
be viewed as an economic determinist, tends to think that with an increase in welfare 
and the unfolding of liberal civic rights necessitated by a market economy, people’s 
value systems will also change towards “Western” kinds of value systems (although 
they may still retain certain individual characteristics). Others, however, think that the 
dominant value system is a decisive factor both regarding to what extent a nation can 
make use of opportunities for economic development, and also regarding the sort of 
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state and forms of coexistence a nation creates from the new opportunities off ered by 
economic growth. 
Yilmaz Esmer (Esmer 2003) also identifi es with those who are not satisfi ed with the 
analyses of Inglehart et al., and has processed the responses to the third wave survey 
into a new classifi cation system. In this classifi cation, the issue of fatalism vs. ability 
to shape ones’ own destiny is not a component of the self-realization index but is a 
part of a value system which results in “modernity”; it is a signifi er of “effi  cacy”, or the 
intention to be effi  cient. Esmer thinks that – following the train of thought of Weber’s 
Protestant Ethics – undertaking the shaping of one’s own life course is a prerequisite for 
work to become a vocation (i.e. more than merely carrying out an assigned task). The 
author shows that, also stemming from Muslim tradition, in all of the Islamic countries 
a much greater proportion of individuals feel that they are “exposed to circumstances” 
than people living in Christian or Far Eastern countries (that are at the same level of 
development). However, in order to verify this, Esmer examined whether in Muslim 
communities living in Balkan countries that have a Christian majority population the 
experience of being at the mercy of fate was also a common trait. He found that it was. 
But in these countries members of the Christian faith are also characterized by having 
almost the same (low) levels of belief in their being able to shape their own destiny. This 
fi nding is, of course, not in opposition to Huntington’s interpretation of the world, since 
he does not regard the followers of Greek Orthodoxy as being (culturally speaking) 
members of the Western Christian tradition.
In order to illustrate the examination of Huntington’s ideas as well, Inglehart et al. 
published a summary of the results of fourth and fi fth wave surveying in a way that, 
using the two-dimensional reference frame, circles that marked the value systems 
of individual countries were extended to cover those countries that have the same 
religious-cultural traditions. Thereby it was possible to indicate that the value systems 
of those countries that belong to the same groups (mainly on the basis of religious 
traditions) are not so diff erent from the value systems of countries with diff erent 
traditions. For instance, the marker identifying the European Catholic group of countries 
overlaps the one for the group of Greek Orthodox countries. The markers for Hungary 
and Lithuania were intermingled with the markers which identifi ed countries in the 
Balkans (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
Hungarian analysts were not surprised that the outcomes of the surveys on 
diff erent value systems across the world and in Europe presented the Hungarian value 
system to be unique (to put it mildly). According to Tamás Keller’s summary value 
surveys that Hankiss initiated (2010) as far back as the 1980s (based on the Rokeach 
test), postmaterialist values were only weakly evident in Hungary. A Hungarian value 
survey (that was integrated already into the fi rst phase of TÁRKI’s panel survey which 
started in 1993) showed no change in this regard. Péter Róbert stated in 1996, when 
analyzing the results of the fi rst survey based on Schwartz’s value test (Róbert 1996), 
that the majority of Hungarians appeared to be frustrated and felt their place in history 
was characterized by an exposure to circumstances. They expected solutions to their 
problems to come from above. Short of solutions, they are characterized by having 
a “complaint culture” (this expression then became solidifi ed in semi-professional 
discourse about Hungarians). According to Schwartz’s value test, using the axis of open 
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thinking/closed thinking, Hungarians shift conspicuously towards closed thinking: 
“Hungarians have a closed thinking, that is, they are passive about public issues, 
they are rarely characterized by caring for themselves, and they do not really accept 
responsibility.” On the basis of Hofstedte’s value test, “Hungarians are characterized by 
an avoidance of uncertainty and short-term thinking” (Keller 2010, 42–43).
Keller himself fi nds the “fatality-index” (that he based on the TÁRKI-surveys) to be 
so decisive in the shaping of the life course of not only the community but also the 
individual that, by descending to micro-sociological level, he suggests  that those 
people (and their off spring) who are most likely to succeed are those who undertake 
the shaping of their destinies (and are those who do not have the overwhelming 
feeling that they are at the mercy of circumstances). This, of course, does not answer the 
chicken or egg question; namely, whether a more conscious choice of values facilitates 
success or whether those who are more successful are more likely to be self-conscious 
than those who are not successful. The attitude, however, represents a particular way of 
passing down cultural capital to the next generation (Keller 2008).
Keller formulated an “index for measuring the control over one’s own destiny” based 
on the following six questions that partly serve to control each other: a1): I cannot solve 
my own problems; a2): Whatever I decide, I carry through; a3): I can scarcely infl uence the 
shaping of my destiny; a4): The shape of my future mainly depends on me; a5): I can hardly 
make a change about my concerns; a6): I have confi dence in the future. In contrast, in our 
questionnaire – as there was no place or time to include a multi-component value 
survey into it because of the omnibus character of the questionnaire – there is a single 
relevant question which addresses the topic: To what extent do you agree with the 
following statement: You can barely infl uence the course of your life? 
Tamás Keller (Keller 2011) also attempted to evaluate how “fateful” (that is, how 
deeply embedded into Hungarian cultural traditions) the “deviance’ of the Hungarian 
attitude is; so deviant that it even shows up in a value-map of the world. Hankiss and 
Róbert, the prime social scientists studying value systems in the 1980s, opined that the 
“stick-in-the-mud” character of Hungarians originated in the unique climate of Kádár’s 
political system. Having observed results from after the system changes of the 1990s, 
the current authors now tend to think that the causal relationship is the opposite: 
the reason why the country was able to operate (with an almost content population) 
under the not really clear (even, uncertain) institutional system of the Kádár-era, and 
the reason why the shaping of the institutional system was so uncertain after 1989, is 
exactly because the Hungarian value system is like it is.
Keller examined whether from the perspective of the “closedness–openness” axis 
our “confi nement among Orthodox nations” decreases with age but found this was not 
the case. Although a lesser proportion of those with a college or university degree are 
characterized by having a less closed way of thinking than the rest of the population, 
it is not in greater proportion than for Balkan countries. Even though Hungarians 
may be somewhat more open-minded than we appeared in former survey waves, in 
neighboring countries (with the exception of Romania) recent “improvements’ have 
been greater. When  Keller contrasted countries using the openness-restrictedness 
scale with GDP per capita, he found that Hungarians, in general, are more closed-
minded than the data would suggest. Not even the late date at which the Hungarian 
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serfs were liberated (in 1848) provides enough explanation for the Hungarian’s closed 
way of thinking (especially when we note that the average openness values in Slovakia 
and Poland could not be better either if we compare the dates of serf liberation). 
Keller then justly proposes that one should go back to Jenő Szűcs’s analysis about 
the three regions of Europe in the late Middle Ages. This explains that with Hungarian 
feudalism the “little worlds of freedom” only extended to the West of the Laitha river, 
and up until the time of the liberation of the serfs the number of “free persons” was 
almost only limited to the aristocracy. However, I do not think that “the thousand-year 
Hungarian history is like fate sitting on us”. In my opinion, the decline of Hungarian 
political culture started around the end of the nineteenth century, and the repressive 
attitude that was then formed in mainstream public discourse (and the “befogging” that 
enraged Ady and the radical intelligentsia so much) which has hindered Hungarians 
from discussing our own concerns and goals with an outsider’s objectivity – but Keller 
is probably right in thinking that this mentality harms our economic potential as well.
SHOULD GOODS BE DISTRIBUTED FAIRLY?
The reason why the state exists, among other things, is to redistribute income. Clearly, 
the main aim of this is to guarantee that there are so-called public goods. Beyond this, 
it should of course secure, or at least control, social insurance, help the downtrodden, 
ensure that the lives of the disadvantaged improve, have family policies, etc. But is it a 
task of the state to attempt to level out or even just to perceptibly alleviate income-
inequality? The averages of relevant opinions of respondents to this question vary 
according to country, not primarily according to the level of economic development, 
but a strong eff ect derives from the “type” of capitalism that has developed in the 
particular country. Nonetheless, Hungarian responses do not correspond to other 
responses from Central Europe. 
The Special 72.1 Eurobarometer survey on poverty and social exclusion in 2009 
examined citizens’ demand for redistribution through several questions – and then 
compared it to their ideas about poverty and budget constraints. The result that is 
interesting to us from the perspective of an international comparison is that, according 
to index values (between –1 and +1) derived from responses to questions about 
diff erent types of redistribution demands, Hungary is among the leading countries. The 
fi rst three are Greece (0.78!), Cyprus (0.59) and Hungary (0.58). Hungary is followed by 
Bulgaria and the Baltic countries. Hungary is in the same group as those countries with 
Orthodox traditions and the Baltic states, just as with value system surveys. 
The decisive question from the block of questions was how much the respondent 
agreed with the following statement: The government should ensure the fair redistribution 
of the country’s wealth. Almost three quarters of Hungarians “agreed completely” with 
this statement. The proportion of those who completely agreed was only higher in 
Greece (Keller–Tóth 2011). The distribution of responses to this question cannot of 
course be directly compared to the ones from our own survey - even less than in the 
case of the “fatalism”-variable. The possibility of comparison is limited due to three 
momentums: 
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A.  A “fair method” of redistribution does not necessarily guarantee equality. 
B.  In a “just world” it is not certain that it is only the state that would ensure fair 
distribution.  
C.  Our question was not what the respondents’ opinion about their preferred 
distribution principle was, but rather we asked them to choose from the following 
three principles which one they favored: 
1.  Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning. 
2.  Everyone should partake equally of goods produced. 
3.  Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should 
get as much as they need. 
POLITICAL OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS IN OUR SURVEY 
Within the indigenous and the migrant population the proportion of communities 
who profess diff erent political (and moral) principles varies not only because a higher 
percentage of immigrants have a higher level of education and are of an active age 
than members of the host society, but also because:  
–  those people who establish their existence in an environment with unfamiliar 
traditions (and language) are generally compelled to refl exive; that is, deliberative, 
judgments about issues concerning the community; 
–  those who strive to succeed in a “world” that seems foreign from outside are 
probably a select group in a way. That is, they have a diff erent modal value system 
to the population of their country of origin;
–  the majority of foreigners that settle in Hungary, even only temporarily, do not 
come here because of some kind of economic or political pressure but either 
because it appeared practical from the point of view of their careers or for 
emotional reasons.
Approximately a quarter of the citizens from countries outside the European Union 
who permanently live in Hungary have settled here because their parents, grown-up 
children or spouses established an existence here, and they chose to join them. Three 
quarters of immigrants decided after “free” deliberation, that they would continue 
their professional careers here, or because of job opportunities that seemed more 
favorable than in their countries of origin they decided to move here, study here, 
or for some emotional reasons live here for a given time. The two most populous 
groups (economically active migrants and foreign students in Hungary) can be 
divided into subgroups from the perspective of life strategies. Diff erent perspectives 
about life-planning are identifi able between those who live through a stage of their 
career in Hungary, those Chinese or Vietnamese salespersons who work as a part of a 
transnational network with an ethnic character, those ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine 
who support their families by making a living here, or those immigrants who are trying 
to make a home for themselves in Hungary. Among students, there are those who 
came to study in a Hungarian school because of their knowledge of Hungarian and 
they face a real dilemma about whether to settle down here in the future, make a living 
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at home, or whether they should market their prospective job skills in the wide space 
of the European Union; others, however, study here just because the opportunity for 
them arose, and remaining in Hungary is not attractive in their eyes. Nonetheless, it is 
a common for the members of these diff erent groups that they decided on their own 
to shape of their destinies.The unique situation of immigrants, their “selected” character 
(compared to those who stayed on), and the fact that they are compelled to weigh up 
opportunities explains also why their potential to exit is higher than for members of the 
host society. The higher level of self-esteem, however, probably does not simply derive 
from the migrant existence but much rather from the unique character and roles of 
immigrants who live in Hungary. 
NOTABLY FEWER WHO FLIRT WITH FATALISM 
While two-thirds of the host population agree partly or fully with the statement that their 
lives are determined to circumstances, only thirty percent of immigrants feel that their 
destiny does not primarily depend on them. The more-than-double the proportion 
of immigrants who ascribe to the principle of individual freedom and responsibility 
for one’s own destiny is probably due to the features listed above. Hungarian public 
discourse – as the results of the formerly-quoted surveys also show – may also play 
a part in this; a kind of “complaint culture” dominates, the majority of citizens have a 
“closed way of thinking”, or, from a diff erent perspective it can be said that they do not 
trust in the possibility of “self-realization”, and they believe it is not they themselves 
but “circumstances” that shape their destiny (this is why some moralists think that the 
“typical Hungarian” is immoral; is someone who always blames others and hides away 
from responsibility). 
We changed the 1–4 scale answer to the statement “You can hardly infl uence the 
course of your life” (completely true, partly true, rather not true, not true at all) to a 
bivariate variable (those who fl irt with fatalism/are not fatalistic) in order to be able to 
demonstrate the results more clearly. 
Table 1 Distribution of the bivariate fatalism-variable (host society and immigrants) 
 Not fatalistic Flirts with fatalism Altogether
Host society
346 654 1000
35% 65% 100%
Immigrants
347 153 500
69% 31% 100%
Altogether
693 807 1500
46% 54% 100%
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The diff erences between diff erent age groups in the samples of those who “fl irt with 
fatalism” also indicate the probability that relying on circumstances (or blaming them) 
is ”socializational damage” that aff ects member of the host (or non-migrating) society 
even into adulthood. The number of individuals in this group grows with age; in the 
population of over 60 years of age, 75% feel that they are the victims of circumstance. 
At the same time, in all age groups of immigrants, those who opt for what could be 
identifi ed as being “bourgeois-individualist” values far outnumber those who hold the 
same values in the “indigenous” sample. What is more, the proportions of immigrants 
who hold this view do not increase according to age: the proportion of those who 
believe they can shape their own destiny is the highest with the most active age group 
(those between 30 and 60; 77.1%). (N. B. In order to ensure a suffi  cient number of items 
for each cell, the subsamples were divided into three groups only: age group 1 – under-
30-year-olds, age group 2 – 30 to 60-year-olds and age group 3 – over-60-year-olds.) 
Table 2 Distribution of the bivariate fatalism-variable (host society and immigrants), %
 Age Not fatalistic Fatalistic
Host society
–30 46 54
30–60 34 66
60+ 25 75
Immigrant
–30 67 33
30–60 77 23
60+ 42 59
For immigrants, the percentage of those who fl irt with fatalism is under 25% of the 
Chinese and those who come from Anglo-Saxon countries, and it is the highest 
(around one-third) for migrants from former member countries of the Soviet union 
and from the Balkans. Even this one-third proportion is hardly more than half the rate 
of the host society. However, we are aware that within the “stay-at-home” population 
of these nations the percentage of those who perceive their lives to be exposed to 
circumstances is as similarly high as with Hungary. The variation between diff erent 
groups of migrants can probably (mainly) be explained not so much by the diff erences 
in the public discourse of the countries of origin, but because immigrants who are not 
fatalistic are overrepresented in the total sample of immigrants. Besides the variation in 
the ways of thinking that migrants bring with them from their home countries, what 
may also have a signifi cant role is the diff erence in social status in Hungary of those 
who have come from diff erent countries. 
Of course, in the host population sample the proportion of those who believe their 
personal role in shaping their own destiny is important cannot be ignored either: half 
of those with a college or university degree (and from this group, 3/5 of those under 
60) and 40% of those who have fi nished high school make up the great majority of this 
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group (it seems that achievements that have been recognized have a role in helping 
people to be less fatalistic.) Understandably, at the same time, level of education has no 
notable signifi cance for immigrants on how they justify the course of their lives within 
the given circumstances. More than three quarters of skilled laborers who come from 
abroad feel that they can shape their own destinies, which is a ratio similar to that for 
individuals with a college or university degree. 
SATISFACTION WITH STATE OFFICES
The eight questions that enquire about opinions regarding official administrative 
processes were compiled to help gather respondents’ opinions about the different 
elements of procedural justice. The strong correlation between responses to the 
questions that focused on different issues signified that respondents only had 
a limited understanding of their analytical differences. Their evaluation of the 
questions is dominated in every case by their level of satisfaction with the outcome 
or the attitude of the administrative procedure. This makes it difficult to carry out 
an analysis according to the original goals but it offers the possibility of formulating 
a unified variable, satisfaction with administrative offices (this was done in two ways: 
firstly, the main component with great explanatory power was used as an index; 
secondly, we summed up responses into a new index with the range (–16, +16) and 
into a variable “satisfied” (0), “not satisfied” (1) with offices). On the basis of previous 
focus group and “citizens” consultation” type surveys carried out on immigrants we 
expected that a large proportion of them would be frustrated about Hungarian 
official regulations and procedural practice. It turned out, however, that migrants 
are more understanding. Because their problems were finally solved in the end, far 
fewer of them are dissatisfied with Hungarian authorities than can be said for the 
host society. What is more, while the modal group of the host society can by no 
means be called satisfied, within the migrant sample, those who are satisfied are 
the majority. 
Our presumption was that that those who had been through processes that 
threatened them with frustration and those who had already formed a routine-like 
relationship with OIN would dominate the sample and explain why immigrants 
were so highly contented. This was not proven correct. Level of satisfaction was not 
related significantly to length of stay and was not correlated to satisfaction with 
OIN. 
In order to represent the distribution of opinions more clearly, we here illustrate 
the spread of the index values (in a range between -16 and +16) gained by summing 
up the responses to the relevant questions, and based on this, the bivariate variable of 
dissatisfi ed (0) and not dissatisfi ed (1) in logit functions. 
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Figure 1/a Distribution of the “satisfaction with authorities” index (Hungarian sample), %
Figure 1/b Distribution of the “satisfaction with authorities” index (Immigrant sample), %
Table 3 Relative eff ect of factors that infl uence the “not dissatisfi ed” value for the “satisfaction 
with authorities” variable (Logit model, N = 1181, unifi ed sample)
 B S.E. Sig. Odds
Level of education (reference: maximum 8 
grades)
    
Skilled worker 0.229 0.226 0.311 1.257
Secondary education 0.825 0.225 0 2.282
Higher education 0.697 0.268 0.009 2.009
Age (reference: –30 years)     
30–60 0.172 0.196 0.38 1.188
60+ 0.887 0.271 0.001 2.427
Immigrant 1.864 0.273 0 6.451
Constant –1.334 0.366 0 0.264
Note: The reference category for the odds was the likelihood that a Hungarian of less than 30 years of age, 
living in Hungary, with a maximum 8-grade-level education would not be dissatisfi ed with administrative 
authorities. 
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The low number of items included in the model (N = 1181 from the unifi ed sample 
of 1500 persons) is a consequence of the fact that the model only incorporated those 
who replied to all the 11 questions that were included in the analysis. The distortion 
of the sample because of many missing elements – and the fact that the immigrant 
sample is half the size of the host society sample – decreases the reliability of the 
results. However, even though we do not have precise information on the extent of the 
diff erences between the two subsamples, we can still evaluate the direction of these. 
It is true of this satisfaction variable as well that while for the host society the level of 
satisfaction grows in parallel with level of education (the proportion of those who are 
dissatisfi ed decreases) such a signifi cant correlation cannot be found for the immigrant 
population. In other words, fl uctuations in the proportions of those dissatisfi ed with the 
authorities are not signifi cant. The outcome of the logistic regression model published 
here signifi es that, within the unifi ed sample, the level of education and the age group 
have low explanatory power in this regard; diff erences stem mainly from the fact 
that fewer immigrants at all levels of education and of every age are dissatisfi ed with 
authorities than the “indigenous population”. Of course, this probably does not mean 
that immigrants have fewer problems with authorities than Hungarians, but that they 
are less strict with their judgments. 
One area for illustrating the diff erence between the judgments of hosts and 
immigrants is the diff erent dimensions of procedural justice: 20% of responding 
members of the host society were dissatisfi ed with the results of offi  cial procedures 
(or associated the question with a case that was not dealt with properly) and 60% of 
these individuals categorically supposed that they were treated diff erently to other 
clients. A further 25% of those dissatisfi ed did not reject this “singled out for diff erent 
treatment” interpretation either. At the same time, only 4.2% of immigrants associated 
the question with a procedure that had an unsatisfactory result and only 30% of these 
thought that representatives of the authority had picked on them. 
ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
The three principles to choose from (Question 46) formulated in a commonplace way 
the basic principles of three speculative political systems. The question assumed that 
the norm Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning 
was a formulation of the basic meritocratic principle of conservative market economy 
(capitalism). The norm that Everyone should partake equally of goods produced refl ects 
the aspiration of socialism (and the social-liberal movement that emphasizes the dignity 
of every individual) to compensate for people’s diff erent opportunities by regulating 
distribution (in a slightly mocking way, this is also called egalitarianism). The norm that 
Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as 
much as they need signifi es the utopian goal of history, communism, or that heavenly 
state in which the world of prosperity and individual freedom is fulfi lled.
Although, for a person socialized in the era of socialism, it is clear which “socio-
economic formation” each principle refers to, the distribution of responses indicates 
that respondents interpreted the question at two separate levels. The meritocratic and 
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the egalitarian distribution principle bring up political dilemmas that compel people to 
make decisions about everyday life situations in the present as well, and the utopian 
principle envisions what kind of a future world would be good. We may assume that 
choosing the last option implies identifi cation with the “communist utopia” but we 
may also hypothesize that choosing utopia serves as a way to avoid taking a stand 
about a dilemma in the present. It is also possible, however, that the respondent has 
only a beautiful future in mind, and not the present, when they are required to choose 
between basic political principles. The communism of free individuals is not the utopia 
of the communists. 
As, according to the outcome of value surveys, the value choices of people with 
a college or university degree diff er notably from those of the rest of the population, 
within both subsamples we separated the responses of those who have at least a 
college degree from the others (according to Keller’s investigations in the restrictedness-
openness dimension – and also in the “self-realization” dimension – those who hold 
college or university degrees show signifi cantly more positive results than others. 
At the same time, when applying the criteria of age (young-old), diff erences are not 
signifi cant). 
Table 4 Distribution of opinions regarding “distributive justice” (host society and immigrants), %
Host society Immigrants
With which of the following statements 
do you most agree?
Does not 
have a degree
Has a degree
Does not 
have a degree
Has a degree
Everyone should get from society 
as much as he/she contributes to its 
functioning
34 44 43 49
Everyone should partake equally of 
goods produced
25 18 15 14
Everyone should contribute to the 
running of society as best as they can, 
and should get as much as they need
41 38 42 38
More than 40% of respondents from both the host and the immigrant sample avoided 
taking a stand about a dilemma concerning the present (another reason for this may 
be that this dilemma was formulated in too exaggerated a way). The proportions 
of those who did make a stand regarding the dilemma, on the other hand, show 
characteristic diff erences. While 60% of Hungarians that committed themselves chose 
the meritocratic principle of distribution, more than three quarters of immigrants did 
so. For the host society, both the act of making a stand on the political dilemma of 
the present and the likelihood of choosing the meritocratic principle of distribution 
explicitly correlates with the level of education. For those with only a basic level of 
education, more choose the egalitarian principle than those the principle that could 
motivate people to achieve. 
For immigrants, the correspondence between the distribution principle one 
chooses and the level of education is not signifi cant. This is partly because (across all 
educational levels) those who adhere to the meritocratic principle are clearly higher 
in number than egalitarians, and partly because the group of skilled laborers who are 
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working in Hungary choose the meritocratic distribution principle of the self-assured in 
even higher proportions than those who have a degree. 
What we found was in accord with our expectations that those who take on the 
shaping of their own destiny (and take responsibility for their own destiny) tend to prefer 
the meritocratic distribution principle (and are less likely to fl ee from decision-making 
into utopia). Indeed: cross tabulation shows that those who fl irt with fatalism are more 
inclined to turn to utopia and are more likely to choose the egalitarian principle than 
those who “trust in themselves” (although, among the latter, the number of those who 
dodge the dilemma and who are egalitarian is also signifi cant). The “fatalism variable” 
explains only a smaller portion of the distribution of opinions and the correlation can 
only be regarded as signifi cant in the case of the host society sample. 
We can observe that the proportion of immigrants who adhere to bourgeois 
(conservative liberal) values is notably higher (that is; it is only well educated Hungarians 
with similar value systems that are present in high proportions). However, we cannot 
claim about these groups that their world view is ideologically coherent (or one-sided, 
viewed from another perspective). 
THE FAIRNESS OF POLITICIANS
Although the question formulated How true is the statement that “politicians are fair 
to people like you in their decisions?” is more sophisticated than the questions which 
address trust in political institutions, according to expectations, responses to this are in 
accordance with questions related to trust in political institutions (which refl ect a much 
more negative picture than responses related to the issue of trust in administrative 
offi  ces). The distribution of responses, however, shows even more notably the 
proportional diff erences in groups with diff erent orientations within the host society 
and the immigrant sample. 
The survey required responses in the form of an evaluation using a 10-degree scale, 
where “0” meant that in the opinion of the respondent the statement was not true at all, 
while the highest mark, “10” meant that they thought it was perfectly true. 
Figure 2/a Trust in politicians’ fairness (Host population sample), %
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Figure 2/b Trust in politicians’ fairness (Immigration population sample), %
While the host society is dominated by those who do not trust the empathy of 
politicians, the modal group of immigrants believe in the fairness of politicians to a 
moderate extent (rating it between 5 and 7 points).  
Even in this case only an insignifi cant part of the diff erence in distribution may be 
explained by the fact that immigrants on average are more highly educated than the 
general population. The rejection of the assumption that politicians are fair becomes 
stronger as educational level decreases (for the host society). However, there is no 
apparently signifi cant diff erence between the distribution of opinions of immigrants 
with diff erent levels of education (here the proportion of those who awarded a score of 
5 points was not lower for immigrants who were skilled laborers than for those who had 
a degree). What is more, there are far fewer immigrants who rejected the supposition 
that politicians could be trusted, whereas the opinions of those with a degree were 
more widely distributed.
The connection between diff erences in the evaluation of one’s own social situation 
and of the fairness of politicians may be signifi cant. Those who evaluate their own 
situation as being better are less likely to think that politicians lack empathy. In fact, 
social position accounts for almost 20% of variation in the evaluation of politicians – but 
for immigrants this variable has low explanatory power (just as does the background 
variable of the wealth index, which refl ects the level of prosperity but explains the issue 
only to a small extent). 
As the percentages of well-educated people, those of active age, those in a 
better-than-average economic position and with a higher social status are higher for 
immigrants – and there is a group of assertive skilled laborers among them – it is natural 
that fewer of them are inclined to make the declaration that politicians are a group of 
soulless people only concerned with themselves than with the Hungarian population. 
Nonetheless, these “more favorable” structural characteristics from the point of view of 
the immigrant sample do not cumulatively have enough explanatory power to explain 
the higher level of tolerance and trust that migrants have. Variation in the proportion of 
opinions within a given statistical group is generally greater between the hosts and the 
immigrants than between the statistical groups within the migrant population. 














      	 
  





201
It is clearly required that we seek further reasons and explanations to interpret 
these fi ndings. Conformity probably has a role in the overwhelming number of 
signifi cantly less critical judgments: let us not judge too harshly about the world of 
the interviewers or host society. But because the question was related – unlike with 
questions concerning political institutions – not specifi cally to Hungarian politicians, 
this explanation does not seem suffi  cient. We can trace the eff ect of the diff erences 
in value systems described above (which include the idea that we should not seek 
the reasons for our own success or lack of success in circumstances such as “politics”). 
The answer may be found in that bourgeois (or philistine) principle that says that we 
should not relate to representatives of another “profession” with hostility; let us believe 
that they are trying to do their jobs well. Clearly, some of the diff erence also lies in the 
fact that – as the Eurobarometer surveys also suggest – looking for scapegoats is not 
as natural everywhere as it is in Hungary, and neither is the tendency to blame those in 
power for every problem that the Good Lord has not solved.  
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Esmer, Y. “Is there an Islamic civilization?” In Human Values and Social Change. Edited by 
R. Inglehart. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003, 35–68.
Huntington, S. P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Inglehart, R. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western 
Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Inglehart, R. and P. Norris. “The true clash of civilization.” Foreign Policy no. 135 (March–
April 2003): 62–70.
Inglehart, R. “Preface.” In Human Values and Social Change. Edited by R. Inglehart. Leiden 
and Boston: Brill, 2003, 35–68.
Inglehart, R. and C. Welzel. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Keller, T. “Értékrend és társadalmi pozíció” [Value system and social position]. Századvég 
n. s., no. 47 (2008): 151–87.
Keller, T. “The position of Hungary on world-wide map of human values.” Review of 
Sociology 6, no. 1 (2010): 27–60. 
Keller, T. and I. Gy. Tóth. Income Distribution, Inequality Perception and Redistribution 
Claims in European Societies.  GINI Discussion Paper 7. Amsterdam, AIAS, 2011.
Róbert, P. “Fogcsikorgatva, a megkeseredett rendszerváltás [Grinding one’s teeth, the 
embittered system change.” Századvég n. s., no. 2 (1996): 59–86.

203
POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND CIVIC 
PARTICIPATION IN HUNGARIAN 
SOCIETY AND FOR IMMIGRANTS 
Borbála Göncz 
INTRODUCTION
This last chapter fi rstly provides an overview of diff erent indicators of civic participation 
and political activity with a comparison of Hungarian society and the immigrant 
population, and secondly, in view of some other factors that were discussed earlier in 
this book. The economic, social and cultural aspects of the political or civic integration 
of migrants (i.e. the ways in which immigrants participate in the host society’s political 
life) are gradually receiving more attention. This topic is interesting from the aspect of 
how migrants (who often originate from non-democratic countries or at least countries 
with a diff erent political culture), get integrated into democratic systems, but also 
because civic participation off ers an opportunity for migrants themselves to represent 
their own interests. 
The concept of political integration generally comprises the host country’s laws, 
identifi cation with the host country, the acceptance of democratic norms and values, 
political participation, mobilization as the process of establishing a collective identity 
and representation, which embodies a sort of legitimation process (Martiniello 2006). 
Research projects on the topic identify several diff erent target groups. The subject 
may be studied from the perspective of the eff ects that gaining citizenship status has 
on civic participation: under this approach the attitudes and behaviours of migrants 
who already possess citizenship status are compared to those who have not yet gained 
it; the attitudes of second-generation migrants are also often studied (e.g. Röder and 
Mühlau 2011). A comparison of migrant communities with minority communities may 
also generate important outcomes (Martiniello 2006). 
For a society, the notion of civic integration (Lockwood 1999) refers to the integrity of 
the institutional system linked to the concept of citizenship; i.e. it comprises institutional 
trust, political participation and activity and other forms of political activity. At the same 
time, the present research, which is focused on measuring the civic integration of 
immigrants, studied the topic of civic integration through a comparison of immigrants 
without citizenship status with members of Hungarian society. For this reason it is 
important to address traditional methods of political participation based on elections 
or voting – usually only available to persons with citizenship status – separately from 
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non-traditional ways of political participation that are not linked to elections and that 
are possibly available to non-citizens as well.
The issue of the political integration of immigrants is especially interesting in the 
case of Hungary where the level of political activity and civic participation is one of 
the lowest in Europe. This phenomenon may be linked to the level of development of 
democracy, in that the social and political institutional system does not have the same 
traditions as in Western European countries (Angelusz and Tardos  2000). In former 
socialist countries in general, and Hungary in particular, refraining from expressing 
one’s opinion and a culture of political passivity is a tradition rooted in the Kádár-era 
(Angelusz 2000). This is the political environment that immigrants should get integrated 
into. 
In Hungary the political integration of immigrants has been studied through two 
earlier research projects.1 Although the focus and the methodology of these earlier 
studies were slightly diff erent, current research fi ndings will be presented in comparison 
to these earlier results, if overlaps in the topics allow. 
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Determining factors of political activity and civic participation 
In recent years, several pieces of research have been undertaken at an international 
level which attempted to examine the political and civic participation of immigrants. 
The main research question usually revolves around the diff erences between the 
political behaviour of the majority population and immigrants and the factors that may 
explain this.
It is important to mention that the political integration of immigrants is not 
necessarily a linear process but can be dynamically uneven; it may be intermittent or 
even unfi nished (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). Earlier research has explored the 
factors behind political integration through various approaches. Besides the classic 
variables that infl uence political participation (sex, age, education, income, interest in 
politics, labour market status, group membership, satisfaction with the performance 
of the government, materialist values, acceptance of authority, political conviction, 
etc.), the national political environment (the mobilizing potential of already-integrated 
political actors, schools, trade unions, associations, etc.) and political institutions also 
play an infl uencing role. Researchers who claim that migration itself is an infl uencing 
factor on its own mostly argue that experiences gained in the country of origin (Black 
1987, Harles 1997) and thus political socialization leave a lasting impact on the political 
behaviours of immigrants. Others, however, emphasize that short-term economic goals 
1 Namely, the international research eff ort LOCALMULTIDEM in 2008, and the EIF-funded research project 
“Immigrants in Hungary” in 2009. Details of both surveys are presented in the book introduction. 
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and a lack of commitment are more likely to be the root-causes of the political inactivity 
of immigrants than a lack of a political and democratic culture (Martiniello 2006).  
This way, the country of origin and earlier political socialization processes emerge 
as important factors. In the case of immigrants from non-democratic countries, the 
level of political trust, the sense of civic duty and civic activity are presumably lower 
(e.g. Paskeviciute and Anderson 2007, Hochschield and Mollenkopf 2009). Besides the 
country of origin, factors such as when the immigrant arrived and for how long they 
have stayed in the host country may also have an important infl uencing role. 
When we examine the topic of political activity and civic participation, the 
connections between this and material and cultural resources, as well as with social 
resources and overlaps with the concept of social capital are also worth taking into 
consideration (e.g. Putnam 1993, Angelusz and Tardos 2003, Klandermans et al. 2008). 
Membership in a non-profi t organization can, on the one hand, be interpreted as an 
aspect of social capital. When examining four aspects of social capital – trust, social 
network, societal norms and civil society activity – comparatively at the European level, 
it is, for instance, apparent that Hungary, together with Romania and Bulgaria, is among 
the worst performing countries (Giczi and Sik 2009). On the other hand, membership in 
non-profi t organizations may be an indicator of civic activity as well, so social capital in 
this respect is not only a determinant of civic or political activity but the two concepts 
also overlap. When examining this topic, Kmetty and Tóth (2011) arrive at the conclusion, 
for example, that in the case of Hungary membership in a non-profi t organization is not 
so much an indicator of social capital as an indication of a democratic attitude.  
Research related to the trust aspect of social capital, especially regarding trust 
in institutions, has rendered interesting results when comparing  host societies and 
immigrants. For example, fi rst-generation migrants who do not yet have citizenship and 
whose experiences related to institutions were gained not or not only in the receiving 
country, were more likely to have confi dence in the host country’s institutions than 
members of the host society were (Röder and Mühlau 2011). At the same time, when 
studying earlier research results, it is not obvious how trust in institutions may infl uence 
the political activity of immigrants. If immigrants suff er some real or assumed off ences 
from these institutions (i.e. their sense of justice or fairness is harmed), this contributes 
to increased political activity (Klandermans et al. 2008).
In addition, increasing amounts of research has focused on the group membership 
tendencies of immigrants (Myberg 2011), which is often low due to obstacles such 
as low levels of political participation, poor local language skills or a scarcity of social 
relationships at a local level. A special form of group membership (which combines the 
eff ects of group membership and the infl uences of migrant origins) is membership in 
ethnic organizations. Tillie has focused, in several pieces of research (Fennema and Tillie 
1999, Tillie 2004) on the eff ect of group membership based on ethnicity or nationality. 
Results indicated that this was likely to increase political participation; what is more, 
this eff ect prevailed at both individual and group level as well. In the 90s, one surprising 
outcome of research conducted on the Muslim community in the Netherlands was 
that even those organizations which were regarded by Dutch legislators as being 
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fundamentalist, authoritarian organizations recorded increased political participation. 
The effi  ciency of the functioning of democracy at a local level was thus improved. 
Group membership may be studied through the concept of social capital but 
also from the perspective of personal identity and belonging (e.g. Martiniello 2006, 
Odmalm 2005). Identity (or rather, a complex and dynamic system of diff erent identity 
components), may also be a decisive factor aff ecting the political participation of 
immigrants. Namely, a greater level of identifi cation with the host society or a double 
identity may lead to more active political participation (Odmalm 2005, Klandermans et 
al. 2008). 
Electoral vs. non-electoral forms of political participation 
However, it is worth dividing political and civic participation into its electoral and non-
electoral components. Indicators of the electoral type of political participation include 
participation in elections, appearance on electoral candidate lists, creation of separate 
political parties and consultative institutions. Research based on the electoral kinds of 
political participation rendered results (both European and international) proving that 
voter turnout is similar for migrants and members of the host society (Ramakrishnan et 
al. 2001). More precisely, there are diff erences between the host society and migrants 
but these observable diff erences are due to the lower level of resource availability for 
migrants. This was demonstrated by Tillie (2004) in his analysis of the social capital of 
diff erent ethnic groups living in the Netherlands, and by Maxwell (2010) with regards to 
immigrant communities in France, the majority of whom lived in lower-quality urban 
environments than their French peers. 
Non-electoral types of political activity comprise participation in trade unions, 
collective organizations of interest representation based on ethnicity, race, nationality, 
culture or religion (Martiniello 2006) but non-electoral kinds of civic participation may 
be apprehended through various other types of activities as well. Earlier research was 
based on measuring the extent of diff erent political activities with diff erent intensity of 
commitment levels, using an (usually additive) index in the analysis (e.g. Paskeviciute 
and Anderson 2007, Klandermans et al. 2008). Such activities may include the signing 
of a petition, attending a political meeting, contacting a politician or participation 
in a legal (or even illegal) demonstration. Besides political activities, membership in 
organizations and social embeddedness, just as with perceptions of civic activity and 
the sense of civic duty as a value, may also be important indicators of civic activity and 
allow the expression of individual interests. In eff ect, these aforementioned activities 
correspond to the concept of “voice” as form of action potential2; that is, the willingness 
or potential for protesting. When analyzing this concept, Bilodeau (2008) found that 
2 “Action potential” is the inclination of and abilities of individual and collective actors to improve their 
situations, or – if conditions deteriorate – to avoid further deteriorations. This research draws our attention to 
the fact that the conditionality of life situations is not only infl uenced by social circumstances and individual 
capacity but also by inclinations, intentions and aspirations (Lengyel 2002). 
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migrants were less active then members of the host society. Results also showed that 
immigrants who had migrated from oppressive countries took part in such activities in 
even lower proportions than other migrants, especially with regards to the signing of 
petitions, an activity that did not guarantee them anonymity. 
When dealing with political activity, several other variables associated with the 
concept in a wider understanding must be taken into account. One such indicator is 
the “political micro-milieu”, employed by Angelusz and Tardos (Angelusz and Tardos 
2009) in a similar way to Devine (1970), who emphasizes the role of media-use, political 
interest and discussions about political debates, information and knowledge about 
politics and active participation in various political initiatives in his theory about the 
politically “attentive public”. Thus, interest and information or knowledge may be 
correlated with political activity, alongside political “cynicism” or disillusion-driven acts 
against political and civic engagement for immigrants as well (Klandermans et al. 2008).
Henceforth, the above-described variables of political and civic activity are 
compared for Hungarian society and immigrants, while reference is given to factors 
discussed in the earlier sections of this book, including objective and subjective well-
being, economic, cultural and social resources, dignity, a sense of procedural and 
distributive justice and identity. 
INDICATORS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Traditional forms of political activity – electoral participation 
As mentioned before, it is worth diff erentiating between electoral and non-electoral 
forms of political activity. The electoral type of political participation was measured in 
our questionnaire by recording participation in national and local elections. According 
to Hungarian law, and similarly to other European countries, only Hungarian citizens 
may vote in national elections, therefore only members of the host society were asked 
about this activity. In contrast, participation in local elections is open to certain groups 
of immigrants.3
From the answers given it is visible that there is a slight but statistically signifi cant 
diff erence regarding participation in national and local elections within the host 
society: slightly more people claimed that they would vote at local than at national 
elections; 37-38% would defi nitely vote, 20-22% would probably vote, while 30-32% 
would defi nitely not go and vote (see Table 1). This low level of interest in participation 
was underlined by another survey carried out in December 2011, which stated that 
“this year, the proportion of those who declared their intention to vote for sure dropped 
3 Those persons from our sample with only a residence permit cannot vote, but those who have an 
immigration permit or a permanent residence permit (i.e. everybody except those with residence permits), 
have the right to vote (Article XXIII of the Basic Law). 
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to 40%, the lowest for 20 years”4 (whereas in 2010 before the elections this proportion 
was 60%5). 
For migrants, results showed a diff erent pattern: 48% said they had no right to vote; 
at the same time it is worth mentioning at this point that many did not know that they 
could in fact vote, or thought they had the right to vote when they did not. A higher 
proportion (58%) of migrants with a residence permit said that they did not have the 
right to vote, while the remaining 42% who also answered this question positively in 
fact did not have voting rights. Out of those migrants who, on the other hand, have the 
right to vote, (i.e. those with an immigration or a permanent residence permit), 37% 
thought that they could not vote. Upon examining only those who actually responded 
to the question (independently of whether they actually had the right to vote or not) 
treating the question only as an indicator of civic attitude, it is visible that immigrants 
would vote in signifi cantly lower proportions than members of the host society – 15.5% 
said they would “defi nitely vote” and 64% stated that they would “probably” or “defi nitely” 
not go and vote. So far, the above-described results refl ect those earlier international 
research results that found that the political activity of migrants was lower than that of 
the host society (e.g. Martiniello 2006). 
Table 1 Willingness to participate in elections (%)
General election Local election
 Host society Host society Immigrants Immigrants
N = 960 960 459 238
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Would vote for sure (4) 36.8 38.1 8.1 15.5
Would probably vote (3) 20.1 21.7 10.5 20.2
Would probably not vote (2) 11.4 10.3 12.0 23.1
Would not vote for sure (1) 31.8 29.9 21.4 41.2
Does not have voting rights – – 48.1 –
Average (1-4) 2.62 2.68 2.10
Note: Host society (general vs. local): t = –3.88****
Local election (host society vs. migrants): t = 6.98****
The question was: “If there was a general/local election this Sunday, can you tell me if you would vote?”
At the same time, when looking at respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics and 
their disposition with cultural resources, there are diff erences observable between the 
intention to vote of the host society and of immigrants. For members of Hungarian 
society, both in the case of general and local elections, higher proportions of older 
people would vote (as is the case for more highly-educated people), while there are 
4 Source: Medián; the survey was carried out in December 2011.
(http://www.median.hu/object.52e79dc7-adcc-4f25-9ed4-4baabb89553b.ivy)
5 Source: DKMKA Hungarian Election Research Programme 2010 survey (Kmetty and Tóth 2011).
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large diff erences between regions: in the Transdanubia region, for instance, people are 
less willing to vote. It is also true that polarization is greater for the inactive than for the 
active population – a higher proportion of the inactive either say they would “defi nitely 
vote” or they would “defi nitely not vote” than the actives. In the case of migrants, their 
level of education also has a positive eff ect on inclination to participate, and there were 
fewer educated respondents who said they did not have the right to vote. Additionally, 
the period respondents have spent in Hungary has also had an eff ect: for those who 
had been in Hungary for longer than 9 years, the proportion who said they did not have 
a right to vote was lower, while inclination to participate was higher. 
Non-electoral forms of political activity 
Political activity, on the other hand, can take numerous non-electoral forms other than 
participation in elections, and for immigrants, focusing on these activities can lead 
to more meaningful results than focusing on electoral participation. In the present 
research, non-electoral political activity is measured by participation in diff erent political 
activities, membership in non-profi t organizations and in terms of how respondents 
evaluate their own ability to represent their interests. 
Diff erent political activities than voting correspond to what Hirschman called “voice”, 
and in this way this topic is directly related to the concept of the “exit” type of action 
potential (Hirschman 1978) that is discussed by György Lengyel in an earlier section 
of this book. The concept of action potential signifi es that individuals and collective 
actors have diff erent competences and abilities for improving their own situations, or 
for stopping them from deteriorating. 
Table 2 contains a number of political activities that refl ect political engagement 
and potential for voice. In general, the occurrence of each of these activities is quite 
infrequent but, at the same time, almost a quarter (24.5%) of Hungarians have taken 
part at least in one of these activities, while the same proportion for immigrants was 
only 13.8%. The most widespread form of protest is getting in contact with politicians 
or civil servants; within the last 5 years, 15% of members of the host society and 9% 
of immigrants had engaged in this form of action. A further 8% of the host society 
had signed a petition while again a signifi cantly lower share of immigrants (5%) had. 
The above results correspond to earlier research fi ndings; for instance, in 2010 similar 
research found that 30% of Hungarians had  participated in such forms of political 
activity, and the proportions of people who took each action was very similar too 
(Kern–Szabó 2011). 
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Table 2 Participation in diff erent political activities – potential for voice (%)
 Host society Immigrants
N = 1000 500
 100.0 100.0 T-test
Contacted a politician or a civil servant 14.6 8.7 3.52****
Signed a petition 7.5 4.9 2.07**
Bought certain products for political, ethical 
or environmental reasons
6.4 5.3 n.s.
Boycotted certain products 5.5 4.5 n.s.
Taken part in a public demonstration 4.8 4.3 n.s.
Attended a political meeting or a rally of a 
political party
4.1 3.3 n.s.
Worn or displayed a campaign badge or 
sticker
3.7 3.4 n.s.
Contacted or appeared in the press to 
express their views
2.6 1.3 1.78*
Donated money to a political organization 
or group
1.8 1.2 n.s.
Participated in the work of a political 
organization or movement 1.8 3.1 n.s.
At least one activity 24.5 13.8 5.14****
Note: The question was the following: “Here are some diff erent forms of political and social action that 
people can take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these things in the past fi ve 
years.”
For the host society it is the age group of 30 to 59 years that showed higher voice 
potential; both younger and older members of society were less inclined to use these 
opportunities. Besides this, or maybe directly in connection with this, economic activity 
and cultural resources, such as level of education or knowledge of foreign languages, 
also have a positive impact. For immigrants, results showed a slightly diff erent picture; 
namely, the older a person was, the less likely they were to take part in the above-
described non-electoral kinds of political activity. At the same time, activity and cultural 
resources had a similar eff ect. Furthermore, voice potential was the highest for those 
who had been living in Hungary for a longer time (5–8 years). 
Another indicator suitable for measuring potential for voice is the extent to 
which immigrants feel capable of protesting eff ectively when they fi nd something 
problematic. As can be seen in Table 3., the question “Suppose a law were being 
considered by Parliament that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If such a case 
arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would be able to do 
something about it?” was answered by a signifi cantly higher proportion of immigrants 
with the response “not at all likely” (70%) than members of Hungarian society (53%).
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Table 3 Perception of interest representation (%)
 Host society Immigrants
N = 941 465
 100.0 100.0
Very likely (4) 4.7 .6
Fairly likely (3) 9.0 6.7
Not very likely (2) 33.8 22.4
Not at all likely (1) 52.5 70.3
Average (1–4) 1.66 1.38
t = 6.99****
Note: The question was: “Suppose a law were being considered by Parliament that you considered to be 
unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would 
be able to do something about it?” 
Regarding this indicator, the economically active and those who dispose of more 
cultural resources report that they would be more likely to be able to do something 
about an unfavourable situation (this is characteristic of both the host society and 
migrants). For both sample groups, young people are more optimistic and so are those 
immigrants who have spent less time in Hungary. In their case (immigrants), country of 
origin plays a signifi cant role; immigrants from the North-American region, presumably 
due to cultural characteristics and socialization, expressed more positive thoughts 
about the issue than the rest. 
Membership in non-governmental organizations is also a widely-used indicator 
of civic activity which, at the same time, can also be interpreted as a manifestation 
of social capital, as already mentioned in the section on the theoretical framework of 
this chapter. In this regard there is, on the whole, no signifi cant diff erence between 
Hungarians and the migrant population: one quarter of all respondents (25–28%) were 
members of at least one such organization. There was a diff erence, however, in the 
number of organizations that respondents were affi  liated with; 14% of immigrants 
were members of one, and another 7% more than two organizations, whereas for the 
host society 20% were members of one organization or fewer while only an additional 
4% were members of another one as well. At the same time, the diff erence lies with 
the types of organizations that respondents participate in. Members of the host society 
were typically more likely to have participated in organising local community events 
(7%) or be participants of religious or church organizations (7%) and in the activities 
of social movements or non-governmental organizations (3%). In contrast, immigrants 
were typically rather members of sports clubs (12%), cultural or leisure associations (9%) 
or organizations for environmental protection (4%). Findings about Hungarian society 
on this topic are very similar to the results of a 2010 survey in which 20% of respondents 
reported to participating in the work of non-profi t organizations (cultural, leisure, sports 
clubs and religious or church organizations were among the most frequent ones) (Kern 
and Szabó 2011). Results of an earlier survey on immigrants from 2009 showed that 
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18% of them were members of an organization (Örkény and Székelyi 2010) – these 
former results are not signifi cantly diff erent from those of the present survey either. 
Table 4 Membership in non-governmental organizations (%)
 Host society Immigrants
N = 1000 500
 100.0 100.0 T-test
The organizations of a local community event 6.6 2.5 3.96****
A religious or church organization 6.6 4.1 2.14**
A sports club or club for outdoor activities 
(recreational organization)
5.9 11.9 -3.7****
The organization of a local sport event 4.9 3.5 n.s.
A cultural or leisure association 3.4 9.0 -3.99****
A social movement, NGO 3.2 .8 3.5****
A business or professional organization 2.9 3.1 n.s.
A political party or organization 2.4 .2 4.35****
A local organization, association 
for the local community
2.4 2.0 n.s.
A charity or social aid organization 2.2 3.3 n.s.
A trade union 2.2 .5 3.01***
An organization for environmental protection 1.5 4.3 -2.8***
A voluntary cooperative for house building 1.4 .8 n.s.
Membership in at least one organization 27.9 25.3 n.s.
Note: The question was: “Do you currently participate actively in or do voluntary work for one or more of the 
following organizations?”
Typically, those who were economically active or had more cultural resources at their 
disposal were more likely to be members of non-profi t organizations. At the same time, 
some not-so-insignifi cant diff erences between the various regions could be observed. 
For members of Hungarian society, those living in the Transdanubian and the Northern 
Great Plain regions were less likely to be members of non-profi t organizations, whereas 
in the case of the immigrant population, this is rather characteristic of those who live 
in Budapest. Younger migrants and those who come from Asia are more likely affi  liated 
with an organization, while the opposite is true of European immigrants, most of whom 
are ethnic Hungarians who used to live in neighboring countries.  
Interest in politics and the obtaining of information
When examining political activity and civic participation, it is worth taking political 
interest and use of information sources into account. As is observable from Table 5, 
immigrants are, to a statistically signifi cant extent, less interested in politics than 
members of Hungarian society. While around one-third of each group said they were 
neither interested nor uninterested in politics, the proportion of those who were either 
fairly or very interested was 26% for the host society and only 11% for the immigrant 
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population. When one compares the level of political interest in Hungarian society to 
results from 2008 and 2010, it can also be seen that, whereas it remained fairly constant 
over the previous two dates (3.03-3.04 on average on a scale of 1 to 5) (Szabó 2011), this 
survey indicated a slight decrease in political interest since then, as the average of the 
diff erent responses was only 2.74. 
Table 5 Interest in politics (%)
 Host society Immigrants
N = 997 492
 100.0 100.0
Not at all interested (1) 18.4 34.8
Not very interested (2) 20.6 23.2
Neither interested nor uninterested (3) 34.8 31.1
Fairly interested (4) 21.4 8.7
Very interested (5) 4.9 2.2
Average (1-5) 2.74 2.21
t = 8.642****
Note: The question was: “How interested would you say you personally are in politics?” 
A signifi cant diff erence, similar to the above, can be observed regarding the extent 
to which Hungarians and migrants follow political, social and economic events which 
are happening in Hungary. While 31% of Hungarian society follows these events 
quite a lot or very much, only 19% of the migrant population do so (see Table 6). In 
accordance with transnational theories of migration, it is hypothesised that immigrants 
maintain their connections to their country of origin, and continue to follow events in 
their countries of origin – sometimes with more intensity than those taking place in 
Hungary. Our data support this assumption, as immigrants are in fact signifi cantly more 
interested in news from their countries of origin. 
Interestingly, results of a 2009 survey on migrants indicated a slightly diff erent 
tendency. Results of the research project “Immigrants in Hungary 2009” demonstrated 
that immigrants had a stronger interest in politics than members of Hungarian society 
– more than 70% of them showed an interest in public matters in Hungary, and 85% 
in public matters in their countries of origin (Örkény and Székelyi 2010). The diff erence 
between the results of these fi ndings and the current research may partly be explained 
by the diff erent wording of the question, as well as the diff erent sampling method and 
sample composition. 
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Table 6 Keeping informed about political, economic and social events (%)
 Events in Hungary Events in the country of origin
 Host society Immigrants Immigrants
N = 1000 498 500
 100.0 100.0 100.0
Not at all (1) 11.9 21.7 15.1
A little (2) 20.6 31.3 28.2
Somewhat (3) 36.3 28.1 30.1
Quite a lot (4) 24.4 14.7 17.6
Very much (5) 6.9 4.2 4.2
Average (1-5) 2.94 2.49 2.77
Note: Events in Hungary (host society vs. immigrants): t = 7.46****
Immigrants (Hungary vs. country of origin): t = –5.24****
The question was: “How much do you follow the political, social and economic news in Hungary / of your 
country of origin?” 
With both political interest and the following of news, respondents with a higher level 
of education showed greater interest. Furthermore, in Hungarian society men are more 
interested in politics and follow politics more closely than women. Budapest-based 
respondents are also more politically interested, as are persons older than thirty years. 
Results for inactive people are less clear than those for active ones. For the migrant 
population, inactivity has a clearly positive eff ect on interest in politics. Immigrants 
from Europe and the North American region are also more likely to follow politics, while 
immigrants from Asia or Africa are less interested, and migrants who have spent a longer 
time in Hungary follow Hungarian news more closely. With regard to news from the 
country of origin it is also true that people with a higher level of education and those who 
have lived in Hungary for a longer period of time follow political news more intensely, 
but at the same time this is more characteristic of the older generation (between 50 and 
59 years of age) and less typical of inactive migrants, who are probably typically younger 
people. It seems that inactive migrants are more interested in politics in general, however, 
they follow the news from their country of origin to a lesser extent.
With regard to political activity and civic participation, apart from having an interest in 
politics, usage of the media (i.e. how / how often one obtains information about political 
issues), is also an important indicator. There is similarly signifi cant variation in the use of 
diff erent news sources and media to the interest in politics indicator. While 55% of the 
host society obtains information from the television nearly every day, this proportion for 
immigrants is 19%, and a similar tendency can be observed with regard to radio, daily and 
weekly papers as well. In general it is true of both groups that the most frequent news 
source is television, followed by the radio, daily papers and, fi nally, weekly papers. Only 
the Internet does not fi t into this trend: this medium is used by immigrants more often 
for the purpose of obtaining information about politics. While 61% of Hungarians “nearly 
never” or “never” use the Internet for obtaining information, the proportion for immigrants 
is only 40% – linguistic issues may underlies this, but this diff erence may also be caused 
by the diff erent demographic composition of the two groups. 
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CONNECTIONS AND EXPLANATORY ASPECTS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION 
AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
The approach
Based on the results of simple cross tabulation it can be seen that the diff erent 
indicators of political activity and civic participation correlate in diff erent ways for the 
host society and the immigrant population. Participation in diff erent types of political 
activity (see Table 2) and membership in non-governmental organizations (see Table 
4) are positively related to how much the respondent perceives that they could do 
something against a parliamentary decision that has a negative impact for them; that is, 
how much potential one has for protesting and validating one’s interest. This correlation 
is valid both for Hungarian society and for migrants.
However, when examining other indicators for political participation, diff erences 
between the two groups arise. While a positive correlation is found for participation 
between diff erent political activities and membership in organizations on the one 
hand, and intention to participate in national and local elections, interest in politics and 
following political, social and economic news on the other, for immigrants these variables 
are independent of each other. Only “following the political, social and economic news 
of the home country” positively correlates to organizational membership (i.e. the more 
closely one follows political news, the more likely they are to be a member of a non-
profi t organization, or vice versa). 
Hereafter, political or civic activity will be examined using three variables: 1. by 
examining intention to participate in elections; and using two aspects of non-electoral 
participation: 2. participation in diff erent political activities (potential for voice), and 3. 
membership in non-profi t organizations. Intention to vote, as already mentioned above, 
only correlates with (the two variables for) non-electoral kinds of activity for Hungarians 
while both of these variables (as can be seen in Table 8), signifi cantly positively correlate 
with each other both for the host society and for the immigrant sample. If a person is 
a member of a non-governmental organization, they are more likely to take part in 
political activities – this connection is of similar strength for both the host society and 
immigrants. For the Hungarian sample, 42% of members of organizations participate 
in some political activity, in contrast to 18% of those who are not members of any 
organization. For immigrants, 29% of members of organizations took part in some 
political activity as opposed to 8% of non-members. 
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Table 8 Connection between potential for voice and membership in a non-governmental 
organization (%)
Voice potential
Membership in an organization
Altogether
 
not a member of an 
organization
member of an 
organization
Host society 
(Cramer’s V: 
0.249****)
did not participate 82.2 58.4 75.6
participated in some activity 17.8 41.6 24.4
N = 721 279 1000
 100.0 100.0 100.0
Immigrants 
(Cramer’s V: 
0.255****)
did not participate 91.2 70.9 86.0
participated in some activity 8.8 29.1 14.0
N = 374 127 501
 100.0 100.0 100.0
In order to gain deeper understanding about the issue, multivariate analysis was 
conducted, which was designed to reveal the factors which determine political and 
civic participation. The three dependent variables used for measuring political and civic 
participation were formulated as dichotomous variables. For the sake of comparability, 
intention to participate in local elections was chosen as an indicator of electoral 
participation (the question being what determines the chance of whether someone 
“would vote for sure” as opposed to all other responses). As almost half of all immigrants 
thought (rightly or wrongly) that they did not have the right to vote, they were not 
included in this analysis (see Table 1). Similarly, the analysis did not diff erentiate between 
those who really possessed voting rights and those who did not. Simply, if respondents 
expressed the intention to vote, this was considered to be an indicator of “civic” attitude 
and made them eligible for inclusion in the analysis. 
As an indicator of non-electoral types of political participation, if respondents had 
taken part in any political activity included in Table 2, they were considered to be 
politically active. Accordingly, if someone was a member of any of the organizations 
included in Table 4, this was coded as being “active civic participation”.  
The main aim of the multivariate analysis was to reveal the characteristics and 
interconnections of political and civic participation of immigrants in comparison with 
Hungarian society. Therefore, separate models were formulated for members of the 
host society and for immigrants in which comparability featured as an important 
aspect. The analysis is primarily exploratory in its approach and examines whether there 
is a diff erence between Hungarian society and immigrants with regard to the following 
questions: 
How do social, cultural and material resources and subjective well-being infl uence 
political and civic participation? 
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Material resources are partly represented by a variable which measures economic 
activity, and partly by a wealth index made up of diff erent assets.6 Educational level 
is an indicator of cultural resources – however, other factors such as knowledge of 
a foreign language were not included in the models because of redundancy and a 
strong correlation between these variables. The eff ect of social capital was included in 
the model through the factors of trust in diff erent institutions, personal trust and the 
frequency of discussions with friends about politics. Institutional trust was analysed 
in the form of a principal component that has been presented in more detailed in an 
earlier chapter by Dorottya Kisfalusi. The concept of subjective well-being has also been 
described and analysed in the book in the section written by Eleonóra Szanyi-F.; the 
results of that principal component analysis were used in this section.  
How is political and civic participation infl uenced by the perception of procedural and 
distributive justice; that is, by how fair one perceives her own treatment to be, and the 
share one obtains of available resources? 
Does identity and attachment play a determining role in political and civic 
participation? 
The concept and components of distributive and procedural justice are detailed in 
this book in the section written by Lilla Tóth. The following regression models include 
the perception of how fair politicians are in their decision-making and the principal 
component of procedural justice. Furthermore, the models have been formulated to 
include the eff ect of identity and attachment to the new or the home country as well 
(Klandermans et al. 2008). 
How does the exit component of the potential for action infl uence political and civic 
participation? 
The concept of action potential and its exit aspect has been discussed by György 
Lengyel in this book in detail. The index formulated there measured whether the 
respondent was planning to move to a diff erent settlement or settle in another country, 
or become an entrepreneur, and serves to measure exit potential. This index is included 
in the multivariate models. Hirschman, who introduced the concepts of exit and voice, 
mentions in a paper written about the connection of these concepts that these two 
forms of actions appear to be in opposition to each other. The less the possibility to exit 
(as an impersonal act which can be taken to avoid a problem or confl ict) is, the more a 
person is motivated to voice their dissatisfaction in a non-anonymous way. Assuming 
that migration or leaving a country is such a form of exit action, Hirschman notes that 
migrants who arrived in the wave of migration before World War I. from Europe to 
6 The standardized additive index contains: car younger than 3 years, holiday home, valuable art object, 
digital camera, automatic washing machine, mp3, personal computer, bank card, bank account and mobile 
phone.  
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America were characterised by having very low levels of protest activity in their new 
country as well. The frequency of their engagement in political protests decreased both 
for the source and host countries (Hirschman 1978). It is worth mentioning that in this 
regard there is a basic diff erence between the two groups under investigation: apart 
from with the responses to the questions which measured exit potential and intentions 
about the future, the group of immigrants have at least once actually realized the 
opportunity for exiting when they left their countries of origin and came to Hungary. In 
this regard, they have real experiences about this option. 
Do cognitive mobilization capacities (that is, interest in politics and media proximity), 
have an eff ect on political and civic activity? 
The characteristics of cognitive mobilization capacities or of the “attentive public” in the 
sense used by Devine (1970); that is interest in politics, following the news or staying 
informed by the media, all have a connection with political and civic activity. This 
assumed relationship is examined on the basis of the variables presented in Tables 5 to 
7, where media-usage is represented by a simple additive index (Table 7). 
Finally: For migrants, to what extent do the previous socialization environment, the 
characteristics of a migrants’ life history and the way this is experienced determine 
political and civic participation? 
The majority of scientifi c research about immigrants’ political and civic activities identifi es 
the determining factors to be the socialization environment, the characteristics of 
the country of origin and the characteristics of the migration (e.g. Bauböck 2006). 
Accordingly, an analysis such as this one should not ignore individual factors such as 
the length of the respondent’s stay in Hungary, their country or continent of origin, how 
immigrants generally view migration, whether their living conditions have improved or 
deteriorated since they migrated, whether the respondent is of Hungarian ethnic origin 
and how well they speak Hungarian. Furthermore, the multivariate models used contain 
the usual control variables such as sex, age and the region where the respondent lives. 
Some of the issues at hand have already been discussed in detail in the previous 
sections of the book. The aim of this analysis is to combine these factors and integrate 
them into a single explanatory model. 
As all of the three dependent variables are bivariate, the analysis will use logistic 
regression techniques. Logistic regression, in contrast to linear regression, does 
not estimate regression coeffi  cients using the method of least squares, but uses an 
estimation of maximum likelihood, which maximizes the value of the log-likelihood 
(LL) function in order to create the most suitable model. Logistic regression does 
not require that the requirements of homoscedasticity be met, and does not specify 
prerequisites about the distribution of variables. On the other hand, interpreting results 
is more complex and redundancy among the variables included in the model cannot 
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be measured in the same way as for linear regression (Székelyi–Barna 2003)7. Regression 
analysis, as used here, is thus rather of an exploratory character and is designed to 
provide an overview of the factors discussed in the book so far. Each explanatory 
variable was sequentially introduced into the model so that the models should have 
the greatest explanatory power possible (i.e. all correlations should be signifi cant and 
parameters should remain robust); that is, the variables introduced did not modify the 
regression parameters of the previously-included variables.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that even though correlations are signifi cant 
and robust, these models do not necessarily represent causal relationships. Therefore, 
reporting on causality is only partly possible. At the same time, the results of earlier 
theoretical and empirical research will serve as guidance for the interpretation of these 
results.
Results
In the following, a total of ten regression models will be presented. Results of models 1 
to 3 (Table 9) refer to intent to participate in local elections, models 4 to 7 (Table 10) are 
related to political participation or involvement in various political activities, while the 
results of models 8 to 10 (Table 11) concern civic participation or membership in non-
profi t organizations. All of the models are signifi cant but their explanatory power varies; 
the explanatory variables involved generally explain 9–41% of the dependent variables 
– included variables explain the most for “intent to vote” (particularly the model that 
includes the individual characteristics of migration for immigrants). Furthermore, the 
included variables explained political activity to a higher extent than civic participation 
(membership in organizations), especially for immigrants for whom the country of 
origin played a signifi cant role in explaining political activity.  
On the whole, examination of members of the host society supplied very similar 
models for participation in national and local elections, so in the following, for the sake 
of comparability, only the latter will be discussed. Regional diff erences can be observed 
within Hungarian society with regard to the inclination to vote in local elections 
(people in Western Transdanubia showed a lower level of willingness to vote), whereas 
such regional variation was less characteristic of the immigrant subsample (while most 
of the sample was concentrated in Budapest). Cognitive mobilization capacity (that is, 
7 For the regression models the following measures were used to test the “goodness” of the model (Székelyi 
and Barna 2003): 
1.  The hit rate of the model: the percentage of the cases (dependent variable) correctly estimated by the 
model. 
2.  R2
L
 = ((-2LL
0
) – (-2LL
M
)) / (-2LL
0
), where –2LL
0
 log-likelihood function is a variable with an approximately 
Chi2 shaped distribution and only has non-negative values. This shows that, without the involvement of 
explaining variables (i.e. only by involving the constant) how great the “error” is in the model. The -2 LL
M
 shows 
the value of this function after the respective explaining variables are included. 
3.  Adjusted R2 – shows the explanatory power of the logistic regression model. This is calculated based 
on linear regression where the explaining variable is the original variable and the one explained is the 
predicted variable.
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discussions about politics with friends), signifi cantly determines electoral participation 
primarily for the host society: those who discuss politics with their friends “often” were 
6 times more inclined to take part in local elections, while such a correlation was not 
found for migrants. At the same time, interest in politics had a positive infl uencing role 
for both groups. It was also true of both groups that those younger than 29 were less 
inclined to vote. Material resources (the possession of diff erent assets) has an infl uence 
only for migrants; however, after the inclusion of variables which measure individual 
migratory parameters this eff ect ceases to exist. For migrants, after including these 
variables the explanatory power of the model considerably increases (from 26% to 
41%).  This is due mainly to the diff erences in their countries of origin. The Chinese are 
less inclined to vote, while migrants from other Asian countries are more so inclined to. 
Apart from this factor, the diff erent legal grounds for their stay, the length of their stay 
and their knowledge of Hungarian does not have a signifi cant eff ect. 
It should be highlighted that other explanatory variables were not included 
in the models because they did not have a signifi cant eff ect. Voting intent, active 
labour market status, the diff erent indicators of cultural resources, subjective well-
being satisfaction and sense of fairness and justice did not play an important part. In 
addition, there are certain factors whose eff ect is not robust and changes from model 
to model depending on the other variables involved so these were not included in the 
fi nal models either. For Hungarians, such factors are trust in institutions and a sense of 
attachment to Hungary, while for immigrants, one such factor is exit potential. 
Determining factors for participation in diff erent political activities are, in the case 
of the host society (see models 4 and 6), material resources or possession of assets 
(the more valuables one owns, the more likely they are to participate in some kind 
of political activity). Furthermore, social capital also has a signifi cant eff ect on political 
activity for the host society: the more often someone has political discussions, the 
more the probability of political activity increases (and it may be multiplied 4 times). 
Personal trust, on the other hand, has the opposite eff ect; those who think that people 
can almost always be trusted are less active politically. Moreover, interest in politics and 
use of various media have a positive eff ect on political activity. 
In contrast, for immigrants the examined factors have a diff erent eff ect on political 
activity – only material resources or the possession of assets and, to a lesser extent, 
political discussions with friends are factors that have similar eff ects as for Hungarian 
society (see models 5 and 7). Younger and more highly-educated migrants are more 
active politically. Unlike material and cultural resources, however, social capital does not 
have a signifi cant eff ect in their case. When we examine individual factors (see model 
7) it is observable that time spent in Hungary, following events in the country of origin, 
the perception of changes in living conditions, Hungarian ethnic origin or knowledge 
of Hungarian, in contrast to previous suppositions, do not determine political activity 
signifi cantly, therefore they were not included in the model. Only two other factors, such 
as the attachment to the country of origin have an infl uence (very strong attachment 
works against political activity). Furthermore, place of origin was infl uential – migrants 
from countries with an Anglo-Saxon political culture (such as those who come from the 
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USA, Canada, Australia or New Zealand) are more active than others and, interestingly, 
the same can be said about those who have immigrated from Asian countries other 
than China. 
In addition, economic activity, trust in institutions, subjective well-being, attachment 
to Hungary, exit inclination, settlement type and region have no signifi cant eff ect on 
political activity either for the host society or for migrants. Additionally, a sense of justice 
does not infl uence the political activity of migrants signifi cantly, while for Hungarians 
there is a negative correlation between thinking that politicians make fair decisions 
and levels of political activity. That is, a sense of injustice is more likely to increase the 
likelihood of political activity.  
In the case of civic participation (membership in an organization) – similarly to 
political activity – material resources have a positive eff ect; that is the more assets 
someone possesses, the more likely it is that they are a member of an organization. 
Economic activity, another indicator of material resources, has a positive eff ect 
on membership in civic organization for members of the host society. Those who 
are economically active are more likely to be affi  liated to an organization. Level of 
education as an indicator of cultural resources has an eff ect on both groups in this 
regard, although it is more signifi cant for migrants. While, for Hungarian society, 
having a college or university degree doubles the chance of being a member of 
some organization, the same factor increases this likelihood for immigrants fourfold. 
In contrast, social capital has an infl uential role primarily on members of Hungarian 
society, in so far as those who have political discussions more often are more inclined 
to be members of organizations, as are those who stay informed about news through 
using the media more often. Age, on the other hand, only has an infl uence in the 
case of immigrants. Those who are 29 years old or younger have a higher rate of civic 
activity than those who are older – this may be linked to the fact that the proportion 
of immigrants who are members of sports associations is much higher than for the 
host society (see Table 4). When we look at the characteristics of migrants, as formerly, 
it is evident that being of Hungarian ethnic origin, having a knowledge of Hungarian, 
and the amount of time spent in Hungary do not, on their own (if the infl uence of 
other factors is controlled for) have a determining eff ect on civic participation; what 
is more, nor do close attachment to the home country and the country of origin itself 
have a signifi cant eff ect in this case. At the same time, changes in living conditions 
due to migration infl uence organizational membership in that the more positive 
someone considers these changes to be, the more likely it is that they are a member 
of some organization. At this point, however, it is worth considering the direction of 
causality which may be just the reverse; that is, a higher level of social embeddedness 
may cause respondents to appraise the eff ects of migration and newly-found living 
conditions more positively.  
Factors that are missing from the determination of civic participation, just for 
the case of political activity, are trust in institutions, a sense of justice or injustice, 
subjective well-being, attachment to Hungary and an interest in politics, and there 
are no signifi cant diff erences according to types of settlement either. For the host 
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society, there is regional variation in civic organizational membership but the eff ect of 
regionality is not consistent for the case of individual models, so this was not included 
in the model in the end. 
On the whole, to the question of whether, by taking the given factors into 
consideration, the inclination to vote of migrants is signifi cantly diff erent from that of 
members of the host society, the answer is yes. On the basis of the results of a joint 
regression model8 it can be seen that being a migrant has a signifi cant eff ect, especially 
on inclination to vote and on diff erent forms of political activities, in so far as the level 
of political participation of migrants is lower. For civic participation (organizational 
membership), a diff erence of similar direction but of smaller proportions and statistical 
signifi cance can also be observed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this fi nal chapter, the topic was civic and political integration of third country 
nationals who live in Hungary. This was addressed through an overview of the 
diff erent indicators of civic participation and political activity for immigrants, and their 
comparison using similar variables for Hungarian society, as well as the exploration 
of the factors underlying civic participation by integrating those indicators that were 
addressed earlier in the book. Thus, both electoral, and non-electoral types of political 
activity have been discussed. These activities were examined in more detail with the 
help of multivariate analysis which was designed to aid examination of the concept of 
civic or political activity according to economic, social and cultural factors, indicators of 
subjective well-being, a sense of justice or injustice and a number of individual variables 
that measure integration and former socialization, primarily for migrants.  
On the whole, results show that migrants are less active than members of the 
host society with regard to participation in both electoral and non-electoral forms of 
political activities. It is less likely that they would vote in local elections – although in 
this case it is not clear how much of a role a lack of information plays –, they participate 
in fewer political activities and slightly fewer of them are members of non-profi t 
organizations. Furthermore, they are less likely to think that either alone or together 
with others they would be able to do something about a parliamentary decision 
that they found unacceptable; they are less interested in politics; they do not follow 
Hungarian news so much (they are somewhat more likely to follow the news from their 
countries of origin), and they follow news presented in the media with less intensity. 
Use of the Internet is the only exception among the media types but this fi nding may 
be explained by the demographic characteristics of this group. The tendencies shown 
by these results correspond with earlier international research fi ndings (e.g. Martiniello 
8 These models are not presented because of the methodological and interpretative problems that the joint 
treatment of the two subsamples cause. Results only serve to provide complementary information. 
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2006). However, even this research was unable to answer the question of whether the 
greater passivity of immigrants stems from short-term planning, the transnational and 
temporary character of migration or diff erences in political culture. At the same time, 
it is worth drawing attention to the fact that components of political and civic activity 
were not infl uenced by length of stay, so it is not clear whether it makes sense to talk 
about short-term goals when those who have stayed in the host country for longer 
behave in the same way. At the same time, what may be in the background of this 
issue is that immigration has a transnational character, so without any regard to the 
time immigrants spend in Hungary, they do not integrate into the Hungarian political 
scene. Political culture and former socialization are found to be infl uential, as there 
are diff erences in political activity according to country of origin. The passivity of the 
Chinese (regarding inclination to vote) is striking, while in terms of non-electoral kinds 
of political activity, migrants from Anglo-Saxon countries are more active than other 
nationals. 
In this respect it is interesting that, if we take the Hochschild–Mollenkopf model as 
a basis (2009), migrants do not only take part in political and civic life to a lesser extent, 
but, because of a lack of interest, the political and civic systems only have a limited eff ect 
on them. Thus, they are (not totally, but somewhat) excluded from the political arena. 
Furthermore, behind the failure to politically integrate there may in fact be personal 
reasons: for instance, that the immigrant would like to maintain their own culture. This 
was proven by the results of our analysis as well, in so far as strong attachment to the 
country of origin contributes to greater political passivity. 
When describing the determining factors of respondents’ political and civic 
activity (or inactivity) in general, it is an especially interesting outcome of the survey 
that such activity appears to be independent from one’s assessment of institutional 
and procedural justice. This is to say that inadequate functioning and a lack of trust 
derived from personal experiences or attitudes do not lead to the political articulation 
of opinions. Another noteworthy fi nding is that it is those who possess more material 
resources that more intensively participate in political and civic activity - although it 
is those who have less material resources for whom political articulation would be 
important. 
Finally, another suggestive thought arises when we try to explain the situation of 
migrants who have a lower level of political activity than members of the host society. 
The results we presented here fi t well with Hirschman’s argument that states that an 
individual chooses the “voice” type of protest when there is (or it is perceived that there 
is), no opportunity to exit; i.e. leave ones’ country. According to this theory, migrants 
who have already chosen to exit once (over choosing the voice option), and who have 
left their countries of origin, more rarely choose the voice type of protest in the host 
country. It should be highlighted though, that if we do not look at historical exit but 
rather at exit potential, as examined by György Lengyel in this book, then the picture 
becomes more subtle – results show that, for immigrants, exit and voice potential, if 
only weakly, mutually strengthen each other.  
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Appendix 1
REPORT ON THE SAMPLING AND 
SURVEY DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH
(Ipsos Media, Advertisement, Market, and Opinion Research Institute Plc.)
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY – SUB-SAMPLE OF HUNGARIAN SOCIETY
Data collection was conducted under the framework of the Ipsos Omnibus survey. 
The block of questions utilised for Corvinus University formed a part of the fi rst half 
of the omnibus research, which addressed multiple issues. It was preceded by groups 
of questions which concerned public life and economic issues; these questions form 
a stable and regular part of Ipsos Omnibus surveys. The second part of the omnibus 
survey featured questions related to market research topics and a list of questions 
about the interviewees’ socio-demographic status. The latter is disseminated to all of 
the clients of Ipsos.
The sampling for the survey was done using a two-stage, proportionally stratifi ed 
probability sample of 1000 randomly-selected persons. It was proportionally 
representative of Hungary’s settlements, with 111 sampling units. The composition of 
the sample corresponded to the composition of the entire adult population according 
to the most important socio-demographic indicators (sex, age group, level of education 
and type of residence). Hungarian citizens of 18 years of age or older who live in Hungary 
provided the population for the survey sample. Based on the above information, it is 
possible to determine the probability of inclusion of an individual into the sample. 
Primary sampling units were settlements – this was the fi rst step in sample selection 
– whereas the fi nal sampling units were defi ned in the second step of the sampling 
process using the population of the defi ned age group. 
The source for the selection of settlements was partly the T-STAR database 
purchased from the Central Statistical Offi  ce and partly the latest updated database of 
the registered population according to settlement and age group, purchased from the 
Central Offi  ce for Administrative and Electronic Public Services (COAEPS). 
For the two-stage sampling, the requirement that all members of the population 
should have an equal likelihood of featuring in the sample was best achieved by 
selecting the primary sampling units (settlements) with a frequency proportionate to 
their size, and then, within the chosen sampling units, selecting an equal number of 
persons with equal probability on a random basis. 
The second phase of sampling concerns the selection of persons for the sample. 
This was done using the electronic COAEPS database which contains results from the 
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2000 census and which was updated with the results of the 2005 microcensus, thus 
ensuring that the selection took place randomly. 
In the course of data collection it was considered a primary goal that the interviews 
should be conducted at the main addresses obtained from COAEPS. When the choice 
of main address needed to be changed, a new interviewee was sought in the closest 
possible vicinity to the originally chosen person, preferably in the next door house or 
fl at. The sex and age group of the new interviewee had to correspond to the ‘dropped’ 
person’s respective parameters which were featured on the address card. With these 
procedures it was ensured that the composition of the interviewees in terms of social 
and demographic parameters, and in terms of their opinions and attitudes as well, 
remained essentially similar. 
The survey was managed jointly by the head of opinion research and the main 
sociologist on the research team at Ipsos. Data collection work was coordinated by so-
called instructors (experienced members of staff  working within the operative section 
of Ipsos). 9 of them worked on this survey; 2 in Budapest and 7 in the countryside. 124 
interviewers worked on the survey in total. 
Data collection was done with CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing) 
method; i.e. following programming of the questionnaire, answers were collected by 
employees of the research company with the use of laptop computers in the period 
between 29 June and 4 July 2011.
Data collection was verifi ed at several levels. In the fi rst round – by checking 
through telephone – it was examined whether the socio-demographic parameters of 
the interviewees matched the information provided on the address card. In the second 
control phase (still during data collection) a supervisory group from Ipsos phoned 175 
randomly-selected interviewees, taking into account data related to the behaviour 
of the interviewers (e.g. the length of the interview, the sequence of questions and 
variance in the responses) that were signifi cantly and persistently diff erent from the 
average. Personal checks were undertaken in the case of 32 interviewees.
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY – SUB-SAMPLE OF IMMIGRANTS
In the fi rst phase, Ipsos ordered from COAEPS data about third country nationals 
who had immigrated to and settled down in Hungary, which included data on the 
immigrants’ country of birth and place of residence in Hungary. The data refl ected the 
situation on 1st January 2011. The managers of the project compared these data to a 
database derived from the Offi  ce of Immigration and Nationality and then structured 
the composition of the sample.
The database received from COAEPS contained persons who were living in Hungary 
with: 1. an immigration permit; 2. a permanent residence permit; or, 3. an interim 
permanent residence permit. Data about immigrants who were living in Hungary with: 
1. a residence permit; 2. a national permanent residence permit; or 3. an EC permanent 
residence permit were available through the Offi  ce of Immigration and Nationality.
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Ipsos Plc. asked for a randomly-selected address list from COAEPS calculating 
with four substitute addresses for each item. According to the submitted request, the 
list contained at least 18 year-old third-country nationals living in Hungary with an 
immigration or permanent residence permit – only one person per address was listed. 
(Places of birth: Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Canada, China, 
Croatia, South Korea, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia, Serbia-Montenegro, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia.) 
Ipsos’ order also specifi ed how many persons from a given settlement and a given 
country of origin should be randomly included in the sample. Based on the resulting 
list (containing the data, names, addresses and places of birth of 1115 persons), 223 
main addresses and accompanying substitute addresses were compiled randomly, 
according to the individual’s country of origin and settlement. However, the 1115-
item address list received from COAEPS was not enough to allow the making of 223 
interviews, as only 156 persons could be reached for the purpose of completing the 
questionnaire. Subsequently, the research coordinators together made the decision 
that for each invalid address, another person from the same country of origin should 
be found to complete the questionnaire. If no interviewee from that specifi c country 
could be found, the aim was to fi nd a person from the same continent.
The number of persons per country of origin to be included in the remaining 277-
item sub-sample was also defi ned in the case of the addresses available through the 
Offi  ce of Immigration and Nationality database. During negotiations with the OIN, the 
institution agreed to contact the immigrants based on the above-detailed information 
and, following their agreement, to hand to us such data as was relevant to our research 
eff orts. In the end, OIN was only able to provide the necessary data – name, contact 
details in Hungary (address, telephone number and email address) and country of 
origin – of 13 persons.
As the two address lists we received were not suffi  cient to enable completion of 500 
interviews, we decided to use the so-called snowball method, for which we identifi ed 
potential respondents in the following way: we gathered data on organizations 
(associations, minority organizations, cultural centres, other countries’ friendly societies 
in Hungary, etc.) and special locations (shops, restaurants, marketplaces, shopping 
centres – e.g. Asia Center – which are frequented by persons coming from the countries 
we specifi ed) where we would have a high chance of fi nding potential interviewees. 
Using the snowball method, we identifi ed 119 persons as starting points (so-called 
‘seeds’), out of whom 98 completed the questionnaire. 21 potential interviewees did 
not agree to take part in the interview. 
In the following we describe the number of links followed from each seed in the 
snowball sample: the seed took part in the interview but could not provide another 
interviewee: 52 cases; the seed participated and suggested someone else but the eff ort 
to involve the suggested person was not successful: 24 cases; the seed participated 
and suggested another person who was successfully contacted: 41 cases (the total 
number – higher than 98 – was because some seeds started several snowballs which 
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resulted in both successful and unsuccessful follow-ups). Other single-interview strings: 
the seed did not take part in the interview but suggested another person who agreed 
to take part in the survey but s/he did not suggest anyone else: 4 cases; the seed did 
not participate but suggested another person who did participate and this person also 
made a suggestion for a potential interviewee, which, however, was unsuccessful: 3 
cases; two-interview strings: the seed took part in the interview and suggested another 
interviewee who also agreed to participate; however, s/he did not recommend 
anybody else: 7 cases; the seed took part in the interview and the person suggested 
by them also successfully participated; however, the suggestion of the second person 
did not result in a successful interview: 7 cases; the seed did not participate in the 
research but recommended two other persons who did – but they did not recommend 
anyone else: 5 cases; the seed did not participate but suggested two other persons 
who did participate, they in turn suggested further potential interviewees; however, 
their suggestions did not prove fruitful: 5 cases; three-interview strings: the seed 
participated and suggested two persons who did as well but they did not suggest 
anyone else: 4 cases; the seed took part in the survey and recommended two more 
persons who also took part; their recommendations in turn did not prove successful: 3 
cases; the seed did not participate in the research but suggested 3 persons with whom 
successful interviews were made; their recommendations in turn were unsuccessful: 
2 cases; four-interview strings: the seed took part in the interview and recommended 
three persons who also did; their recommendations in turn were unsuccessful: 1 case; 
the seed did not participate in the interview but suggested four persons who did, but 
they in turn did not suggest anyone: 5 cases; the seed did not take part in the interview 
but recommended four persons who did; however, their recommendations in turn 
were unsuccessful: 1 case; six-interview strings: the seed took part in the interview and 
recommended fi ve persons who also did; they, however, did not recommend anyone 
else: 1 case.
As a result, 156 persons out of the sub-sample of 500 immigrants were involved in 
the questionnaire survey based on the COAEPS list (following the multi-stage sampling 
method according to settlement), while the other part of the sample, 344 persons, was 
recruited using the snowball method. 
Data from respondents were collected in face-to-face interviews in a paper-
based format. The instructors responsible for data collection checked whether the 
questionnaires were completed and then handed them over for processing. Subsequent 
verifi cation of the data through repeated meetings with the interviewees proved 
unviable after a few unsuccessful attempts. The reason for this was strong feelings of 
aversion from interviewees (we hypothesise that they refused to communicate with us 
any further as they thought that we were engaged in some sort of offi  cial follow-up in 
connection with their answers given in the earlier interview). They were alarmed and 
were not willing to take part in this phase of the research; we therefore stopped this 
type of checking procedure. 
Based on our experience with the survey of immigrants, in general it can be said 
that the interviewees partly understood the purpose of the research but they basically 
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remained suspicious of our intentions. Many of them were afraid that the interviewers 
were employed by the Offi  ce of Immigration and Nationality. The main reasons 
for refusing to be interviewed were based on this suspicion, and communication 
(language) problems. 
A basic problem with the address list provided by the COAEPS was a high number 
of invalid addresses; where the person who was registered at a certain place was not 
found to live there – either because they were just using the address as an offi  cial place 
of residence, or because they owned the place but did not actually live there. There 
were also a large number of addresses at which the assigned persons had never been 
seen, or whose inhabitants had already left Hungary. These persons were typically 
Serbian citizens (or citizens from the former Yugoslavia) who had either returned to 
their home countries or who had received Hungarian citizenship in the meantime.
WEIGHTING OF THE TWO SUB-SAMPLES 
The diff erences of the composition of the population and the sample were corrected 
using the so-called iterative weighting method. We utilised this method by comparing 
the actual sample proportions and the sample composition according to certain 
characteristics (separately, one after the other). If, at the fi rst stage, weighting only 
corrected the proportion of the 2 sexes, for instance, this could have changed the 
composition according to other characteristics and may have lead further away from 
representativity. Therefore, in the subsequent phases, weighting for other characteristics 
was carried out as well. The iteration process was continued until the distance in value 
of the weighting from 1 was minimized. 
The sub-sample of migrants was weighted for age groups and sex, while the sub-
sample of Hungarian citizens was weighted for sex, age grouping, education and type 
of settlement. 
FOCUS GROUPS
Two focus group discussions were carried out within the frame of this research. The 
two, three-hour long, 8-member focus group discussions took place on 17–18 August 
2011 and were organized by Ipsos Ltd. Participants of the discussions were recruited 
using the help of a fi lter questionnaire. Apart from the concrete fi ltering questions that 
were relevant to the research topic, some other standard fi ltering criteria were also 
used. For this research – just as in the case of any other similar research – we excluded 
those potential participants (or close family members living in the same household) – 
who have had experience with market research or who had personally taken part in any 
other focus group discussion or in-depth interview during the previous 12 months, or 
who had ever participated in any research related to social inclusion and integration. 
Furthermore, we did not recruit anyone for the group discussion who would have had 
the opportunity to publicize the content of the interviews in the media. 
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The fi lter questionnaire contained, apart from questions related to the fi lter criteria 
and demographic aspects, some questions about basic background information 
connected to the research. Apart from the use of the fi lter questionnaire, the standard 
quality of the sampling process was also guaranteed by use of a detailed quota for the 
composition of the groups. 
Recruitment, fi ltering and verifi cation happened in four stages:
1.  Recruitment: selection of participants on the basis of the fi lter questionnaire.
2.  Data verifi cation: based on the completed questionnaire, selected participants 
were phoned and the data they provided were verifi ed.
3.  Checking of availability: on the day of the focus group discussion the recruited 
persons’ participation in the discussion was checked. 
4.  Subsequent fi ltering: those who were present at the event were asked to fi ll in 
a questionnaire (to be self-completed) containing the same questions as the 
fi lter questionnaire, in order to verify the answers they had earlier given. As we 
intended to avoid including persons who may have known each other, this 
subsequent fi ltering phase also provided the opportunity to fi lter these people 
out. This proved necessary because two participants who were Serbian nationals 
knew each other from their early school days, so – although both of them 
fulfi lled the requirements to participate– only one of them was asked to join 
the discussion. In order to be able to guarantee smoothly fl owing focus group 
discussions and the representation of individuals from the required countries of 
origin, we recruited more participants. ‘Over-recruitment’ of 14 persons for each 
group discussion made it possible for us to conduct the group discussions and 
meet all of our criteria. 
Each phase of the fi ltering process was carried out by a diff erent member of the 
research team. All in all, recruiting the participants for the immigrant group proved 
to be a much more diffi  cult task for our coordinators. Finding potential participants 
was not as problematic as ‘convincing’/inviting them to participate. Our organizers had 
diffi  culties with recruiting participants from Far Eastern countries who were generally 
unwilling to participate (or/and who, on the agreed date, did not appear and who then 
could not be reached through telephone). Consequently, the previously decided-upon 
quota was slightly modifi ed and no participants from the Far East were present during 
the group discussion. 
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Appendix 2
QUESTIONNAIRE
INTRODUCTION/ TITLE OF AND REASON FOR STAYING IN HUNGARY
Subsample1
1 – host society 
2 – immigrants
Immigrants
1.  With what status (with what kind of permit) are you living in Hungary? 
SHOW CARD. ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE
1 – residence permit,
2 – immigration permit,
3 – permanent residence permit,
4 – interim permanent residence permit
5 – national permanent residence permit, or
6 – EC permanent residence permit?
7 – other, namely: ……………………………… 
8 – Hungarian citizen  FINISH THE INTERVIEW!
9 – DK  FINISH THE INTERVIEW!
Immigrants
2. Which year did you arrive to Hungary?
……. year 
X –
Immigrants
3.  From which country did you come to Hungary?
SHOW CARD. ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (NATIVE) IS TO BE GIVEN
1 The questions apply to both sub-samples, unless otherwise indicated: 
[Immigrants] >> question to be asked of immigrants only
[Host society] >> question to be asked of the host society sub-sample only
01 – Croatia
02 – Serbia
03 – Russia
04 – Turkey
05 – Ukraine
06 – Israel
07 – Japan
08 – China
09 – Mongolia
10 – Syria
11 – Vietnam
12 – United States
13 – Canada
14 – Libya
15 – Other, namely: 
…………………
X –
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Immigrants 
4.  Which country are you a citizen of? SHOW CARD. IF THE INTERVIEWEE HAS 
DUAL CITIZENSHIP, BOTH SHOULD BE INDICATED. HUNGARIAN CITIZENSHIP 
Immigrants
5. What is your mother tongue? SHOW CARD. MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE.
Immigrants
6. Why did you decide to leave your native country?
Immigrants
7.  What was the main reason that made you choose Hungary as your 
destination? ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE, NAME THE MOST IMPORTANT
1 –  marriage 
2 –  family reunifi cation 
3 –  permanent settlement for other than family reasons
4 –  work 
5 –  study 
6 –  came with parents when still a minor 
7 –  other reason, namely: ………………………………….
9  –  DK X  –  
01 – Croatia
02 – Serbia
03 – Russia
04 – Turkey
05 – Ukraine
06 – Israel
07 – Japan
08 – China
09 – Mongolia
10 – Syria
11 – Vietnam
12 – United States
13 – Canada
14 – Libya
15 – Other, namely:
…………………………………
X –
01 – Croatian
02 – Serbian
03 – Russian
04 – Turkish
05 – Ukrainian
06 – Hebrew
07 – Japanese
08 – Chinese
09 – Mongolian
10 – Arabic
11 – Vietnamese
12 – English
13 – Hungarian
14 – Other, namely:
…………………………………
X –
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Immigrants
8. Why did you choose Hungary as your destination? 
ACTION POTENTIAL, INCLINATION FOR POLITICAL AND CIVIC 
PARTICIPATION
Host society
9. Do you live in the settlement in which you were born?
1  –  yes  2  –  no   9  –  DK X  –  
10. Are you planning to move to another settlement?
1  –  yes  2  –  no   9  –  DK X  –  
11. Have you been abroad (outside Hungary) in the past 5 years?
1  –  yes  2  –  no   9  –  DK X  –  
12.  Have you lived abroad (outside your native country and Hungary) for over 
three months?
1  –  yes 2  –  no   9  –  DK X  –  
13. Can you imagine relocating to another country?
1  –  yes 2  –  no   9  –  DK X  –  
14.  Are you planning to live abroad (outside Hungary and your native country) in 
the near future (within 1-2 years)?
1  –  yes 2  –  no   9  –  DK X  –  
Immigrants
15. Would you gladly move back to your native country?
1  –  yes  2  –  no   9  –  DK X  –  
IF NOT AN ENTREPRENEUR:
16. Would you like to be an entrepreneur? DON’T OFFER OPTIONS!
1  –  yes 2  –  no   3  –  it depends 4 – I am one 9  –  DK X  –  
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QUESTION TO EVERYONE:
17.  (Putting the question in another way): if you had two options, which would 
you prefer? 
1 – to be an employee, or " GO TO 18
2 – to be an entrepreneur " GO TO 19
3 – neither " GO TO 20
9 – DK " GO TO 20
 X –  
18. If you would prefer to be an employee, why?
DON’T READ OUT, CODE THE SPONTANEOUS ANSWERS!
a) regular, fi xed income/ stable job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
b) fi xed working time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
c) social security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
d) has no idea/possibility to go into business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
e) has no fi nancial resources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
f ) has no skills needed, doesn’t know how to go about it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
g) too diffi  cult to change back, gets chained to the business  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
h) habits, customs, never thought of going into business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
i) because of offi  cial, administrative diffi  culties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
j) if unsuccessful, he/she would be afraid of legal, social consequences . . . . . . . . . 10
k) other reasons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
l) DK/NA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
19. If you would prefer to be an entrepreneur, why?
DON’T READ OUT! CODE THE SPONTANEOUS ANSWERS
a) independence, self-realization, intriguing tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
b) business opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
c) better income prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
d) freedom to decide how and where to work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
e) there are no good jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
f ) there are self-employed among friends/family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
g) favourable economic climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
h) to avoid uncertainties implied by employment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
i) other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
j) DK/NA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
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IF THE INTERVIEWEE IS NOT AN ENTREPENEUR:
20.  How attractive is the idea to you personally of becoming an entrepreneur in 
the next fi ve years?
1. not attractive at all
2. not very attractive
3. rather attractive
4. very attractive
9. DK/NA
IF HE/SHE IS NOT AN ENTREPRENEUR:
21.  Ignoring now your opinion about the attractiveness of being an entrepreneur, 
how feasible is it to become an entrepreneur?
1. not feasible at all
2. not very feasible
3. fairly feasible
4. perfectly feasible
9. DK/NA
22.  Here are some diff erent forms of political and social action that people can 
take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these 
things in the past fi ve years. SHOW CARD
Have done Haven’t done DK
Contacted a politician or a civil servant 2 1 9 X
Attended a political meeting or a rally of a 
political party
2 1 9 X
Participated in the work of a political 
organization or movement
2 1 9 X
Worn or displayed a campaign badge or 
sticker
2 1 9 X
Signed a petition 2 1 9 X
Taken part in a public demonstration 2 1 9 X
Boycotted certain products 2 1 9 X
Bought certain products for political, 
ethical or environmental reasons
2 1 9 X
Donated money to a political organization 2 1 9 X
Participated in illegal protest activities 2 1 9 X
Contacted or appeared in the press to 
express your views
2 1 9 X
Phoned into a radio programme 2 1 9 X
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23.  Suppose a law were being considered by the Parliament that you considered 
to be unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting 
alone or together with others, would be able to do something about it? SHOW 
CARD
1 – very likely,
2 – fairly likely,
3 – not very likely, or
4 – not at all likely?
9 – DK
X – 
24.  Do you currently participate actively in or do voluntary work for one or 
more of the following organizations? SHOW CARD. MULTIPLE ANSWERS 
POSSIBLE
Mentioned
Not 
mentioned
A sports club or club for outdoor activities 
(recreational organization)
1 0 X
A cultural or leisure association 1 0 X
A trade union 1 0 X
A business or professional organization 1 0 X
A political party or organization 1 0 X
A social movement, NGO 1 0 X
A religious or church organization 1 0 X
A local organization, association for the local 
community
1 0 X
A charity or social aid organization 1 0 X
A voluntary cooperative for house building 1 0 X
An organization for environmental 
protection
1 0 X
The organization of a local community event 1 0 X
The organization of a local sport event 1 0 X
Host society
25.  If there was a general election this Sunday, can you tell me if you would vote? 
SHOW CARD
1 – would vote for sure,
2 – would probably vote,
3 – would probably not vote, or
4 – would not vote for sure
9 – DK  X –
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26.  And if there was a local election this Sunday, can you tell me if you would 
vote? SHOW CARD
1 – would vote for sure,
2 – would probably vote,
3 – would probably not vote, or
4 – would not vote for sure
8 – Is not eligible to vote
9 – DK   X –
27.  Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10, how much you personally trust each of the 
following institutions to usually make the right decisions. ‘0’ means that “you 
do not trust an institution at all” and ‘10’ means “you have complete trust”.
ROTATED! No trust at all Complete trust
Don’t 
know the 
institution
DK
the Hungarian 
Parliament
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 88 99 X
the Police 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 88 99 X
the Hungarian 
Government
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 88 99 X
the Hungarian Offi  ce 
of Immigration and 
Nationality
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 88 99 X
The local 
government
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 88 99 X
28.  Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where ‘0’ means “the 
left” and ‘10’ means “the right”? SHOW CARD
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
left right
99  –  DK X  –  
29.  How interested would you say you personally are in politics? SHOW CARD
5 – very interested, 
4 – fairly interested, 
3 – neither interested nor uninterested, 
2 – not very interested, or 
1 – not at all interested 
9 – DK   X – 
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30.  On average, how often do you obtain political news or information through… 
SHOW CARD
Every day or 
nearly every 
day
Several 
times a 
week
Once or 
twice a 
week
Less 
often
Never or 
nearly 
never
DK
1. the Internet? 5 4 3 2 1 9 X 
2. daily papers? 5 4 3 2 1 9 X 
3. weekly papers? 5 4 3 2 1 9 X 
4. radio? 5 4 3 2 1 9 X 
5. television? 5 4 3 2 1 9 X 
31.  How much do you follow the political, social and economic news in Hungary? 
SHOW CARD
5 – very much, 
4 – quite a lot
3 – somewhat, 
2 – a little, or 
1 – not at all 
9 – DK   X – 
Immigrants
32.  How much do you follow the political, social and economic news of your 
country of origin? SHOW CARD
5 – very much, 
4 – quite a lot, 
3 – somewhat, 
2 – a little, or  
1 – not at all  " GO TO 34
9 – DK   X – " GO TO 34
Immigrants
33. How do you stay informed of events? MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE
1 – through the media of my country
2 – through the media in Hungary 
3 – through the international media, or 
4 – through personal contacts?
5 – through other channels, namely: ……………………
9 – DK  X – 
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IDENTITY
34.  We are all a part of diff erent groups. Some are more important to us than 
others when we think of ourselves. In general, which from the following list 
is most important to you in describing who you are? And the second most 
important? And the third most important? SHOW CARD
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K
Your occupation 1 2 3 8 9 X
Your nationality 1 2 3 8 9 X
Your gender (that is, being a man or a 
woman) 
1 2 3 8 9 X
Your age group (that is, being young or old) 1 2 3 8 9 X
Your religion 1 2 3 8 9 X
Your preferred political party 1 2 3 8 9 X
Your ethnic background 1 2 3 8 9 X
Your social class 1 2 3 8 9 X
The town or city where you live 1 2 3 8 9 X
Being European 1 2 3 8 9 X
35. How close do you feel to … SHOW CARD
Ve
ry
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 c
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K
1. Your town or city 4 3 2 1 9 X
2. Hungary 4 3 2 1 9 X
[Immigrants]
3. Your country of origin 
4 3 2 1 9 X
4. Europe 4 3 2 1 9 X
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OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING, SOCIAL RESOURCES
36.  How satisfi ed are you with the following things: if not at all, say 0, if you are 
perfectly satisfi ed, say 10. How satisfi ed are you with … SHOW CARD
ROTATED! Not satisfi ed at all Perfectly satisfi ed DK
your standard of living? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
your housing situation? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
the surroundings of your 
housing?
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
IF DOESN’T WORK= X
     your work?
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
IF DOESN’T WORK= X
    your career?
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
your household income? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
your fi nancial situation? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
your state of health? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
public order and 
security?
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
your friendships? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
your family life? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
your future prospects? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
your social recognition, 
prestige?
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
Immigrants
37.  Do you think you’d be better or worse off  if you had remained in your country 
of origin, or you’d be in the same situation as regards your… ROTATED!
be
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er
w
or
se
th
e 
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e
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K
a. fi nancial situation? 1 2 3 9 X
b. housing? 1 2 3 9 X
c. work career? 1 2 3 9 X
d. friends? 1 2 3 9 X
e. family life? 1 2 3 9 X
f. social recognition, prestige? 1 2 3 9 X
g. feeling of being at home? 1 2 3 9 X
h. health? 1 2 3 9 X
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38.  Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people? SHOW CARD
1  –  People can almost always be trusted.
2  –  People can usually be trusted.
3  –  You usually can’t be too careful in dealing with people.
4  –  You almost always can’t be too careful in dealing with people.
9  – DK   X –
39.  Some people are often afraid, some never. How often are you afraid? 
SHOW CARD
1  –  never,
2  –  rarely
3  –  often, or
4  –  very often?
9  – DK   X –
40.  When you get together with your friends, relatives or fellow workers, how 
often do you discuss politics?… 
3  –  Often, 
2  –  rarely, or 
1  –  never? 
9  – DK   X –
41. Altogether, how many friends do you have at home (in Hungary) or abroad?
………………friends
00  –  have no friends
X  –  
42. Are there foreigners (non-Hungarians) among your friends? 
1  –  there are 2  –  there aren’t   9  –  DK X  –  
Immigrants
43. Are there Hungarians among your friends? 
1  –  there are 2  –  there aren’t   9  –  DK X  –  
44. If you had to choose, who would you befriend:
1  –  someone from your own social stratum, or 
2  –  someone of your own nationality? 
3 – other answer:
9  – DK   X –
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45.  Please think of a seven-step ladder. On the top step stand the happiest people 
(7), on the bottom the most unhappy people (1). On which step do you stand 
on this seven-step ladder? SHOW CARD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
most unhappy happiest
people people
9  –  DK  X  –  
46. How true of you are the statements below:  SHOW CARD
ROTATED!
Perfectly 
true
Partly true
Not really 
true
Not true 
at all
DK
You often feel tired, exhausted. 4 3 2 1 9 X
You often feel lonely. 4 3 2 1 9 X
If you want to achieve 
something, you are forced 
to break some rules. 
4 3 2 1 9 X
Things are too complicated 
nowadays to see clearly.
4 3 2 1 9 X
You can hardly infl uence 
the course of your life.
4 3 2 1 9 X
47.  In Hungary some people have high social status, some have low. Please 
defi ne your place on a scale where 0 marks the lowest social status and 10 
marks the highest. SHOW CARD
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
lowest highest
social status social status
99  –  DK X  –  
DISTRIBUTIVE AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
48.  With which of the following statements do you most agree? SHOW CARD. 
ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE
1 –  Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its 
functioning.
2 – Everyone should partake equally of goods produced.
3 –  Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, 
and should get as much as they need.
9 – DK
X – 
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49.  What do you think of your own situation? Do you think on the whole you 
get more from society than you contribute to common expenditure, or do 
you contribute more than you get? ”0” means you get much more than you 
contribute, “10” means you contribute much more than you get. SHOW CARD
gets much 
more than 
contributes
contributes 
much more 
than gets
doesn’t 
know
refuses 
to 
answer
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 88 77
50.  How true is the statement that ”politicians are fair to people like you in their 
decisions?” ”0” means you don’t agree with this statement at all, and ”10” 
means you fully agree with it. SHOW CARD
Not true 
at all 
Perfectly true 
doesn’t 
know
refuses to 
answer
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 88 77
51.  We would like to know what your general impression was of the administration 
processes of Hungarian offi  ces when you had to arrange something. How 
true are the statements below? SHOW CARD
NOT ROTATED
Perfectly 
true
Partly 
true
Neither 
true nor 
untrue
Rather 
not 
true
Not 
true at 
all
DK
a
The offi  ce explained its 
decisions adequately.
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
b
It was clear what the rules 
were in the situation and 
what you had to do.
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
c
On the whole your matter 
was dealt with according to 
the rules.
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
d
A client in a similar 
situation would have been 
treated similarly. 
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
e
The offi  ce did its best to 
solve your situation.
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
f
You were treated with due 
respect.
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
g
The matter was solved 
favourably for you.  
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
h
The solution was 
acceptable to you.
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
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HUMAN DIGNITY
52.How true are the following statements of you? SHOW CARD
ROTATED
Perfectly 
true
Partly 
true
Neither 
true nor 
untrue
Rather 
not true
Not 
true at 
all
DK
a
When I am suff ering 
physically, people (other than 
my family) around me usually 
do not know it
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
b
When things go wrong 
around me I usually do not 
blame others.
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
c
I have control over life 
decisions and choices, such 
as where to work or when I 
can leave home
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
d
I treat people the same way I 
like to be treated by them 
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
e
Until now, I have been 
pleased with what I have 
accomplished so far
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
f
I make an important 
contribution to my 
community 
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
g I am free to act on my beliefs 5 4 3 2 1 9 X
h
I have a high sense of self-
respect 
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
i
Other people treat me with 
respect 
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
j
I do not feel I need to depend 
on other people around me 
to get things done
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
k
I feel that I am not a burden 
on my friends/family 
members
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
l I try to overcome adversity 5 4 3 2 1 9 X
m
I have the freedom to 
exercise my rights as a 
human being 
5 4 3 2 1 9 X
n I respect other people 5 4 3 2 1 9 X
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CULTURAL / MATERIAL RESOURCES
53.  Do you know a foreign language at least at intermediate level, beside your 
mother tongue? 
1 – yes------------------------- >  Which language? 
SHOW CARD. MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE
01 – Romani  06 – Russian 11 – Ukrainian
02 – Czech 07 – Romanian 12 – English
03 – Croatian 08 – Serbian 13 – French
04 – Hungarian 09 – Slovakian 14 – Italian
05 – German 10 – Slovenian 15 – Spanish
  16 – other: 
2 – no 
X – refused to answer 
54. Which of the following statements applies to you most? SHOW CARD 
1 – I am religious, I follow the teachings of the church  
2 – I am religious in my own way  
3 – I can’t say if I am religious or not  
4 – I am not religious  " GO TO 56
5 – I have a diff erent conviction, I am defi nitely not religious  " GO TO 56
6 – other, namely:………………….  " GO TO 56
X –  
55. Which religion or denomination do you feel you belong to? SHOW CARD 
1 – Roman Catholic 
2 – Calvinist
3 – Lutheran
4 – Greek Catholic
5 – Jewish
6 – Baptist, Adventist, other minor denominations
7 – Muslim
8 – Buddhist
9 – other religion, namely: …………………………………
10 – belongs to no denomination
88 – doesn’t answer
99 – DK
X – 
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56. By which right do you live at your current residence?
01 – as owner
02 – as usufructuary
03 – as tenant, partner of tenant
04 – apartment sharer
05 – as supporter on a support-for-life contract
06 – as family member
07 – as occupant without title
08 – by courtesy (e.g. for work)
09 – as subtenant
10 – other
99 – DK
X –
57. How many people live in the apartment/part of the apartment/house?
………………. people
99 – doesn’t know
X -
58. In your fl at/part of fl at/house is there…. THAT YOU ARE ABLE TO USE!
there is there isn’t DK
1. … electricity? 1 0 9 X
2. … running water? 1 0 9 X
3. … permanent hot water? 1 0 9 X
4. … a bathroom? 1 0 9 X
5. …  mains sewerage system (no 
cesspit)? 
1 0 9 X
6. …  local sewerage system (e.g. 
cesspit)? 
1 0 9 X
7. … water closet? 1 0 9 X
8. … central or district heating? 1 0 9 X
9. … piped gas? 1 0 9 X
10. … gas cylinder? 1 0 9 X
11. … electric or gas heating? 1 0 9 X
12. … a telephone? 1 0 9 X
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59. Before you came to Hungary was there…. in your fl at/part of fl at/house?
yes no DK
1. … electricity? 1 0 9 X
2. … running water? 1 0 9 X
3. … permanent hot water? 1 0 9 X
4. … a bathroom? 1 0 9 X
5. … mains sewerage system (no cesspit)? 1 0 9 X
6. … local sewerage system (e.g. cesspit)? 1 0 9 X
7. … water closet? 1 0 9 X
8. … central or district heating? 1 0 9 X
9. … piped gas? 1 0 9 X
10. … gas cylinder? 1 0 9 X
11. … electric or gas heating? 1 0 9 X
12. … a telephone? 1 0 9 X
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND (OMNIBUS)
CHECK USING DATA ON ADDRESS CARD!
D1. GENDER OF RESPONDENT:
1 – Male
2 – Female
CHECK USING DATA ON ADDRESS CARD!
D2.  Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about your household that are 
necessary for processing of the data. Which year were you born?
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IF HE/SHE IS BELOW TWENTY, HE/SHE CAN’T HAVE OBTAINED A TERTIARY 
DIPLOMA (CODES 10, 11). IF HE/SHE IS BELOW 21, HE/SHE CAN’T HAVE 
OBTAINED A UNIVERSITY DIPLOMA (CODE 11).
D3.  Finally, I should like to ask you a few questions about your household that 
are necessary for the processing of the data. 
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
COURSES, MARXIST UNIVERSITY DOESN’T COUNT!
01 – didn’t go to school
02 – fi nished grades 1-5 (elementary)
03 – grades 6-7 (elementary)
04 – less than 8 grades
05 –  8 primary grades (before WW2: 4 common school or 4 lower secondary 
grades, now: also 9th-10th grades, unterminated secondary school)
06 –  vocational training certifi cate, certifi cate of mastership or apprenticeship 
07 – specialized secondary school certifi cate (unfi nished tertiary education)
08 – general secondary school certifi cate (unfi nished higher education)
09 –  vocational training conditional upon secondary school certifi cate (not trade 
exam!), industrial technical school, higher training not accredited to give diploma
10 – college diploma, higher technical school
11 – university diploma
N – doesn’t know
V – refuses to answer
D4. Do you work, do you undertake regular-income earning activity?
2 – Yes
1 – No
N – DK
V – NA
D5. At present are you:
1 – an active earner (assistant family member, too),
2 – on pregnancy, maternity or parental leave,
3 – retired, an old-age pensioner (by own right), widow’s pensioner,
4 – disability pensioner (before retirement age),
5 – unemployed,
6 – student or
7 –  housewife, other inactive earner (you live on your wealth; let out 
property, fl at; only have contract of support for life or annuity), other 
dependent (living on social aid, in an institution, supported by children 
only, disabled)?
V – refused to answer
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D6. Your (last) place of work is (was):
1 –  in the private sector (self-employed, at a partnership, Ltd., Plc., cooperative, etc.),
2 – government, local government, budgetary organ, institution,
3 –  civil organization (foundation, association, non-profi t company) or———  8. 
9 – never had a job? ———  11. 
N – DK
V – NA
D7. Regarding your occupation, do/did you mainly work(ed) as an:
ONLY ONE POSSIBLE ANSWER, INDICATE THE MORE TYPICAL!
1 – employee, or 
2 – entrepreneur, owner?
N – DK
V – NA
D8. You will see occupational categories on the screen.
D9.  What is (was) your (last) job, position? Please read the categories on the 
screen and help me to classify your occupation. If you have (had) several jobs, 
choose the one that is (was) the source of your highest permanent income!
01 –  high-prestige independent intellectual work in own enterprise (e.g. 
freelance journalist, private doctor, lawyer, architect, accountant, 
software specialist, etc.)
02 –  have agricultural undertaking, producer, self-employed farmer, primary 
producer
03 – owner of other enterprise without employees
04 – owner of other enterprise with 1-5 employees
05 – owner of other enterprise with 6 or more employees
11 – senior manager with a staff  of 6 or more 
12 – senior manager with a staff  of 5 or fewer
13 – mid-level manager with a staff  of 5 or more
14 – mid-level manager with a staff  of 5 or fewer
15 –  diploma-holder employed in the public sphere (civil servant, state 
employee with diploma)
16 – diploma-holder employed in the competitive sphere
17 – offi  ce worker in the public sphere (civil servant, state employee)
18 – offi  ce worker in the competitive sphere
19 –  neither blue collar nor white collar worker (travel, services, customer-
visiting, teleworking)
20 – skilled employee doing light physical work (nurse, manual assistant)
21 – skilled worker doing physical labour
22 –  semi-skilled and unskilled worker, physical assistant, household employee
77 –  never had a job (e.g. unemployed from the beginning) —————  11. 
N – DK
V – NA
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D10.  Which sector of the economy does your (past) workplace belong to? Please 
read the sectors on the screen that will help you classify your workplace.
01 –  agriculture (game management, forestry, fi sheries, crop production, 
livestock)
02 –  industry (mining, manufacturing, engineering, chemical industry, heavy 
industry, food industry)
03 – energy industry (electricity, gas, steam, hydroelectricity)
04 – construction
05 – retail and wholesale trade
06 – catering, tourism (accommodation)
07 –  transport (people and goods), newscasting, telecommunication, postal 
services, storage, water management
08 – fi nancial services (banking, insurance)
09 –  economic services (rent, real estate, information technologies, research-
development, market research, legal and security activity)
10 –  government, administration, public services, protection (army, fi re 
brigades), compulsory social insurance
11 –  education, culture
12 – health care, welfare services
13 –  other community, personal services (churches, representative bodies, 
entertainment, sport, hairdresser, shoemaker, waste treatment, etc.)
N – DK
V – NA
D11.  What is your net income (that you actually receive) (work salary/pension/
scholarship) per month? Please add all extra income (from part/time work, 
occasional income, etc.)
 ___________________HUF
000 – no income
N – doesn’t know
V – refuses to answer
D12.  Now I turn the screen to you again. You will see income categories. I would 
like to ask you to select and mark the category that best describes your 
monthly income. Sign the circle next to the right category by moving the 
blue highlight to the right answer and pressing the widest (space) key.
TURN THE SCREEN TO THE INTERVIEWEE!
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TO THOSE WHO COULDN’T GIVE AN ANSWERTO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION
(ANY OF CODES V, N, X)!
D13.  You can see income categories on the screen. I would like to ask you to select 
and mark the one to which your monthly income belongs!
PLEASE TURN THE SCREEN BACK TO THE INTERVIEWER WHEN YOU HAVE 
ANSWERED THE QUESTION!
 01 – less than 30,000 HUF
 02 – 30,001 – 45,000 HUF 
 03 – 45,001 – 60,000 HUF
 04 – 60,001 – 75,000 HUF
 05 – 75,001 – 90,000 HUF
 06 – 90,001 – 110,000 HUF
 07 – 110,001 – 150,000 HUF
 08 – 150,001 – 200,000 HUF
 09 – 200,001 – 250,000 HUF
 10 – 250,001 – 300,000 HUF
 11 – 300,001 – 350,000 HUF
 12 – 350,001 – 400,000 HUF
 13 – 400,001 – 450,000 HUF
 14 – 450,001 – 500,000 HUF
 15 – 500,001 – 750,000 HUF
 16 – 750,001 – 1,000,000 HUF
 17 – 1,000,001 – 1,500,000 HUF
 18 – 1,500,001 – 2,000,000 HUF
 19 – Above 2 million HUF
 0 – no income
 N – DK
 V – NA
D14. What is your marital status?
REGISTER THE ACTUAL STATUS, NOT THE LEGAL STATUS!
 1 – single, unmarried
 2 – married, living alone
 3 – divorced, living alone
 4 – windowed, living alone
 5 – unmarried, living with partner
 6 – married, living with spouse
 7 – married, living with partner
 8 – divorced, living with partner
 9 – widowed, living with partner
 V – refused to answer
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D15. How many people live in your household (sharing costs) including you?
 1 – lives alone ————  33. 
 2 – 2
 3 – 3
 4 – 4
 5 – 5
 6 – 6
 7 – 7
 8 – 8
 9 – 9 or more
 V – refused to answer
THOSE PERSONS UNDER 18 MUST NUMBER FEWER THAN THE SIZE OF 
HOUSEHOLD.
D16. How many of them are under 18?
 _________________
 V – refused to answer
D18.  Please tell me how your family is composed. Which category describes best 
the form of household you live in?
 1 – married (unmarried) couple
 2 – married/unmarried couple + child(ren)
 3 – single parent + child(ren)
 4 – grandparent(s) + grandchild(ren)
 5 – grandparent(s) + parent(s) + child(ren)
 6 – other composition
 N – DK
 V – NA
D19.  How much is the net income of your household per month? Please include 
your own net income, too. Please add each income: family allowance, child 
support, market garden sales, second job, etc.!
 ___________________HUF
N – doesn’t know
V – refused to answer
D20.  Now I turn the screen to you again. You will see income categories. I would 
like to ask you to select and mark the category that best describes your 
monthly income. Mark the circle next to the correct category by moving the 
blue highlight to the right answer and pressing the widest (space) key.
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D21.  On the screen you can see income categories. Please classify and indicate 
your household’s net income per month using the right category!
AFTER MARKING THE ANSWER PLEASE TURN THE SCREEN TO THE 
INTERVIEWER!
 01 – less than 30,000 HUF
 02 – 30,001 – 45,000 HUF
 03 – 45,001 – 60,000 HUF
 04 – 60,001 – 75,000 HUF
 05 – 75,001 – 90,000 HUF
 06 – 90,001 – 110,000 HUF
 07 – 110,001 – 150,000 HUF
 08 – 150,001 – 200,000 HUF
 09 – 200,001 – 250,000 HUF
 10 – 250,001 – 300,000 HUF
 11 – 300,001 – 350,000 HUF
 12 – 350,001 – 400,000 HUF
 13 – 400,001 – 450,000 HUF
 14 – 450,001 – 500,000 HUF
 15 – 500,001 – 750,000 HUF
 16 – 750,001 – 1,000,000 HUF
 17 – 1,000,001 – 1,500,000 HUF
 18 – 1,500,001 – 2,000,000 HUF
 19 – more than 2 million HUF
 00 – no income
 N – DK
 V – NA
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D33.  Now I would like to ask you about your household equipment. 
How many do you have/use of the following items:
ALSO TO BE MENTIONED ARE ITEMS OWNED BY FIRM BUT ALSO USED 
PRIVATELY!
0-9  pcs
N – DK
V – NA
01. personal computer (PC)/laptop? 61
02. regular camera? 62
03. camcorder? 63
04. colour TV? 64
05. electric stir fryer? 65
06. VCR? 66
07 radio alarm clock? 67
08. electric drill? 68
09. car that is less than 3 years old? 69
10. car that is more than 3 years old? 70
11. holiday cottage, weekend house,piece of land? 71
12. bank-/credit card? 72
13. CD-player? 73
14. digital camera? 74
15. DVD-player? 75
16. Discman? 76
17. valuable art object? 
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D34. I would like to ask a few more questions about your household’s equipment.
How many do you have/use of the following items:
ISDN TELEPHONE LINE COUNTS AS TWO LINES!
0-9 PCS
N – DK
V – NA
01. automatic washing machine? 77
02. bank account? 78
03. HI-FI stereo equipment? 79
04. cable TV? 80
05. cassette player? 81
06. freezer? 82
07. MP3 player? 83
08. mobile phone? 84
09. TV with remote control? 85
10. landline telephone? 86
11. TV with teletext? 87
12. walkman? 88
13. gaming console (wii, xbox, playstation, Nintendo DS) 89
14. GPS navigation system 90
15. home movie system 91
16. TV set apt for digital broadcasting (hdtv) 92
17. adapter for digital broadcasting (set top box) 93
18. plasma TV 94
19. LCD TV 95
20. LED TV 96
21. 3D TV 97
22. blue ray player 98
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D33b.  Before you came to Hungary, did you have the following items in your 
household:
ALSO TO BE MENTIONED ARE ITEMS OWNED BY FIRM BUT ALSO USED 
PRIVATELY!
1 yes
2 no
9 DK
01. personal computer (PC)/laptop? 61
02. regular camera? 62
03. camcorder? 63
04. colour TV? 64
05. electric stir fryer? 65
06. VCR? 66
07. radio alarm clock? 67
08. electric drill? 68
09. car that is younger than 3 years? 69
10. car that is older than 3 years? 70
11. holiday cottage,piece of land? 71
12. bank/ credit card? 72
13. CD-player? 73
14. digital camera? 74
15. DVD-player? 75
16. Discman? 76
17. valuable art object? 
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D34b.  Just a few more questions: before you came to Hungary, did you have in 
your household any of the following:
ISDN TELEPHONE LINE COUNTS AS TWO LINES!
1 yes
2 no
9 DK
01. automatic washing machine? 77
02. bank account? 78
03. HI-FI stereo equipment? 79
04. cable TV? 80
05. cassette player? 81
06. freezer? 82
07. MP3 player? 83
08. mobile phone? 84
09. TV with remote control? 85
10. landline telephone? 86
11. TV with teletext? 87
12. walkman? 88
13. gaming console (wii, xbox, playstation, Nintendo DS) 89
14. GPS navigation system 90
15. home movie system 91
16. TV set suitable for digital broadcasting (HDTV) 92
17. adapter for digital broadcasting (set top box) 93
18. plasma TV 94
19. LCD TV 95
20. LED TV 96
21. 3D TV 97
22. blue ray player 98
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60.  Please assess again your current and earlier living conditions. Where would 
you place them on a scale where 0 means the worst and 10 means the best 
living conditions? SHOW CARD
 worst best DK
a. current living 
conditions? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
b. living conditions
before relocation? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 99 X
IT1.  Now I’d like to ask you about another thing
Do you personally have access to the Internet:
2 – yes
1 – no
N – DK
V – NA
1. at home?  9
2. at work?  10
7. at home?  11
3. at a friends, acquaintances?  12
4. at a relation’s place, family member?  13
5. in a public place, e.g. café, library?  14
6. at another place?  15
8. and do you have access to mobile internet?  16
IT2. How often do you use the Internet:
7 – every day, almost every day,
6 – several times a week,
5 – once a week,
4 – several times a month,
3 – once a month,
2 – less frequently
1 – never?
N – DK
V – NA
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QUESTIONS TO THE INTERVIEWER
K 6. DON’T ASK, JUST RECORD! Type of house/apartment in which the interviewee lives:
Village:
01 – village emergency housing
02 – solitary homestead
03 – traditional farmhouse
04 – Modernized renovated traditional farmhouse
05 – village family residence with a garden
06 – house with several fl ats (city type)
07 – multi-storied new house
08 – cottage with garden in a city
09 – other house in village, i.e.:
City:
10 – small-garden house (with one home) in small town/suburb
11 – small-garden house (with several homes) in small town/suburb
12 – city emergency housing (temporary dwelling, hovel, premises of a shop) 
13 – old apartment house fl at looking onto a yard
14 – old apartment house fl at looking onto the street
15 – fl at in an old apartment house (place is not defi ned)
16 – old (built in 1930s, 40s), but more modern apartment house, condominium
17 – fl at in housing estate, not block of fl ats
18 – fl at in a block of fl ats (in housing estate)
19 – condominium with garden that seems old
20 – condominium with garden that seems new
21 – cottage with garden (new and old)
22 – family residence with garden in city
23 – newly built condominium (without garden)
24 – housing park
25 – other in city
NN – DK
VV – NA
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61. How well did the respondent speak Hungarian? 
5  –  perfectly
4  –  
3  –  
2  –  
1  –  very poorly
Immigrants
62. How well did the respondent understand the questions? 
5  –  perfectly
4  –  
3  –  
2  –  
1  –  very poorly
Immigrants
63. Did the respondent use any external help? 
1 – yes------------------------- > What help was used? 
01 – dictionary
02 – family member/ acquaintance
03 – other, namely: ………………………
2 – no 
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Appendix 3 
RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULATED 
BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE CIVIC 
DISCUSSIONS  HOST SOCIETY
PRECONDITIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  The following ideas and recommendations for programmes cannot be 
implemented without the cooperation, active involvement of, or acceptance by, 
the host society, and they cannot be eff ective without substantively addressing 
those areas which are connected with the topics that aff ect the host society 
(such as the taxation system, education, healthcare, the situation of employment, 
administrative matters, etc.). 
2.  One general recommendation is that it is necessary to develop a Hungarian 
Demographic Strategy that addresses immigration and integration of immigrants. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Provision of information
1.  Local NGOs whose activities are connected with migrants should be encouraged 
to implement programmes which present the culture and problems of locally 
resident migrants to the local population or host society (through cultural 
programmes or sports events, etc.). The necessary resources could be provided 
by the local governments through project calls.
2.  Within the curricula of citizenship and social studies, migrant-related topics should 
be introduced both at primary and at secondary school level. It is recommended 
that time is spent on informing students about migrants’ rights and their status 
and on dispelling stereotypes about them. At such lessons, guest speakers from 
the respective cultural community could help by providing information to the 
children. 
3.  There is a need to conduct further research that focuses on the employment 
situation of migrants and the results of this research should be made available to 
society on a regular basis (e.g. through the Metropol newspaper or other widely-
available media).
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 In order to help dispel myths and promote a clearer view of the issue of 
migration, the following questions need to be addressed:
• How many people are immigrating/have immigrated to the country?
• How many of them work legally? How many pay taxes?
• During their stay, for what period do they have legal employment?
•  To what extent are they “useful” members of society? To what extent does 
society have a need for them?
Research could be fi nanced by the European Integration Fund. 
4.  The following subjects should be introduced within teacher training courses: 
introduction to foreign cultures and how to deal with immigrants. 
Administration
5.  Instructions in other languages than Hungarian should be created to assist 
migrants with fi lling out the forms required to apply for diff erent types of 
residence permits.
6.  During the process of recognising the qualifi cations of migrants, equivalence 
rules should be simplifi ed in a systematic way. The making of exceptions (or/and 
allowing further consideration) should be made possible for: 
•  teachers who are foreign nationals and who teach in a foreign language;
•  simplifying the process key professions or professions with a shortage of 
workers;
•  allowing temporary accreditation of migrants for a limited period, when 
justifi ed.
7.  Hungarian authorities should support preparation for the “equivalency 
examination” in the process of recognising qualifi cations obtained abroad.. This 
may be fi nanced through the following means:
•  Off ering discounted/preferential loans;
•  Providing state-subsidized loans, similar to how student loans are provided. 
8.  It is necessary to support the development and maintenance of preparation 
programmes for the above-mentioned equivalency examination. They may be 
fi nanced by: 
• the state; 
• local governments;
• EU projects; 
• involving foreign embassies in Hungary.
9.  There is a need to support the activities and strengthen the project application 
competencies of non-profi t organizations for migrants (or those whose work is 
connected to migrants), and to help and encourage employment of volunteers 
from the same cultural community.
10.  Foreign students who have completed their education in Hungary in Hungarian 
within the formal educational system should be enabled to obtain a permanent 
residence permit more quickly. Time spent living in the country (with a residence 
permit) for educational purposes should be recognized. 
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11.  In the case of persons with Hungarian ethnic origins who live in neighbouring 
countries, the administrative process of obtaining a permanent residence 
permit and citizenship status needs to be simplifi ed (not by shortening the 
waiting period but by rethinking and simplifying the conditions for obtaining 
the requisite documents). 
Knowledge of the language
12.  School age: Before a child starts going to a school class for their own age group, 
they should have the opportunity to learn Hungarian. After obtaining some 
basic linguistic competence, they should start going to an integrated school in 
order to be with other children.
 The realization of this recommendation could be achieved through the 
cooperation of schools and cultural centres, as described below. 
13. Adults: It is necessary to disseminate information about available language 
courses to the widest possible audience. There is a need to support the 
acquisition of basic Hungarian language skills. Possible fi nancial sources include:
• student loan type credit for immigrants;
• migrants’ own fi nancial sources.
The above-mentioned recommendations could be bought to fruition 
within an integrated structure: 
 It is necessary to establish cultural centres where there is a possibility to treat the 
problems of immigrants in an integrated way. The centres’ profi le for integrated 
activities could be established according to the diff erent needs of diff erent regions. 
Possible services to be provided: 
• language courses;
• transmission of culture; “Get to know our country” trips;
• assistance with administrative tasks;
• help with obtaining information;
• interest representation, legal assistance;
• focused “cultural encounters”, forums and roundtables.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULATED 
BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE CIVIC 
DISCUSSIONS  MIGRANTS 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
1. We recommend adopting good practices from other countries.
2.  We suggest that new research methods should be tested and that research 
methodology should be further developed (using both immigrants and members 
of the host society). 
3. We recommend ensuring that children are consulted about this topic.
LAWS AND LEGAL AWARENESS
We recommend that:
4.  The understanding of laws should be aided by the compiling and publishing 
of simplifi ed versions of legal texts (by creating multilingual brochures and 
employing migrants as counsellors). 
5. Laws should be simplifi ed.
6.  Instead of “patching up” relevant laws, they should be reformulated entirely (in 
order to make them more easily comprehensible). 
7. Jurisdictional matters should be made coherent.
8.  It should be compulsory to consult with migrants when legislation that concerns 
them is prepared. 
9.  There should be real equality before the law. If someone has “immigrant” status, 
their rights should not be limited – if an immigrant loses their job, they should 
be entitled to unemployment benefi ts and protection (so that they are not so 
exposed to blackmail). 
10.  Children of “immigrants” should not be limited in their rights (they should not be 
interrogated about where their parents work). 
11.  The “head quota” system should be applied to every child who goes to school.1
12.  A monitoring system should be introduced to check if regulations are observed 
and what the eff ects of those regulations are. 
1 Hungarian public education is mainly fi nanced by the central budget through a normative support known 
as the “head quota” provided after each student.
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13.  The directives of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 18th October 
2008 should be incorporated into Hungarian legislation.
14.  The 8-year waiting period necessary for acquiring citizenship should include 
the years spent at university – graduates of Hungarian universities should be 
entitled to special consideration. 
15.  The monopoly of the National Offi  ce for Translation and Attestation should be 
curtailed. 
16.  The required length of residency for a permanent residence permits should be 
shortened from 5 years to 3 years. 
17.  Laws which concern professional chambers should allow “immigrant” non-
citizens to become members of professional organizations under certain 
conditions.
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
We recommend that:
18.  Specifi c, tailored information about available services should be provided (e.g. 
posters and leafl ets about non-profi t organizations and links to the organizations 
on the website).
19.  A multilingual counselling service should be set up at the Offi  ce of Immigration 
and Nationality (OIN), where competent employees of the Offi  ce are able to 
provide information that is in accordance with offi  cial procedures and to provide 
personalized assistance as well. 
20.  Information should be available with regard to who can lodge complaints 
and under what conditions. There should be an evaluation system for the 
work of administrators, and their salaries should be performance-based. Client 
satisfaction should be measurable, and made more important. 
21.  OIN should have on-line access to the databases of the other administrative 
authorities. 
22.  It should be possible to manage administrative issues on-line.
23.  OIN’s human resource capacity should be increased; more clerks should be 
employed. 
24.  The client’s need for comfort should be taken into account by OIN: at least one 
toilet should be provided for each sex, there should be suitable waiting rooms 
(with a snack bar and internet access) and information points. A happier client 
is a better client :).
25.  Suitable selection, motivation and the continuous training of administrators 
who work at the offi  ce should be ensured. 
26.  Administrators should receive intercultural training at certain intervals (they 
should meet with “immigrants” in other settings as well).
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27.  There should be a quota system for the administrative staff  of OIN to ensure 
representation of each larger migrant group. These individuals should receive 
culture-specifi c training, as necessary.
28.  There should be opportunities (at least once or twice per week) for migrants 
to deal with administrative issues personally, including outside regular working 
hours.
29.  OIN should operate a “green number” that can be called after working hours, 
manned by selected employee(s) who are competent in a wide range of relevant 
issues and speak several languages. 
30.  Every client of OIN should have a single administrator designated to them 
personally so that they can talk to the same person every occasion (and clients 
should be able to meet with the administrator at an arranged time). 
EDUCATION, CULTURE, TOLERANCE
We recommend that:
31.  Media in the host society should take a bigger role in increasing the host society’s 
tolerance of immigrants. They should present more migrant communities, show 
balanced images of them and should not enhance negative stereotypes.
32.  The introduction of a migrant child to a new school class should follow a certain 
“ritual” (or given order: e.g. personal introduction, presentation of the cultural 
background, etc.)
33.  “Getting to know foreign cultures’ should be integrated into the compulsory 
school curriculum in the framework of multicultural lessons; cultural and leisure 
school activities together with members of immigrant communities should be 
organized from primary school level onwards. 
34.  Members of the police force should receive intercultural training so that they can 
effi  ciently and eff ectively deal with diff erent situations concerning immigrants. 
This type of training could be integrated into the core curriculum of Hungarian as 
a foreign language, where police offi  cers could meet with immigrants in person 
so that they in turn could also become informed about the competencies of the 
police force.
35.  The legal environment should be permissive, and legislation concerning 
associations should be simplifi ed so that migrant communities can form and 
operate associations easily.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE LANGUAGE
We recommend that:
36.  Children of migrant backgrounds, when entering a Hungarian school for the fi rst 
time, should not be allowed to study a foreign language as well as Hungarian 
simultaneously, but to study only Hungarian. There should be specially-assigned 
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schools in each district for this, where all the migrant children in the district 
could go to “Hungarian as a foreign language” classes. Course books suitable for 
various age groups should be provided for this purpose. 
37.  Professionally-trained immigrant and Hungarian volunteers should be involved 
in the teaching of Hungarian as a foreign language and of the native languages 
of migrant communities, both for children and for adults. 
38.  Further professional training opportunities for teachers of Hungarian as a foreign 
language should be provided.  
39.  Information about language learning and language teacher training should be 
made accessible to everybody (both recently arrived immigrants and those who 
have been resident for longer). 
EMPLOYMENT
We recommend that:
40.  A website should be created with information about employers who are known 
to welcome immigrant employees.
41.  A (private or state) intermediary company should be established which can 
take the burden of arranging paperwork for the immigrant workforce off  the 
shoulders of the employer.
42.  Administrative burdens connected to the employment of immigrant persons 
should be made lighter. 
43.  Immigrants who lose their jobs and hold only an interim permanent residence 
permit should not automatically lose their residence status, but there should be 
a period of tolerance (of at least three months). 
44.  The equivalency conditions for degrees obtained in foreign countries and the 
framework for professional training courses should be simplifi ed. 



